Issues and Problems in
 Other Insurance,  Multiple Insurance,
and Self-Insurance by Richmond, Douglas R.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 22 | Issue 4 Article 2
5-15-1995
Issues and Problems in "Other Insurance," Multiple
Insurance, and Self-Insurance
Douglas R. Richmond
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Insurance Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Douglas R. Richmond Issues and Problems in "Other Insurance," Multiple Insurance, and Self-Insurance, 22 Pepp. L. Rev. 4 (1995)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol22/iss4/2
Issues and Problems in
"Other Insurance," Multiple Insurance,
and Self-Insurance
Douglas R. Richmond*
I. INTRODUCTION ................................ 1375
11. OTHER INSURANCE AND MULTIPLE INSURANCE .......... 1376
A. What Constitutes "Other Insurance" and
"Multiple Insurance"? ...................... 1376
B. The "Other Insurance" and 'Multiple Insurance"
Bottom Line ............................. 1378
C. "Other Insurance" Clauses .................. 1379
1. Pro Rata Clauses ....................... 1382
2. Excess Clauses ....................... 1385
3. Escape and Excess Escape Clauses ........ 1386
4. Tailor-Made Clauses .................... 1387
III. RECONCILING "OTHER INSURANCE" CONFLICTS ......... 1387
A. Primary Policies With Similar "Other Insurance"
Clauses ................................. 1388
1. Pro Rata Clause v. Pro Rata Clause ........ 1388
2. Excess Clause v. Excess Clause ........... 1389
3. Escape Clause v. Escape Clause .......... 1391
B. Primary Policies With Dissimilar "Other
Insurance" Clauses: Majority Approaches ....... 1392
1. Pro Rata Clause v. Excess Clause ......... 1392
2. Pro Rata Clause v. Escape Clause ......... 1393
3. Excess Clause v. Escape Clause ........... 1394
C. Primary Policies With Dissimilar "Other
Insurance" Clauses: Minority Approaches ...... 1395
1. The Lamb-Weston Rule ................. 1395
2. The Minnesota Rule .................... 1397
* Associate, Armstrong Teasdale Schlafly & Davis, Kansas City, Missouri. B.S.,
Fort Hays State University, h.Ed., University of Nebraska; J.D., University of Kansas.
1373
D. Reconciling "Other Insurance" Clauses Involving
Excess and Umbrella Policies ................ 1399
1. Requiring an Excess Carrier to "Drop Down" . 1402
2. Allocating Liability Between Concurrent
Excess Insurers ....................... 1409
IV. STATE INSURANCE GUARANTY FUNDS AS
"OTHER INSURANCE"............................. 1411
V. DEDUCTIBLES AND STACKING ...................... 1414
A. Deductibles .............................. 1414
B. Stacking ................................ 1418
VI. APPORTIONING DEFENSE COSTS BETWEEN OR AMONG
CONCURRENT PRIMARY INSURERS ................... 1425
VII. ALLOCATING LOSSES AND APPORTIONING DEFENSE COSTS
AMONG OR BETWEEN CONSECUTIVE INSURERS:
"MULTIPLE INSURANCE" PROBLEMS .................. 1429
A. Coverage 'Triggers" . ...................... 1429
1. The "Exposure" Trigger ................. 1430
2. The "Actual Injury" or "Injury in Fact"
Trigger .............................. 1430
3. The "Manifestation" Trigger .............. 1431
4. The "Continuous Trigger" or
"Triple Trigger" Theory ................. 1432
B. Liability Insurance: Allocating Losses and
Apportioning Defense Costs ................. 1433
1. Exposure Trigger ...................... 1433
2. Actual Injury Trigger ................... 1435
3. Continuous Trigger .................... 1436
C. A Single Occurrence v. Multiple Occurrences .... 1439
D. The Special Problems of Property Insurance ..... 1443
VIII. SELF-INSURANCE ............................... 1447
A. Self-Insurance Mechanisms or Schemes ........ 1448
1. True Self-Insurance .................... 1448
2. Self-Insured Retentions ................. 1449
3. Fronting Policies ...................... 1449
4. Retrospective Premiums ................ 1450
B. SeV-Insurance as "Other Insurance"........... 1450
1. Self-Insurers v. Insurers in the Liability
Insurance Context ..................... 1450
2. Self-Insurance as "Other Insurance" for
Purposes of Determining Guaranty
Fund Liability ........................ 1456
C. Existence, Scope and Extent of Coverage ....... 1459
1. Fact v. Extent of Coverage .............. 1459
2. Scope of Coverage ..................... 1462
LX. CONCLUSION ................................. 1465
1374
[VoL 22: 1373, 1995] Issues in 'Other Insurance"
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
Theoretically a mere category of contract law, "insurance law" is now
a world unto itself. No area of insurance law spawns more practical
confusion than coverage disputes, due largely to insurers' chosen policy
language. One exasperated court observed:
Ambiguity and incomprehensibility seem to be the favorite tools of the insurance
trade in drafting policies. Most are a virtually impenetrable thicket of incompre-
hensible verbosity. It seems that insurers generally are attempting to convince the
customer when selling the policy that everything is covered and convince the
court when a claim is made that nothing is covered. The miracle of it all is that
the English language can be subjected to such abuse and still remain an instru-
ment of communication.'
Additional confusion and difficulty are created if two or more insur-
ance companies insure the same risk. Courts recognize that under such
circumstances, a single insurer should not be compelled to pay the entire
loss, but instead should be entitled to contribution from other insurers
pursuant to various formulas or theories. Problems involving multiple
insurers and the interaction of the "other insurance" clauses in their
policies are most perplexing
As if the problems posed by overlapping insurance coverage were not
sufficiently difficult, insurers and sophisticated commercial insureds have
developed a range of hybrid mechanisms for allocating risk. Precisely
because these arrangements are designed for differing and special cir-
cumstances, they vary widely and seldom are defined by standard insur-
ance industry policy forms.3 Perhaps best generically described as "self-
insurance," these customized arrangements are now woven into the fab-
ric of insurance disputes.
This Article examines the problems posed and the issues raised by
multiple insurance and interacting "other insurance" clauses in policies,
1. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 451 S.W.2d 616, 622-23
(Ky. Ct. App. 1970).
2. In Columbia Cas. Co. v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 282 Cal. Rptr. 389 (Ct
App. 1991), the court observed that the policy at issue was "[mlore a vehicle for
Jesuitical or Talmudic debate than a definition of the rights and obligations of the
parties .. . the policy crosses one's eyes and boggles one's mind." Id. at 396. The
court in Insurance Co. of North America v. Home & Auto Ins. Co., 628 N.E.2d 643
(IlL. App. Ct. 1993), noted that it was being drawn "deep into the catacombs of insur-
ance policy English, a dimly lit underworld where many have lost their way." Id. at
644.
3. William T. Barker, Combining Insurance and Sef Insurance: Issues for Han-
dling Claims, 61 DEF. CouNs. J. 352, 354 (1994).
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including loss allocation and the apportionment of defense costs. This
Article also addresses the developing area of self-insurance as it relates
to various indemnification schemes.
II. OTHER INSURANCE AND MULTIPLE INSURANCE
Addressing the issues raised when several insurers cover the same risk
requires an understanding of what constitutes "other insurance" and
"multiple insurance." It is also important to recognize common "other
insurance" clauses.
A. What Constitutes "Other Insurance" and "Multiple Insurance"?
"Other insurance" refers only to two or more policies insuring the
same risk, and the same interest, for the benefit of the same person,
during the same period.' Courts and litigants often liberalize this some-
what restrictive definition, describing the interplay between insurance
policies as though there were no requirement of concurrent policies.
Thus, consecutive policies may be thought to constitute "other insur-
ance," so long as the risk and insured interest superficially remain the
same. Such treatment or definition is seriously flawed, however, because
while successive policies might insure the same type of risk, they do not
insure the same risk. Moreover, so generous a definition wrongly sug-
gests that insurers might be liable for damages occurring outside their
policy periods. The fact that "other insurance" clauses in policies only
operate when there is concurrent coverage" highlights these definitional
4. See American Ins. Co. v. Freeport Cold Storage, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 1475, 1485
(D. Utah 1987); Nationwide Mut Ins. Co. v. Hall, 643 So. 2d 551, 561 (Ala. 1994); In-
surance Co. of N. Am v. Nicholas, 533 S.W.2d 204, 206 (Ark 1976); Nolt v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 617 A.2d 578, 579-84 (Md. 1993); McCormick v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 496 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Mass. App. Ct 1986); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire
Ins. Co., 444 N.W.2d 813, 819-20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 476
N.W.2d 392 (Mich.), rehg denied, 503 N.W.2d 442 (1991); Retail Sys., Inc. v. CNA Ins.
Cos., 469 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); B.K Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Michi-
gan Mut. Ins. Co., 612 N.Y.S.2d 198, 199 (App. Div. 1994); Mutual Benefit Ins. Co. v.
Goschenhoppen Mut. Ins. Co., 572 A.2d 1275, 1277 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); National
Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 425 S.E.2d 754, 757-58 n.4 (S.C. CL App.
1992); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Griffin, 888 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tex CL App.
1994).
5. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 235, 241 (4th Cir.
1990) (applying North Carolina law); In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 170 B.R. 222, 235-36
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (applying New York law); Pines of La Jolla Homeowners Ass'n v.
Indus. Indem., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53, 58-59 (CL App. 1992); Pafco Gen. Ins. Co. v. Provi-
dence Washington Ins. Co., 587 N.E.2d 728, 729 n.2 (Ind. Ct App. 1992); Continental
Cas. Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 859 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Mo. CL App. 1993); Owens-
Illinois, Inc. v. United In. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 991, 995 (N.J. 1994); Orsi v. Aetna Ins.
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problems. Accordingly, questions relative to consecutive policies should
be ascribed to "multiple insurance."
Concurrent coverage for the same risk can be the product of design,
coincidence, or the inadvertent purchase of overlapping policies. Com-
mon examples of designed co-insurance are the purchase of an umbrella
liability policy with specifically scheduled underlying policies, and the
purchase of multi-layered excess coverage above specifically scheduled
primary insurance or self-insurance.' Coincidental concurrent coverage
results when the driver of a non-owned automobile is a named insured
under his own policy as well as being covered by the onmibus clause in
the owner's policy,' where an insured driver rents a car from an insured
agency,8 or where a health care professional has personal malpractice
insurance and is simultaneously covered by a hospital's policy." There
may be an inadvertent overlap if an insured switches from occurrence
coverage to claims made coverage and suit is filed during the claims
made policy period for an alleged tort committed during the occurrence
policy period. Competing coverage under consecutive policies typically
occurs in toxic tort or environmental claims, where the alleged ijury or
damage spans several policy periods.10 Coverage under consecutive pol-
icies also becomes an issue in progressive property damage claims, such
as those resulting from earth movement or water leakage."
Co., 703 P.2d 1053, 1058 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985); see Transamerica Ins. Group v. Turn-
er Constr. Co., 601 N.E.2d 473, 476-77 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); Secura Ins. Co. v. Cin-
cinnati Ins. Co., 497 N.W.2d 230, 232 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); Northern States Power
Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657, 664 (Min. 1994); Board of Vocational
Educ. v. Janickl, 422 S.E.2d 822, 825 (W. Va. 1992).
6. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 631 So. 2d 30 (La.
CL App.), writ denied, 635 So. 2d 1108 (La. 1994); Globe Indem. Co. v. Jordan, 634
A.2d 1279 (Me. 1993); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mahin, 634 N.E.2d 1058
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993), jurisdictional motion overruled, 630 N.E.2d 378 (Ohio 1994).
7. E.g., Georgia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rollins, Inc., 434 S.E.2d 581 (Ga. CL App. 1993);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 883 S.W.2d 530 (Mo. CL App.
1994); Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. State Farm Ins. Co., 777 P.2d 353 (Mont. 1989);
Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Preferred Mut Ins. Co., 583 N.Y.S.2d 986 (App. Div. 1992);
Unisun Ins. Co. v. First S. Ins. Co., 443 S.E.2d 808 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994).
8. See, e.g., LAberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vanarkadie, 585 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. Dist. CL
App. 1991); Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 796 S.W.2d 763,
766-69 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
9. E.g., American Cas. Co. v. PHICO Ins. Co., 643 A.2d 91 (Pa. 1994).
10. E.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 811 F.
Supp. 210, 216-18 (D. Md. 1993); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 600 N.E.2d
176 (Mass. App. Ct.), review denied, 604 N.E.2d 35 (Mass. 1992).
11. See, e.g., Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 273 Cal. Rptr. 431
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B. The 'Other Insurance" and 'Multiple Insurance" Bottom Line
The reconciliation of "other insurance" and "multiple insurance" issues
is often irrelevant to insureds.' If a single policy will cover a claimed
loss, or if a single insurer will defend without reserving its rights, the
potential involvement of two or more insurers matters little to the in-
sured. However, the presence of another insurer on a particular risk is of
appreciable economic concern to all carriers.
Courts recognize that when two or more insurance companies insure
the same interest and the same risk, and one carrier is compelled to pay
the entire loss, the insurer that pays may be entitled to recover some
portion of its expenditure from its co-insurers." An insurer's right to
recover from another carrier on the same risk does not sound in contract
because there is no contractual relationship between the carriers."
Courts thus look to the basic equitable principle that "one who pays
money for the benefit of another is entitled to be reimbursed.""6 Some
courts allow insurers to recover from one another under a contribution
theory," while others follow equitable subrogation doctrine. Still other
(Ct. App. 1990); Cullen/Frost Bank v. Commonwealth Lloyd's Ins. Co., 852 S.W.2d 252,
256-58 (Tex. Ct App. 1993), error denied, 889 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1994).
12. This is not to say that "other insurance" clauses are entirely meaningless to
insureds. If a loss is covered by two concurrent policies, neither having an "other in-
surance" clause, it can be argued that the insured is entitled to full recovery under
both policies. See, e.g., Linn v. North Idaho Dist. Medical Serv. Bureau, Inc., 638 P.2d
876, 884 (Idaho 1981); Control Specialists Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 423
N.W.2d 775, 777 (Neb. 1988). Insureds may not hesitate to pursue double recovery.
See, e.g., Caballero v. Metropolitan Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co., 476 So. 2d 296, 297 (Fla.
Dist. Ct App. 1985); Costello v. Illinois Farmers Ins Co., 636 N.E.2d 710 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993).
13. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. James J. Benes & Assocs., Inc., 593 N.E.2d 1087,
1090 (Ill. App. CL), appeal denied, 602 N.E.2d 445 (ill. 1992). It logically follows that
if the insured interests and risks are not identical, there is no right to contribution.
Hall v. Country Cas. Ins. Co., 562 N.E.2d 640, 644 (Ill. App. Ct 1990).
14. Northern Ins. Co. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 955 F.2d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir.) (apply-
ing California law), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3033 (1992); Gould, Inc. v. Continental
Cas. Co., 585 A.2d 16, 18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
15. Carolina Can. Ins. Co. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 408 P.2d 198, 203 (Or. 1965).
16. MIC Prop. & Cas. Ins. Corp. v. International Ins. Co., 990 F.2d 573, 576-77
(10th Cir. 1993) (applying Oklahoma law); Gulf Ins. Co. v. American Family Mut. Ins.
Co., 962 F.2d 834, 835-36 (8th Cr. 1992) (applying Missouri law); Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Hall, 643 So. 2d 551, 561-62 (Ala. 1994); Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Fore-
most Ins. Co., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242, 254 (Ct App. 1993); United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 556 N.E.2d 671, 675 (Ill. App. CL 1990); Jefferson
Ins. Co. v. Health Care Ins. Exch., 588 A.2d 1275, 1277-78 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991); Continental Cas. Co. v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 609 N.E.2d 506, 513-14 (N.Y. 1993); J.
I. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 509 (Pa. 1993); TRW-Ti-
tie Ins. Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 832 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
17. See Hartford Accident & Indent Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 792 P.2d 749,
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courts apparently mix contribution and subrogation, or allow recovery on
either approach.8
While insurers' rights to contribution may be essentially equitable, they
are not purely so. The specific means by which co-insurers' risk is allo-
cated "must be determined not by an adjustment of equities, but by the
provisions of the contracts which they made."' Hence the significance
of "other insurance" clauses in concurrent policies.
C. 'Other Insurance" Clauses
"Other insurance" clauses originated in property insurance to discour-
age insureds from over-insuring, thereby reducing moral hazard.' They
became standard in many liability policies despite the remote possibility
that over-insurance would promote fraud.' For an "other insurance"
clause to be triggered, concurrent policies must cover the same interest.
If, for example, two persons have different insurable interests in the
same property, a loss affecting their distinct interests will not implicate
the "other insurance" clauses in their respective policies.'
Indemnity agreements between insureds or contracts with indemnifica-
752-54 (Ariz 1990); State v. Continental Cas. Co., 879 P.2d 1111, 1114-15 (Idaho 1994);
North Carolina Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Century Indem. Co., 444 S.E.2d 464, 472 (N.C. Ct.
App.), review denied, 448 S.E.2d 532 (N.C. 1994); Unisun Ins. Co. v. Hertz Rental
Corp., 436 S.E.2d 182, 186 (S.C. CL App. 1993); Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 614 A.2d 385, 387 (Vt. 1992).
18. See, e.g., Forum Ins. Co. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 711 F. Supp. 909, 914 (N.D. M11.
1989) (applying Illinois law); National Cas. Co. v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 833 P.2d
741, 747-48 (Colo. 1992); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 586 A.2d 567,
569-70 (Conn. 1991).
19. Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 764 P.2d 1256, 1259
(Kan. CL App. 1988), ofd, 775 P.2d 176 (Kan. 1989). Accord Isler v. Federated Guar.
Mut. Ins. Co., 567 So. 2d 1264, 1265 (Ala. 1990); American Economy Ins. Co. v. Mo-
torists Mut. Ins. Co., 593 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Ind. Ct App.), offd in part, vacated in
part on other grounds, 605 N.E.2d 162 (Ind. 1992); State Auto. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.
v. Gibbs, 444 S.E.2d 504, 507 (S.C. 1994); American Concept Ins. Co. v. Certain Un-
derwriters at Lloyds of London, 467 N.W.2d 480, 482 (S.D. 1991).
20. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bogart, 717 P.2d 449, 451 (Ariz. 1986); St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. American Home Assur. Co., 514 N.W.2d 113, 115
(Mich. 1994).
21. Bogart, 717 P.2d at 451; St. Paul, 514 N.W.2d at 115.
22. See, e.g., Western Agric. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Indem. Ins. Co., 838 P.2d 1353,
135657 (Ariz. CL App. 1992); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Western Cas. & Sur.
Co., 712 S.W.2d 722, 724-25 (Mo. CL App. 1986); Musselnman v. Mountain W. Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 824 P.2d 271, 275 (Mont. 1992).
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tion clauses, such as those commonly found in the construction industry,
may shift an entire loss to a particular insurer notwithstanding the exis-
tence of an "other insurance" clause in its policy.' Policy endorsements
may affect the allocation or apportionment of losses. For example, the
endorsement at issue in Woodson v. A & M Investments, Inc.' made
one carrier's policy primary and triggered a second insurer's excess
"other insurance" clause.' "Other insurance" clauses may be circum-
vented in certain regulated industries, such as transportation. In the case
of interstate motor carriers, for example, primary liability is determined
by Interstate Commerce Commission regulations.' Policy endorsements,
exclusions or terms also may sever an insurer's obligations when it might
otherwise appear that there is concurrent coverage.'
"Other insurance" clauses only affect insurers' rights among them-
selves; they do not affect the insured's right to recovery under each con-
current policy.' Inter-insurer loss allocation by way of "other insurance"
clauses never permits allocation of a loss to the insured. Payment of the
insured's claim always takes priority over the allocation of the loss be-
23. See, e.g., J. Walters Constr., Inc. v. Gilman Paper Co., 620 So. 2d 219, 220-21
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (applying Georgia law); Costello v. Times Square Hotel Co.,
567 N.Y.S.2d 231, 232 (App. Div. 1991).
24. 591 So. 2d 1345 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
25. Id. at 134748.
26. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Ins. Co., 801 P.2d 454, 455 (AriL Ct.
App. 1990); Planet Ins. Co. v. Gunther, 608 N.Y.S.2d 763, 767 (Sup. CL 1993); Ohio
Cas. Ins. Co. v. United S. Assur. Co., 620 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ohio CL App.), jurisdic-
tiona motion overru/ed, 619 N.E.2d 698 (Ohio 1993). But see Prestige Cas. Co. v.
Michigan Mut. Ins., 859 F. Supp. 1058, 1070-71 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
27. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 286 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Ct.
App. 1991); Englund v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 475 N.W.2d 369 (Mich. CL
App. 1991); Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Empire Ins. Co., 616 N.Y.S.2d 136, 137-38
(Sup. Ct. 1994); Universal Leaf Tobacco Co. v. Oldham, 439 S.E.2d 179 (N.C. CL
App.), review denied, 447 S.E.2d 412 (N.C. 1994); Mattheis v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co.,
487 N.W.2d 52 (Wis. Ct App. 1992). This situation often occurs in connection with
the "newly-acquired automobile" clause in automobile liability insurance policies, or
where a vehicle is sold and liability or 'no fault" coverage are an issue. See, e.g., Ha-
walan Ins. & Guar. Co., Ltd. v. Financial Sec. Ins. Co., 807 P.2d 1256 (Haw.), recon-
sideration denied, 841 P.2d 1074 (1991); Ellis v. Weger, 550 N.E.2d 1347 (Ind. CL
App. 1990); Northern Assur. Co. of Am. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 822 P.2d 46
(Kan. 1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut Ins. Group, 868 P.2d 110 (Utah Ct App.
1994).
28. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp. 1136,
1154 n.11 (D.N.J. 1993) (applying New Jersey law); Employers Reinsurance Corp. v.
Phoenix Ins. Co., 230 Cal. Rptr. 792, 798 (CL App. 1986); Zurich Ins. Co. v.
Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 494 N.E.2d 634, 650 (I1. App. Ct. 1986), affd
sub nom. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 514 N.E.2d 150 (111. 1987); Bazinet
v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 513 A.2d 279, 281 (Me. 1986); Slabic v. Hendrickson,
556 N.Y.S.2d 236, 237 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
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tween concurrent insurers.2 Finally, it must be noted that "other insur-
ance" clauses do not automatically operate to require contribution or
apportion losses. The insured must tender a claim to all concurrent in-
surers. If an insurer is not asked to respond to a claim by way of defense
or indemnity, those insurers accepting the insured's tender cannot later
seek contribution from the non-participating company. An "other insur-
ance" clause does not make an insurer a third-party beneficiary under its
insured's other concurrent policies.'
Insurance policies typically contain any of four "other insurance" claus-
es: "(1) the 'pro rata' clause, which provides that the insurer will pay its
share of the loss in the proportion its policy limits relates to the aggre-
gate liability coverage available;" (2) an "excess" clause, which provides
that an insurer will pay a loss only after other available primary insur-
ance is exhausted; (3) an "escape" clause, which provides that an insurer
is absolved of all liability if other coverage is available; and (4) an "ex-
cess escape" clause, which provides that the insurer is liable for that
amount of a loss exceeding other available coverage and that the insurer
is not liable when other available insurance has limits equal to or greater
than its own."' Some "other insurance" clauses specially crafted by indi-
29. See E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp. 124,
127 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
30. See Institute of London Underwriters v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 599 N.E.2d 1311,
1315 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
31. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 603 A.2d 300, 301 n.2 (R.I. 1992).
Another type of "other insurance" clause not discussed in this Article is a coor-
dination of benefits (COB) clause. COB clauses appear in health insurance plans and
policies. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc. v. Riverside Hosp., 703 P.2d
1384, 1387 (Kan 1985); City of Louisville v. McDonald, 819 S.W.2d 319, 320 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1991); Smith v. Physicians Health Plan, Inc., 514 N.W.2d 150, 152 (Mich. 1994);
Samuels v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 592 A.2d 1310, 1313-15 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991), appeal denied, 604 A.2d 250 (Pa. 1992). COB clauses provide that "if the same
hospital, medical or surgical risk is covered by more than one insurer, the insurance
carrier the company insuring with a COB provision in its policies may reduce the
amount of its payment by that payable from some other coverage. In other words,
the claimant may not recover twice." William C. Brown Co. v. General Am. Life Ins.
Co., 450 N.W.2d 867, 870-71 (Iowa 1990). Absent COB clauses in their policies, con-
current health insurers are obligated to pay all qualifying medical expenses. That a
patient or her beneficiaries may receive payments exceeding a hospital's charges is
no defense to the insurers' obligations to pay under their policies. Nahom v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Ariz., Inc., 885 P.2d 1113, 1119 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). "COB
provisions prescribe rules to determine when the carrier's obligation to pay is prima-
ry or secondary." William C. Brown Co., 450 N.W.2d at 871. If an obligation is "pri-
mary," the carrier pays all qualifying policy expenses. Id. "Secondary" means that the
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vidual insurers defy easy classification. Commentators and scholars
sometimes term such "other insurance" clauses "tailor-made."3
1. Pro Rata Clauses
Pro rata clauses usually call for sharing a loss in relation to the
insurers' respective liability limits.' A simple pro rata clause in an auto-
mobile liability policy may provide:
[I]f the insured has other similar insurance available to him... the Company shall
not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to which this Coverage applies
than the limits of liability hereunder bear to the sum of the applicable limits of lia-
bility of this insurance and such other insurance.'
A pro rata clause in a homeowners policy may provide: If a loss covered
by this policy is also covered by other insurance, we will pay only the
insurer's obligations are excess to all other applicable insurance. Id. at 871; see also
Arkansas Poultry Fed'n Ins. Trust v. Lawrence, 805 S.W.2d 663, 659 (Ark. Ct App.
1991). Simply statedi "COB provisions have as their primary characteristic a structure
of priority of claim payment which enables broad risk accident and health insurance
carriers to reduce the amount of premiums paid out by limiting the claimants to a
single payment of benefits for a single medical risk." William C. Broun Co., 460
N.W.2d at 871 (citing American Family Life Assur. Co. v. Blue Cross of Fla., Inc., 346
F. Supp. 267, 268-69 (S.D. Fla. 1972), offd, 486 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 905 (1974)).
32. See, e.g., BARRY R. OSTRAGER, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 285
(3d ed. 1990); Shaun McParland Baldwin & Dawn Midkiff, Apportioning Indemnity
and Dqfense Costs: The "Other Insurance" Clause and Other Theories of AUocation,
in SELECTED ISSUES IN INSURANCE COVERAGE AND PRACTICE (Def. Research Inst. 1990).
33. A few courts have attempted to prorate losses according to the premiums paid
for each of the subject policies. See, e.g., Indiana Ins. Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co.,
415 N.E.2d 80, 88-89 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). Following this approach, each insurer's
contribution is based on the percentage of premiums it received compared to the
total premiums paid to all insurers. The underlying theory is that the amount of the
premiums collected accurately reflects the amount of risk assumed by each insurer,
and therefore most fairly allocates the loss. ROBERT H. JERRY, H, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW 496 (1987). But prorating according to policy premiums can also be
unfair, because equal premiums seldom are paid for the same coverage. See Ruan
Transp. Corp. v. Truck Rentals, Inc., 278 F. Supp. 692, 695 (D. Colo. 1968) (criticizing
pro rata by premium approach because "many variables other than the maximum
amount of coverage" affect premium charges). For example, one concurrent insurer
may have received significantly greater premiums solely because its policy covered
additional insureds and additional risks. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co., 464 A.2d 431, 436-37 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). Under such circum-
stances, compelling the better compensated insurer to bear a larger portion of the
loss penalizes the company for issuing one policy when it could have issued several.
Moreover, this approach is practically unworkable and is so administratively expen-
sive as to be unfeasible. For these reasons the premium approach to pro rata alloca-
tion has been abandoned.
34. M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 654 S.W.2d 230, 234 n.4
(Mo. CL App. 1983).
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proportion of the loss that the limit of liability that applies under this
policy bears to the total amount of insurance covering the loss.
As case law concerning the effect of various "other insurance" clauses
developed, insurers modified their policy provisions in the pursuit of
economic advantage. The simple pro rata clause was a casualty of indus-
try advances, and its use is now mostly limited to automobile and home-
owner policies. Most comprehensive general liability (CGL) policies now
contain an "other insurance" amalgam. Today's standard CGL pro rata
clause provides:
When both this insurance and other Insurance apply to the loss on the same basis,
whether primary, excess or contingent, the company shall not be liable under this
policy for a greater proportion of the loss than that stated in the applicable contri-
bution provision below-
(1) Contribution by Equal Shares: If all of such other valid and collectible insur-
ance provides for contribution by equal shares, the Company shall not be liable
for a greater proportion of such loss than would be payable if each insurer con-
tributes an equal share until the share of each insurer equals the lowest applicable
limit of liability under any one policy or the full amount of the loss is paid, and
with respect to any amount of loss not so paid the remaining insurers then contin-
ue to contribute equal shares of the remaining amount of the loss until each such
insurer has paid its limit in full or the full amount of the loss is paid.
(2) Contribution by Limits: If any of such other insurance does not provide for
contribution by equal shares, the Company shall not be liable for a greater propor-
tion of such loss than the applicable limit of liability under this policy for such
loss bears to the total applicable limit of liability of all valid and collective insur-
ance against such loss.'
The difference in the amounts an insurer might have to contribute,
depending on whether pro rata indemnity is calculated by liability limits
or by equal shares, can be appreciable. The difference in the approach-
es-and thus the economic effect on co-insurers-is best understood by
way of example.' Assume a $700,000 loss, and three concurrent primary
liability policies providing aggregate coverage of $1,400,000. Insurer A has
$100,000 policy limits, Insurer B has policy limits of $300,000, and Insurer
C provides $1,000,000 in coverage. Allocating the loss by equal shares:
35. State of N.Y. v. Blank, 27 F.3d 783, 799 (2d Cir. 1994); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 756 F. Supp. 953, 955 (S.D. Miss. 1990).
36. Percentages and total have been rounded for simplification. For a similar ex-
ample, see Baldwin & Midkiff, supra note 32, at 48.
1383
Insurer A $100,000 + [Limits]
Insurer B $100,000 + 200,000 = $300,000
Insurer C $100,000 + 200,000 = $300,000
$700,000
Alternatively, allocating the same loss by policy limits:
Insurer A $100,000 = 7.14% of loss = $49, 980
$1,400,000
Insurer B $300,000 = 21.4396 of loss = $150,010
$1,400,000
Insurer C $1,000,000 = 71.43% of loss = $500,010
$1,400,000
The differences in the contribution by equal shares and by limits ap-
proaches to pro rata allocation can be illustrated with a smaller loss, as
well. Assume that an insured has two personal lines policies: Policy A
provides $50,000 in coverage, while Policy B has a $150,000 limit of liabil-
ity. The insured suffers an $80,000 loss covered by both policies. Were
the loss prorated by equal shares, each insurer would contribute $40,000.
Were the loss prorated by policy limits, on the other hand, Insurer A
would contribute $20,000 (because Insurer A wrote 25% of the total cov-
erage) and Insurer B would contribute $60,000.
As illustrated and expected, the insurer with the lowest policy limits
benefits when the loss is allocated by limits. The converse is true when
the loss is allocated by equal shares.'
37. See JERRY, supra note 33, at 495.
38. Kansas and some other jurisdictions take a different approach to proration by
equal shares. Assuming the $700,000 loss and $1,400,000 in available coverage from
the first example, Kansas courts would prorate the loss (in round numbers):
Insurer A $33,333 + [Linits] = $33,333
Insurer B $33,333 + 100,000 = $133,333
Insurer C $33,333 + 500,000 =
$700,000
Kansas courts thus prorate losses equally up to the limits of the lowest policy in
stages, first dividing the lowest policy limits among all three insurers, and then be-
tween two, with the largest insurer bearing the largest loss. In this example, Compa-
ny C's share is calculated as: $33,333 + 100,000 + 400,000 = $533,333. Company C
thus contributes equally with A and B at the first stage, and it contributes equally
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Of the two pro rata approaches, contribution by equal shares is proba-
bly the most logical. Each co-insurer has undertaken equally to insure
against low-level losses. Accordingly, the insurers should share losses
equally at lower levels." Opponents of the contribution by equal shares
approach might argue that it results in a windfall to insurers with higher
liability limits. In the $80,000 loss illustrated above, for example, the
insurers share the loss equally even though Company B's policy limits are
three times greater than Company A's. Under such circumstances, equal
loss allocation may appear inequitable. To the contrary, each insurer
received the same premiums up to the limit of the lowest policy, and the
insurers should therefore share the loss up to the lowest limit equally.'
Insurers with higher policy limits should not be required to subsidize
insurers with lower policy limits.4
2. Excess Clauses
An excess "other insurance" clause provides that the insurer's liability
is limited to the amount of the loss exceeding all other valid and collect-
ible insurance, up to the limits of the policy. A typical excess clause
might read: "This insurance shall apply only as excess insurance over any
other valid and collectible insurance which would apply in the absence
of this policy, except insurance written specifically to cover as excess
over the limits of liability applicable to... this policy."'
Some courts dislike excess "other insurance" clauses.' This disfavor
results from the court's realization that an excess clause is "a self-serving
provision that attempts to make [a primary] insurer only secondarily
liable" when other available coverage exists." In sum, a primary insurer
should not be able to avoid a loss when it bargained for the risk.
with B (matching A's $100,000 policy limits) at the second stage. Under this minority
approach, Insurer C bears the greatest loss when contributing by equal shares, just as
it would were the loss prorated by policy limits.
39. JERRY, supra note 33, at 496.
40. Ld.
41. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 479 A.2d 289, 293 (DeL
Super. Ct. 1983).
42. Deerfield Management Co. v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 529 N.E.2d 243, 248 (II.
App. C 1988).
43. See, e.g., Federal Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 638 So. 2d 1132,
1135-36 (La CL App. 1994) (refusing to give effect to excess clause).
44. Penton v. Hotho, 601 So. 2d 762, 764-65 n.3 (La. CL App. 1992).
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3. Escape and Excess Escape Clauses
An escape clause provides that the insurer is not liable if any other
coverage is available." A simple escape clause typically states: "Provid-
ed that where the Assured is, irrespective of this insurance, covered or
protected against any loss or claim which would otherwise have been
paid by the Assurer, under this policy, there shall be no contribution by
the Assurer on the basis of double insurance or otherwise. 4
Escape clauses are often more broadly drafted. All-inclusive escape
clauses are commonly referred to as "super-escape" clauses.4, A super-
escape clause may provide: "This insurance does not apply... to any
liability for such loss as is covered on a primary, contributory, excess or
any other basis by insurance in another insurance company. "'
In addition to simple escape and super-escape clauses, insurers also
employ hybrid "excess escape" clauses. An excess escape clause provides
that the insurer is liable for the amount of the loss exceeding the limits
of other available insurance, and that the insurer is not liable where the
limits of other available coverage equal or exceed its own.' For exam-
ple:
If... the insured has other insurance, whether on a primary, excess or contingent
basis, there shall be no insurance afforded hereunder... ; provided, that if the
limit of liability of this policy is greater than the limit of liability provided by other
insurance, this policy shall afford excess insurance over and above such other
insurance in an amount sufficient to give the insured, as respects the layer of
coverage afforded by this policy, a total limit of liability equal to the limit of lia-
bility afforded by this policy.'
Excess escape clauses are common in uninsured motorist coverage. For
example:
With respect to bodily irury to an insured while occupying an automobile not
owned by the named insured, Uninsured Motorists Coverage shall apply only as
excess insurance over any other similar insurance available to such insured and
applicable to such automobile as primary insurance, and this insuranceshall then
apply only in the amount by which the limit of liability for this coverage exceeds
the applicable limit of liability of such other Insurance.'
45. Brown v. Travelers Ins. Co., 610 A.2d 127, 128 (R.L 1992).
46. Elf Exploration, Inc. v. Cameron Offshore Boats, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 386, 392
(E.D. Tex. 1994).
47. See, e.g., Automobile Underwriters, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 874 F.2d
188, 191 (3d Cir. 1989) (describing clause as "super-escape/reduced limits clause")..
48. Baldwin & Mldldff, supra note 32, at 49; see also Hodgen v. Forest Oil Corp.,
862 F. Supp. 1567, 1577 (W.D. La. 1994) (similar language in marine protection and
indemnity policy).
49. Broum, 610 A.2d at 128; see also McDonald v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 478
N.E.2d 571, 574 (1l. App. Ct. 1985).
50. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Continental Cas. Co., 575 F.2d 1070, 1072 (3d Cir.
1978).
61. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co., 599 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Kan. Ct. App.
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No matter how they are classified, escape clauses are disfavored. Es-
cape clauses are frequently viewed as being contrary to public policy.2
4. Tailor-Made Clauses
Some "other insurance" clauses are difficult to classify because they
are drafted by individual insurers for particular risks. For example, the
hybrid pro rata/excess clause at issue in Firemen's Insurance Co. v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.5 provided:
If the Insured has other insurance against a loss covered by Part I of this policy,
the Company shall not be liable under this policy for a greater proportion of such
loss than the applicable limit of liability stated in the declarations bears to the
total applicable limit of liability of all valid and collectible insurance against such
loss; provided, however, the insurance with respect to a temporary substitute
automobile or non-owned automobile shall be excess over any other valid and
collectible insurance."
Although tailor-made clauses may suit the objectives of the immediate
contracting parties, their special characteristics often clash with "other
insurance" clauses in policies purchased to share specific losses. What
appears to be primary coverage may thus become excess, or intended
pro rata loss allocation may be circumvented.'
Ill. RECONCILING "OTHER INSURANCE" CONFLICTS
The presence of "other insurance" predictably results in litigation be-
tween insurers. Courts hearing disputes between concurrent insurers
have formulated certain principles for resolving conflicts. Some situa-
tions permit a straightforward approach to resolution. For example,
where neither of the two policies at issue contains an "other insurance"
clause, courts prorate liability between the two insurers' or require
1979); see also Childs v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 531 A.2d 723, 724 (N.J. 1987)
(very similar clause).
52. CSE Ins. Group v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120, 124 (Ct
App. 1994); Fryer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 A.2d 225, 226-28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
53. 411 P.2d 271 (Or. 1966).
54. Id. at 272.
55. See, e.g., Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of the State of Pa.,
638 So. 2d 102 (Fla Dist Ct. App. 1994) (reversing declaratory judgment for pro rata
allocation and designating one insurer to pay primary and one to pay excess cover-
age).
56. See Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958,
960 (9th Cir. 1952); United Servs. Auto Ass'n v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 355 P.2d 143,
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them to share the loss equally. 7 As the vintage of the supporting cases
suggests, the proliferation of "other insurance" clauses has virtually elim-
inated this simple problem. In the more likely scenario where one policy
contains an "other insurance" clause and the competing policy does not,
courts generally give effect to the lone "other insurance" clause. ' This
rule reflects a judicial effort to effectuate the insurers' intent.
Real problems surface when both or all of the policies at issue contain
"other insurance" clauses. Policies may have similar "other insurance"
clauses, or dissimilar "other insurance" clauses.
A. Primary Policies With Similar "Other Insurance" Clauses
1. Pro Rata Clause v. Pro Rata Clause
Where both policies contain pro rata clauses, the traditional rule has
been to hold insurers liable for the proportion of the subject loss that the
face amount of each insurer's policy bears to the total amount of valid
and collectible insurance.' The contribution by limits method has been
144 (N.M. 1960).
57. See, e.g., Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 147 A.2d 529, 534
(N.J. 1959).
58. Transport Indem. Co. v. Paxton Nat'l Ins. Co., 657 F.2d 657, 660 (5th Cir. 1981)
(applying Mississippi law), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982); Fremont Indem. Co. v.
New England Reinsurance Co., 815 P.2d 403, 405-06 (Ariz. 1991); United States Fideli-
ty & Guar. Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 842 P.2d 208, 214 (Colo. 1992); South-
ern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Boerste, 394 S.E.2d 566, 567-68, 70 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); Carriers
Ins. Co. v. American Policyholders' Ins. Co., 404 A.2d 216, 218 (Me. 1979); Nationwide
Ins. Co. v. Auto-Owners Mut. Ins. Co., 525 N.E.2d 508, 512 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Co-
operators Ins. Co. v. Allstate Rent-A-Car, 804 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Nev. 1991); White v.
Howard, 573 A.2d 513, 514-16 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert denied, 585 A.2d 354
(NJ. 1990); see also City of Old Town v. American Employers Ins. Co., 858 F. Supp.
264, 270-71 (D. Me. 1994) (enforcing escape clause where competing policy's "other
insurance" clause stated it was primary and did not apportion liability); Safeco Ins.
Co. of Am. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 983, 987-88 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (giving
effect to escape clause where one insurer's "other insurance" clause simply stated
that its policy was primary, and did not attempt to allocate or apportion liability);
Honeywell, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 441 N.E.2d 348, 349-51 (11. App. Ct
1982) (holding as primarily liable the insurer whose excess clause was silent on al-
location or apportionment versus the second insurer's "other insurance clause");
Integon Gen. Ins. Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 394 S.E.2d 209, 210-11
(N.C. Ct App. 1990) (finding that "other insurance" clause clearly declared policy's
coverage as primary). But see Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hall, 643 So. 2d 551, 561-
62 (Ala. 1994) (requiring insurers to share loss pro rata by limits even though one
policy did not have an "other insurance" clause).
59. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 889 F.2d 174, 179-81 (8th
Cir. 1989); Compton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 870 P.2d 545, 547-48 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1993); General Accident Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 602
N.Y.S.2d 948, 951-52 (App. Div. 1993); Tarolli v. Continental Cas. Co., 581 N.Y.S.2d
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subject to criticism, however, because it ignores the economic reality
that the cost of insurance does not increase proportionately with policy
limits. Furthermore, the fact that a company insures a party against ma-
jor losses should be of no significance when considering that insurer's
relative liability for a small loss.' Accordingly, the current preference is
for contribution by equal shares, whereby two or more insurers share the
loss equally until the lowest policy is exhausted." Certainly, insurers are
required to contribute by equal shares where both policies' "other insur-
ance" clauses so provide-even if the clauses alternatively provide for
pro rata contribution by limits.'
2. Excess Clause v. Excess Clause
When two primary policies both contain excess "other insurance"
clauses, courts generally treat the excess clauses as mutually repugnant
and prorate the loss between the insurers. 0 As the court explained in
510, 511 (App. Div. 1992); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 429 S.E.2d
406, 409 (N.C. Ct App. 1993); Equity Mut Ins. Co. v. Spring Valley Wholesale Nurs-
ery, Inc., 747 P.2d 947, 954 (Okia 1987); Mission Ins. Co. v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 683
P.2d 215, 220 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Continental
Cas. Co., 498 N.W.2d 247, 249-50 (Wis CL App.), revie denied, 501 N.W.2d 459
(Wis. 1993).
60. OSTRAGER, supra note 32, at 403.
61. See, e.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 753 F.2d 1288,
1292 (4th Cir. 1985) (applying District of Columbia law); Arkansas Poultry Fed'n Ins.
Trust v. Lawrence, 805 S.W.2d 653, 660-61 (Ark. Ct App. 1991); Western Cas. & Sur.
Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 657 P.2d 576, 580-82 (Kan. 1983); Nolt v. Unit-
ed States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 617 A.2d 578, 582 (Md. 1993); Mission Ins. Co. v.
United States Fire Ins. Co., 517 N.E.2d 463, 468 (Mass. 1988); Tracey Road Equip.,
Inc. v. Village of Johnson City, 571 N.Y.S.2d 586, 589 (App. Div. 1991); North Carolina
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 403 S.E.2d 151, 153
(S.C. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 411 S.E.2d 425 (S.C. 1991); Odessa Sch. Dist. No.
105 v. Insurance Co. of Am., 791 P.2d 237, 243-44 (Wash. Ct App.), appeal dis-
missed, 804 P.2d 9 (Wash. 1990).
62. See, e.g., State v. Blank, 27 F.3d 783, 798-99 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying New York
law); Aviles v. Burgos, 783 F.2d 270, 281-83 (1st Cir. 1986); Liberty MuL Ins. Co. v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 756 F. Supp. 953, 956-57 (S.D. Miss. 1990);
Holyoke Mut Ins. Co. v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 386 S.E.2d 524, 526-27 (Ga. Ct. App.
1989); Insurance Co. of N. An. v. Home & Auto Ins. Co., 628 N.E.2d 643, 644-46 (ll1
App. CL 1993).
63. Indiana Ins. Co. v. Mission Nat'l Ins. Co., 874 F.2d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 1989) (ap-
plying Washington law); Hennes Erecting Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 813
F.2d 1074, 1077 (10th Cir. 1987) (applying Kansas law); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Unit-
ed Int'l Ins. Co., 762 F. Supp. 1470, 1474 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (applying Alabama law),
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Federal Insurance Co. v. Atlantic National Insurance Co.:"
If we were to take the language literally and give effect to each of these [excess]
"other insurance" clauses, we would be required to conclude that neither policy
provided primary coverage. But that would be a logical impossibility since, quite
obviously, there can be no excess insurance absent a policy providing primary
coverage and, in the absence of such other policy, each would be primary. To give
effect to the excess clause in either of the policies would defeat the similar provi-
sion in the other and it follows, therefore, that the "excess" clauses operate to
cancel out each other, both coverages must be treated as primary and each com-
pany is obligated to share in the cost of the settlement and the expenses.'
There is some question as to whether the general rule holds true when
one of the excess clauses at issue is a hybrid "excess escape" clause.
This uncertainty is compounded by a relative lack of precedent. Some
courts follow the general rule and hold that the clauses cancel out each
other,' while other jurisdictions give effect to the excess escape
clause.'7
a~fd, 932 F.2d 1443 (lth Cir. 1991); Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
735 F. Supp. 15, 17-18 (D. Me. 1990) (applying Maine law); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Pacific Indem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 140, 143 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (applying Pennsylvania
law); Arkansas Poultry Fed'n Ins. Trust v. Lawrence, 805 S.W.2d 653, 660-61 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1991); CSE Ins. Group v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120,
122-23 (Ct. App. 1994); Empire Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 764 P.2d
1191, 1199 (Colo. 1988); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Executive Car & Truck Leasing, Inc., 494
So. 2d 487, 489 (Fla. 1986); Georgia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southern Gen. Ins. Co., 351
S.E.2d 658, 659 (Ga Ct. App. 1986); Continental Nat'l Am. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life &
Cas. Co., 542 N.E.2d 954, 958 (IIl. App. Ct. 1989); Motor Club of Iowa Ins. Co. v.
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 508 N.W.2d 634, 637-38 (Iowa 1993); Dean v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 518 So. 2d 1115, 1118 (La Ct. App. 1987), writ denied, 522 So. 2d
1096 (La. 1988); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 638 A.2d 1220,
1224 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); National Indem. Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys, Inc.,
489 N.W.2d 175, 176-77 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Polenz v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 419
N.W.2d 677, 684 (Neb. 1988); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 592
A.2d 515, 517 (N.H. 1991); Rogers v. Snappy Car Rental, Inc., 639 A.2d 1154, 1160
(NJ. Super. Ct. Law Dlv. 1993); Lumber Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co.,
588 N.Y.S.2d 630, 631 (App. Div. 1992), appeal denied, 616 N.E.2d 159 (N.Y. 1993);
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 429 S.E.2d 406, 409 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993); Erie Ins. Group v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 585 N.E.2d 464, 471 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1989); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 353 S.E.2d 894,
896-97 (Va. 1987). But see Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 579 N.Y.S.2d
207, 209 (App. Div.) (holding that excess clause "indicating a higher level of cover-
age" is given effect over competing excess clause), appeal denied, 602 N.E.2d 232
(N.Y. 1992).
64. 250 N.E.2d 193 (N.Y. 1969).
65. Id. at 194-95 (emphasis in original).
66. Fremont Indem. Co. v. New Eng. Reinsurance Co., 815 P.2d 403, 407 (Ari.
1991).
67. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 983 F.2d 1549, 1560-61 (10th Cir.
1993) (applying Utah law); R11 Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 980 F.2d
120, 122-24 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying Connecticut law).
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There are exceptions to the general rule that excess clauses cancel out
each other. For example, if one policy specifically states that it provides
excess coverage above another designated primary policy, courts will
enforce the excess clause and only the designated policy will be prima-
ry.? Perhaps the most common exception arises in the context of state
financial responsibility laws mandating automobile liability insurance and
uninsured motorist coverage. If an insured is driving a vehicle he does
not own and the owner's insurance policy provides concurrent coverage,
the owner's policy will be deemed primary even if both policies contain
excess "other insurance" clauses.' This result is mandated by standard
automobile policy language providing that the owner's policy is excess
only with respect to non-owned covered automobiles. Simply stated,
automobile insurance "follows the automobile, rather than the driver.""
3. Escape Clause v. Escape Clause
f courts enforced competing escape clauses, insureds would be left
without coverage. At the same time, there is no rational means by which
one insurer's escape clause might be enforced, and another concurrent
insurer held liable. Therefore, when two or more concurrent policies
contain "other insurance" provisions that can be categorized as escape
clauses, courts generally deem the clauses mutually repugnant and pro-
rate the loss between the insurers.' This general rule holds true when
68. See Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 417 N.E.2d 66, 67-68 (N.Y.
1980).
69. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. CNA Ins. Co., 606 A.2d 990, 993-94 (Conn. 1992);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co., 604 A.2d 384, 390 (DeL
1992); Jones v. Wortham, 411 S.E.2d 716, 718 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Employers Mut Cas. Co., 500 N.W.2d 80, 83 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993);
Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 638 A.2d 1220, 1224-25 (Md. CL
Spec. App. 1994); Boren v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 406 N.W.2d 640, 644 (Neb.
1987); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 592 A.2d 515, 516-17 (N.H.
1991); Royal Ins. Co. v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co., 638 A.2d 924, 927 (NJ. Super. Ct App.
Div. 1994); State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 444 S.E.2d 504, 507 (S.C. 1994);
Union Ins. Co. v. Farmland Ins. Co., 389 N.W.2d 820, 822 (S.D. 1986); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 791, 796 (W. Va.
1989). But see John Deere Ins. Co. v. West Am. Ins. Group, 854 P.2d 1201, 1202-04
(Arlz. Ct. App. 1993) (competing garage owners' liability policies); United Servs. Auto.
Ass'n v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 420 S.E.2d 155, 157-58 (N.C. 1992) (garage
owner's liability policy at issue).
70. Allstate Ins. Co. v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 364 S.E.2d 30, 33 (W. Va. 1987).
71. See Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Pike, 977 F.2d 1278, 1279-80 (8th Cir.
1992) (applying Arkansas law); Guidry v. CSI Blasters/Painters, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 435,
1391
both conflicting clauses are of the "excess escape" variety.' Conflicting
"super-escape" clauses should also be declared mutually repugnant, since
the enhanced exculpatory language does not affect their basic character.
B. Primary Policies With Dissimilar "ther Insurance" Clauses:
Majority Approaches
When faced with dissimilar "other insurance" clauses, most courts
attempt to reconcile the clauses in a manner that will give effect to the
intent of the parties. This approach is consistent with traditional contract
law.
1. Pro Rata Clause v. Excess Clause
It is common in concurrent coverage situations for one policy to con-
tain a pro rata "other insurance" clause and the other policy to include
an excess clause. Under the majority rule, the policy with the excess
clause is treated as true excess coverage and the insurer is liable only
after the primary coverage provided by the policy with the pro rata
clause is exhausted." The relationship between pro rata and excess
437 (W.D. La. 1989), ,ffd, 921 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying Louisiana law);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 478 So. 2d 363, 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985), review denied, 488 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1986); Centennial Ins. Co. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 524 A.2d 110, 115-16 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 530 A.2d
273 (Md. 1987); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chappell, 246 So. 2d 498, 504 (Miss. 1971);
Crown Ctr. Redevelopment Corp. v. Occidental Fire & Cas. Co., 716 S.W.2d 348, 361-
62 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Carlino v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 546 N.E.2d 909, 912
n.3 (N.Y. 1989).
72. Arizona Joint Underwriting Plan v. Glacier Gen. Assur. Co., 631 P.2d 133, 134-
35 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); see also Perez Trucking, Inc. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc.,
886 P.2d 196, 200-201 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (noting pro rata approach hinged on
special facts involving insured tractor-trailer rig).
73. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Cas. Co., 642 F. Supp. 180, 185 (D.
Wyo. 1986) (applying Wyoming law); Alta Cal. Regional Ctr. v. Fremont Indem. Co.,
30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 841, 847 n.1 (Ct. App. 1994); United States Auto. Ass'n v. Hartford
Ins. Co., 468 So. 2d 545, 547 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 476 So. 2d 676
(Fla. 1985); Home Indem. Co. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 572 N.E.2d 962,
964 (11. App. Ct. 1991); Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Globe Am. Cas. Co., 426
N.W.2d 635, 638 (Iowa 1988); Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co.,
764 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988), affd, 775 P.2d 176 (Kan. 1989); Hartford
Ins. Co. v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 766 S.W.2d 75, 76-77 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989);
Fros v. Bullock, 639 So. 2d 1218, 1221 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 644 So. 2d 391
(La. 1994); Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 485 A.2d 242,
243-44 (Me. 1984); Nolt v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 617 A.2d 578, 582 (Md.
1993); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. American Home Assur. Co., 514 N.W.2d 113,
118-21 (Mich. 1994); Mountain W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Credit Gen. Ins. Co.,
805 P.2d 569, 570-71 (Mont. 1991); Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Crum & Forster Personal
Ins., 588 A.2d 385, 388-89 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1990); Belmer v. Nationwide Mut.
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"other insurance" clauses was succinctly explained in Jones v. Medox,
Inc.:'
[Tihe standard phrase "other valid and collectible insurance" [in an excess clause]
means other valid and collectible primary insurance. It follows, then, that the
policy containing the pro rata clause is other valid and collectible primary insur-
ance that triggers application of the excess clause in the second policy. The ex-
cess clause in the second policy therefore is given full effect and that carrier is
liable only for the loss after the primary insurer has paid up to its policy limits.
The policy containing the excess clause, however, is not considered to be other
valid and collectible primary insurance for the purpose of triggering the operation
of the pro rats clause, because when a stated contingency occurs, that is, when
there is other valid and collectible primary insurance available to the insured, the
policy containing the excess clause becomes secondary coverage only.'
This reasoning might justifiably be attacked as circular, inasmuch as it
appears to depend on which competing policy is read first. Even so, the
majority approach is consistent with the insurers' intent as expressed in
their policies. Were courts to enforce the pro rata clause and instead or-
der proration, "they would effectively deny the terms and intent of the
excess clause."" Additionally, an insurer's use of a pro rata clause ex-
pressly recognizes primary liability up to the policy's liability limits."
2. Pro Rata Clause v. Escape Clause
If one primary policy contains a pro rata "other insurance" clause and
a second policy contains an escape clause, the insurer with the escape
clause in its policy will prevail. The policy containing the escape clause
Ins. Co., 599 N.Y.S.2d 427, 429 (Sup. Ct. 1993); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co., 420 S.E.2d 155, 156-57 (N.C. 1992); Transamerlca v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 463 N.W.2d 641, 643-44 (N.D. 1990); Shelby Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N.
Am., 601 N.E.2d 210, 213-14 (Ohio CL App. 1991); Equity Mut. Ins. Co. v. Spring
Valley Wholesale Nursery, Inc., 747 P.2d 947, 954 (Oki. 1987); American Cas. Co. v.
PHICO Ins. Co.,. 643 K2d 91, 94-95 (Pa. 1994); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 147, 149 (S.D. 1978); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 396 S.E.2d 658, 660-61 (Va. 1990); Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Cameron, 724 P.2d 1096, 1102 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986); Duncan v. Ehrhard, 461 N.W.2d
822, 825 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
74. 430 A.2d 488 (D.C. 1981).
75. Id. at 491.
76. LInda K. Hasse, Comment, Is There a Solution to the Circular Riddle? The
Effect of "Other Insurance" Clauses on the Public, the Courts, and the Insurance
Industry, 25 S.D. . REV. 37, 44 (1980).
77. Federated Am. In. Co. v. Hansen, 563 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977)
(quoting General Ins. Co. v. State Farm Ins. Co., 449 P.2d 391, 393 (Wash. 1969)).
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does not constitute other valid and collectible insurance within the
meaning of the competing pro rata clause. Conversely, the policy with
the pro rata clause is the "other insurance" that gives effect to the es-
cape clause. The insurer with the pro rata clause in its policy therefore
bears the loss.T
3. Excess Clause v. Escape Clause
When confronted with two concurrent primary policies, one containing
an excess "other insurance" clause and the other containing an escape
clause, courts' responses are mixed. It is presently impossible to state a
majority rule." A court may follow the traditional rule and deem the
policy with the escape clause primary and require its exhaustion before
applying the policy with the excess clause.' One reason for this ap-
proach is fundamental judicial dislike for escape clauses, regardless of
circumstance. Alternatively, a court may find that a policy with an excess
clause is not "other valid and collectible insurance," and the escape
clause therefore never operates. Other jurisdictions enforce the escape
clause.8' Still other courts deem the clauses mutually repugnant and pro-
rate the loss.' Similarly unsettled is the question of how to reconcile
the conflict between an excess clause and a super-escape clause. Some
courts hold that the insurer with the super-escape clause is absolved of
liability,' while others take the time honored approach and make the
78. See, e.g., Efferson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 816 F. Supp. 1103, 1119
(E.D. La. 1993); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 604 N.E.2d 30, 32
(Mass. 1992).
79. The excess clause versus escape clause conflict has long tormented courts. The
Supreme Court of Texas once labeled the attempted resolution of conflicting excess
and escape clauses a "circular riddle." Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farm-
ers Ins. Exch., 444 S.W.2d 583, 589 (Tex. 1969).
80. American Home Assur. Co. v. Fish, 451 A.2d 358, 359 (N.H. 1982); Horace
Mann Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 284 S.E.2d 211, 214 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981); Con-
necticut Indem. Co. v. Cordasco, 535 A.2d 631, 633-34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). Cf.
Mosca v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 541 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530 (App. Div. 1989) (holding that
insurer with "non-liability clause" in policy is primarily liable while insurer with ex-
cess "other insuralice" clause is secondarily liable).
81. Hodgen v. Forest Oil Corp., 862 F. Supp. 1567, 1577 n.43 (W.D. La. 1994) (ap-
plying Louisiana law); State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co. v. Burgin, 752 F. Supp. 877,
884-86 (W.D. Ark. 1990) (applying Arkansas law); State Auto. Mut Ins. Co. v. Ryder
Truck Rental, Inc., 627 So. 2d 1326, 1327-28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied,
639 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1994); State Farm MuL Auto. Ins. Co. v. Western Cas. & Sur.
Co., 477 S.W.2d 421, 427 (Mo. 1972) (discussing the escape clause in garage owner's
policy versus excess clause in auto policy); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 571 N.Y.S.2d 735, 745 (App. Div. 1991); Government Employees Ins. Co. v.
Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 350 S.E.2d 612, 615-16 (Va. 1986).
82. Home Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 641 N.E.2d 855, 857 (I1. App. Ct. 1994);
Dette v. Covington Motors, Inc., 486 So. 2d 805, 807 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
83. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 632 N.E.2d 402, 404-05
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insurer with the excess clause in its policy only secondarily liable.'
Not all courts adhere to traditional rules when excess "other insur-
ance" clauses conflict with escape or super-escape clauses. In Brown v.
Travelers Insurance Co.,' the Supreme Court of Rhode Island faced the
issue of how to reconcile an excess clause and a super-escape clause.
The Brown court did not differentiate between simple and super-escape
clauses," but nonetheless declined to apply the majority rule. Fearing
that ruling for either of the two insurers involved "would lend more am-
munition to the battle of the drafters," and not wishing to "encourage the
complication of insurance legerdemain" at the expense of courts and
policyholders, the Brown court required both insurers to afford pro rata
liability.Y
C. Primary Policies With Dissimilar "Other Insurance" Clauses:
Minority Approaches
1. The Lamb-Weston Rule
Some courts avoid the "other insurance" fray by adopting the simple
rule that all "other insurance" clauses are mutually- repugnant and are
therefore unenforceable. Sometimes referred to as the "Oregon Rule,"
this approach is best known as the "Lamb-Weston Rule," named after the
Oregon case Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Automobile Insurance Co.'
(Mass. 1994); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 429 S.E.2d 406, 409 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1993).
84. See, e.g., Protective Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 361 So. 2d 1058, 1059-60 (Ala. 1978).
85. 610 A.2d 127 (R.I. 1992).
86. Id. at 130. The court found that the conflict between an escape clause in one
policy and an excess clause in the other "is more readily resolved by requiring both
insurers to afford pro-rata liability." Id.
87. Id. Accord Aid Ins. Co. v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 445 N.W.2d 767, 769-71 (Io-
wa 1989).
88. 341 P.2d 110 (Or. 1959), modified and rehg denied, 346 P.2d 643 (1959). The
Lamb-Weston rule was actually introduced seven years earlier by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Oiegon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195
F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1952). Applying Oregon law, the Court of Appeals held.
[T]he "other insurance" provisions of the two policies are indistinguishable in
meaning and Intent. One cannot rationally choose between them .... Here,
where both policies carry like "other insurance" provisions, we think they
must be held mutually repugnant and hence be disregarded. Our conclusion
is that such view affords the only rational solution of the dispute in this
case.
Id. at 960 (footnote omitted).
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In Lamb-Weston, one of the plaintiffs drivers destroyed a truck leased
to the corporation.' The lessor's liability policy contained a pro rata
"other insurance" clause, while the plaintiffs policy contained an excess
clause.9* After reviewing various approaches to resolving "other insur-
ance" conflicts, the Supreme Court of Oregon concluded that "none [are]
logically acceptable and... any attempt to give effect to the 'other
insurance' provisions of one policy while rejecting it in another is like
pursuing a will o' the wisp."9' The court then explained the basis for the
rule that now bears its name:
The "other insurance" clauses of all policies are but methods used by insurers to
limit their liability, whether using [escape, excess or pro rata clauses]. In our
opinion, whether one policy uses one clause or another, when any come in con-
flict with the "other insurance" clause of another insurer, regardless of the nature
of the clause, they are in fact repugnant and each should be rejected in toto.0
The court ultimately held that the loss should be prorated between the
two insurers, in an amount proportional to their coverage limits.'
The Lamb-Weston Rule has endured," and has been adopted by sever-
al jurisdictions.' The beauty of the Lamb-Weston Rule is its simplicity.
Application of the rule yields uniform results regardless of the number of
subject policies or the nature of their "other insurance" clauses. At the
same time, however, the rule has many shortcomings. The Lamb-Weston
approach ignores the contracting parties' intent," and the rule amounts
to judicial legislation of mandatory pro rata "other insurance" clauses in
all policies.' Furthermore, Lamb-Weston ignores the fact that the con-
struction and enforceability of 'other insurance" clauses is a factor in the
actuarial determination of premiums." As a result, judicial disregard of
89. Lamb-Weston, 341 P.2d at 111.
90. Id. at 113-14.
91. Id. at 115-16.
92. Id. at 119.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Northwest Agric. Coop. Ass'n, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 769 P.2d
218, 220 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 777 P.2d 410 (Or. 1989); Forest Indus. Ins.
Exch. v. Viking Ins. Co., 728 P.2d 943, 944-45 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
95. See, e.g., Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 777 P.2d 1162, 1164
(Alaska 1989) (pro rata v. escape); Indiana Ins. Co. v. American Underwriters, Inc.,
304 N.E.2d 783, 787-89 (Ind. 1973) (excess v. escape); York Mut. Ins. Co. v. Conti-
nental Ins. Co., 560 A.2d 571, 573 (Me. 1989); CC Housing Corp. v. Ryder Truck Rent-
al, Inc., 746 P.2d 1109, 1113 (N.M. 1987); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 511
S.W.2d 464, 465 (Tenn. 1974) (pro rata v. excess).
96. See Hartford Ins. Co. v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 766 S.W.2d 75, 76
(Ky. Ct App. 1989).
97. See Jones v. Medox, Inc., 430 A.2d 488, 492-93 (D.C. 1981); Sloviaczek v. Estate
of Puckett, 565 P.2d 564, 568-69 (Idaho 1977) (McFadden, C.J., dissenting).
98. See John D. Ingram, Conflicts in 'ther Insurance" Clauses, 44 FED'N INS. &
CoRP. CouNs. Q. 51, 62 (1993).
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"other insurance" clauses can lead to uncertainty in the calculation of
premiums, resulting in the unnecessary and inadvertent burdening of
consumers.
2. The Minnesota Rule
Minnesota courts do not just look at the types of "other insurance"
clauses in conflict. The preferred Minnesota approach is to allocate re-
spective policy coverages in light of the total policy insuring intent, as
determined by the primary risks on which each policy's premiums are
based and as determined by the policies' primary functions.' Alterna-
tively, Minnesota courts allocate liability to the insurer whose policy is
"closest to the risk.""® To determine which policy is closest to the risk,
Minnesota courts ask three questions: (1) Which policy specifically de-
scribes the cause of the subject accident? (2) Which policy's premiums
reflect greater contemplated exposure? and (3) Is coverage of the risk
the primary focus of one policy and incidental to the other?"' Despite
their similarities, Minnesota courts resist attempts to blend the two ap-
proaches." This reluctance is curious considering that the only differ-
ence between the two approaches is that the "total policy insuring in-
tent" test has a slightly less mechanical application."n
In Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. v. Auto-Oumers Insurance Co., M
Kenneth DeCent, a high school student, was rendered a quadriplegic
while in a scramble for a loose ball in physical education class." De-
Cent was injured when Jim Leitch, a senior student supervisor, acciden-
tally dropped him on his head as they wrestled for the ball." DeCent's
99. Garrick v. Northland Ins. Co., 469 N.W.2d 709, 712 (Minn. 1991); Integrity Mut.
In. Co. v. State Auto & Cas. Underwriters Ins. Co., 239 N.W.2d 445, 446 (Minn.
1976).
100. American Family Ins. v. National Cas. Co., 515 N.W.2d 741, 745 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994); Richardson v. Ludwig, 495 N.W.2d 869, 873-75 (Minn. Ct App. 1993); United
States Fire Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 461 N.W.2d 230, 234-36 (Minn. C
App. 1990).
101. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v. Depositors Ins. Co., 480 N.W.2d 657, 660-61 (Minn.
CL App. 1992).
102. See, e.g., Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 433 N.W.2d 82, 86
(Mina 1988).
103. CPT Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 515 N.W.2d 747, 751 (Minn. Ct
App. 1994).
104. 433 N.W.2d 82 (Minn. 1988).
105. Id. at 83.
106. Id.
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parents sued the school, various teachers and administrators, and
Leitch."° Ultimately, the DeCents settled all claims against all parties
for $810,863." The school's primary insurer, Continental, paid $500,000,
and its excess liability carrier, Interstate, paid the remaining $310,863. "'
Interstate then sued Auto-Owners, Leitch's insurer, to recover the settle-
ment it paid."0
Auto-Owners moved for summary judgment, arguing that Interstate
was "closest to the risk," and, as a result, that Interstate's policy should
be prioritized..' The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment
in Auto-Owners' favor."2 The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, con-
cluding that the Interstate policy was excess only, and thus did not oper-
ate on Auto-Owners' coverage level."3
The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the intermediate appellate
court and reinstated the trial court's summary judgment."' The court
reasoned:
Interstate, the umbrella carrier, contracted with the school district to provide
coverage in excess of the underlying insurance provided by Continental, the pri-
mary carrier. While it Is true that Interstate relied on Continental's primary cover-
age in setting its premium, Interstate was not further relying on each student hav-
ing a family homeowners policy when it calculated Its risk In insuring the school
district The umbrella policy contemplated coverage for accidents and injuries
sustained on school property during school events. The injury caused by a student
supervisor during a physical education class is precisely the type of risk Interstate
Intended to cover in providing catastrophic insurance to the school district To
hold that Auto-Owners is the primary insurer for this accident would be to ignore
the intent of the respective policies."'
The Minnesota approach is potentially troublesome because it may
eliminate the parties' intent as expressed in the "other insurance" clauses
at issue."0 In Interstate Fire, for example, the Leitch's homeowners pol-
icy with Auto-Owners did not contain either an excess clause or an es-
cape clause,"7 and therefore should have afforded primary coverage.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. Auto-Owners also argued that its business pursuit exclusion precluded cov-
erage. Id. at 84. That portion of the decision, however, is not discussvd here. Id.
112. Id. at 84.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 86.
115. Id.
116. Baldwin & Midkiff, supra note 32, at 54.
117. Interstate Fire, 433 N.W.2d at 83-84. The Auto-Owners policy contained what is
now the standard pro rata "other insurance" clause, alternatively providing for pro
rata contribution by equal shares and by limilts. Id.
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D. Reconciling '"ther Insurance" Clauses Involving Excess and
Umbrella Policies
Confusion often results where secondary coverage is involved. Second-
ary coverage may come in the form of an excess insurance policy, or an
umbrella policy.
A true excess or umbrella policy requires a primary policy as a condi-
tion of coverage. "8 In other words, "the same insured" must have "pur-
chased underlying coverage for the same risk.""' The purpose of excess
coverage or an umbrella policy is to protect the insured in the event of
catastrophic losses in which liability exceeds available primary cover-
age. '2 Excess and umbrella policies are intended to "expand the
amount, but not the scope of coverage." Therefore, only after the un-
derlying primary policy has been exhausted will any umbrella policies
kick in."2 Many umbrella policies, unlike traditional excess policies, al-
so provide primary coverage for risks that the underlying policy does not
cover. 12
The nature of excess policies, and their relationship with primary poli-
118. Southern Baptist Hosp. v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 628 So. 2d 142, 145 (La. Ct.
App. 1993).
119. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v, Gilmore, 812 P.2d 977, 980 (Ariz. 1991).
120. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Overseas Ace Hardware, Inc., 550 So. 2d 12, 13
(Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1989), cause dismissed, 557 So. 2d 867 (Fla.), review dismissed,
557 So. 2d 866 (1990); Bailey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 642 N.E.2d 1323, 1326
(111. App. Ct. 1994); LeMars Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farm & City Ins. Co., 494 N.W.2d 216,
218 (Iowa 1992); Lindsey v. Poole, 579 So. 2d 1145, 1147 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied,
588 So. 2d 100 (La. 1991); Globe Indem. Co. v. Jordan, 634 A.2d 1279, 1283 (Me.
1993).
121. Globe Indemnity, 634 A.2d at 1283 (emphasis in original); see also Kennerly v.
State, 580 A.2d 561, 566 (Del. 1990).
122. Institute for Shipboard Educ. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. Co., 22 F.3d 414, 426
(2d Cir. 1994) (applying Pennsylvania law); Iolab Corp. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 15 F.3d
1500, 1504 (9th Cr. 1994) (applying California law); Barrett v. Chin, 843 F. Supp. 783,
787 (D. Mass. 1994) (applying Massachusetts law); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Gilmore, 812 P.2d 977, 980 (Ariz. 1991); Grant v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 613 So. 2d
466, 470-71 (Fla. 1993); Royal Ins. Co. v. Process Design Assocs., Inc., 582 N.E.2d
1234, 1242 (Im. App. Ct 1991); State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cramer, 857 P.2d
751, 754 (Nev. 1993); Utica Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 812 S.W.2d 656, 662-
63 ('rex. CL App. 1991); Seats Inc. v. Nutmeg Ins. Co., 504 N.W.2d 613, 618 (Wis. CL
App.), evriew denied, 510 N.W.2d 136 (Wis. 1993).
123. Haggard Hauling & Rigging Co. v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 852 S.W.2d 396, 399 n.I
(Mo. CL App. 1993); see, e.g., Laborde v. Deblanc, 587 So. 2d 58, 62 (La Ct App.
1991).
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cies containing excess "other insurance" clauses, are succinctly described
in Oellafen v. Tower Insurance Co.: U
Umbrella carriers are not primary insurers that attempt to limit a portion of their
risk by describing it as "excess." Umbrella policies also are not devices for an
insurer to escape responsibility ....
We also note that the intent of umbrella policies to serve a different function
from primary policies with excess clauses is reflected in the rate structures of the
two types of policies. In general, umbrella policy premiums are relatively small in
relation to the amount of risk "so that the company cannot be expected to prorate
with other excess coverages; and public policy should not demand that this be
done.""u
These policies are therefore considered true excess coverage over and
above all primary coverages, including primary policies with excess "oth-
er insurance" clauses.' An excess "other insurance" clause in a prima-
ry policy "does not transform that primary policy into an excess policy
vis-a-vis a second carrier with excess coverage.""
In a leading case, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. United States Fire
Insurance Co.,' a Texas court applied these basic principles to com-
plex facts. Elizabeth Hillyer was injured in an automobile accident.m
Steve Kennedy was driving the automobile in which Hillyer was a passen-
ger.'n Kennedy had an insurance policy with Liberty Mutual that had
policy limits of $100,000 per person per accident' Henry Taub, the
124. 492 N.W.2d 321 (Wis. Ct. App.), review denied, 494 N.W.2d 211 (Wis. 1992).
125. 492 N.W.2d at 324 (quoting 8A JA. API'LEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW
& PRACTICE, § 4909.85 (1981)).
126. Id.; see also Towne Realty, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 854 F.2d 1264, 1268-
69 (11th Cir. 1988) (applying Florida law); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 728
F. Supp. 298, 302-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying New York law); Insurance Co. of N.
Am. v. American Economy Ins. Co., 746 F. Supp. 59, 64 (W.D. Okia. 1990) (applying
Arkansas law); Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Mutual Assur., Inc., 553 So. 2d 115, 118
(Ala. 1989); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 712,
713-14 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 770 P.2d 1342,
1347-48 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); Atkinson v. Atkinson, 326 S.E.2d 206, 213-14 (Ga.
1985); Easton v. Chevron Indus., Inc., 602 So. 2d 1032, 1041 (La. CL App.), writ de-
nied, 604 So. 2d 1315, writ denied, 604 So. 2d 1318 (La. 1992); Admiral Ins. Co. v.
Columbia Cas. Ins. Co., 486 N.W.2d 351, 360 (Mich. CL App. 1992), appeal denied sub
nom. Admiral Ins. Co. v. Brochert, 503 N.W.2d 449 (Mich. 1993); Kattoura v. Patel,
619 A.2d 1031, 1035-36 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.
v. LiMauro, 482 N.E.2d 13, 18-20 (N.Y. 1985); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harbor Ins. Co.,
603 A.2d 300, 302-03 (R.L 1992); Carrabba v. Employers Cas. Co., 742 S.W.2d 709,
714-15 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
127. North River Ins. Co. v. American Home Assur. Co., 257 Cal. Rptr. 129, 131 (Ct.
App. 1989).
128. 590 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
129. Id. at 784.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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owner of the car, had two policies: a family automobile policy with
American General Insurance Company for $100,000 and a $1,000,000
umbrella policy with United States Fire.' There was no dispute that
the United States Fire policy was excess over the American General poli-
cy. W
Hillyer's personal injury claim was settled for $250,000."H American
General and Liberty Mutual each paid $100,000, and United States Fire
paid the remaining $50,000.- Liberty Mutual then sued United States
Fire to determine the respective obligations.' The trial court held that
Liberty Mutual was not entitled to recover any of its settlement expendi-
ture from United States Fire, and Liberty Mutual appealed.'"
The Liberty Mutual policy had not been made underlying insurance in
the United States Fire policy schedules.' The only provision in the
United States Fire policy applicable to Liberty Mutual, therefore, was its
"other insurance" clause statement that it was excess over any other
valid and collectible insurance, and would not contribute with such other
insurance.' The Liberty Mutual policy, however, contained an "other
insurance" clause making its coverage excess in the event its insured was
involved in an accident while driving a non-owned automobile.' Thus,
the accident in this case fell squarely within Liberty Mutual's excess
"other insurance" clause.
Liberty Mutual argued that its excess clause and the excess clause in
the United States Fire policy were "mutually repugnant."4' Accordingly,
the two policies provided "concurrent second-layer" coverage and
Hillyer's loss should be prorated based on their respective policy lim-
its." The court rejected this superficially appealing argument:
It is true that each of the policies has an *other insurance" clause that apparently
limits coverage in the fortuitous circumstance of the presence of other validly
subsisting coverage, but an examination of the purpose of the policies dictates the
132. Id.
133. Id. The United States Fire policy expressly provided that it was excess above
a scheduled $100,000 automobile policy. Id. at 784-85.
134. Id. at 784.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 785.
140. Id. at 784.
141. Id. at 785.
142. Id.
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resolution of this dispute. Liberty Mutual's policy generally affords primary cover-
age; its coverage becomes excess only because of the presence of a non-owned
vehicle. United States Fire's policy remains excess in all events. Thus it is appar-
ent that the Intent of all parties to the policies is for United States Fire's policy to
remain an umbrella policy, and Liberty Mutual's coverage to underlie it .... Had
Liberty Mutual issued its policy as it did, and United States Fire had issued its
policy to Kennedy instead of to Taub, there would be no question that Liberty
would be liable to the full extent of its policy limits."'
The Liberty Mutual approach now reflects the majority rule.
A different result was reached in US. Fire Insurance Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co.' In US. Fire, however, the excess policy at is-
sue did not contain a general "other insurance" clause stating that it was
excess over all other valid and collectible insurance.'" The competing
primary policy contained an excess clause.'" Under those circumstanc-
es, the excess carrier was secondary only to the underlying primary poli-
cy specifically scheduled in its policy. 7 The competing primary carrier
with an excess "other insurance" clause was therefore secondary even to
the excess insurer's obligations.'
1. Requiring an Excess Carrier to "Drop Down"
It is not unusual for an insured's primary policy to fully cover a loss,
negating the need for excess or umbrella coverage. Similarly, a loss
might consume the insured's primary coverage and even trigger a first
layer of excess coverage, but not encroach on upper layers of excess
coverage. But what if a primary insurer or an intermediate excess insurer
is insolvent? May an excess carrier be forced to "drop down" and fill the
coverage gap created by the underlying insurer's insolvency?
"Drop down" coverage occurs when an insurer providing a higher level
of coverage is obligated to provide the coverage that an immediately
underlying carrier agreed to provide. Drop down coverage can become
an issue for reasons other than insurer insolvency. For example, a loss
may fall within an exclusion in the primary insurer's policy, or the loss
simply may not be covered. Under such circumstances, is an excess
carrier required to drop down and provide primary or lower coverage?
Drop down questions are answered by the terms of the subject excess
policy.'" Unfortunately, many excess policies fail to address whether
143. Id.
144. 781 S.W.2d 394, 399 (Tex. CL App. 1989).
145. Id. at 398.
146. Id, at 396.
147. Id. at 399.
148. Id, 396-99.
149. Alabama Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Kinder-Care, Inc., 551 So. 2d 286, 287 (Ala 1989);
Denny's Inc. v. Chicago Ins. Co., 286 Cal. Rptr. 507, 510 (Ct App. 1991); Domingue v.
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they drop down to the next lowest level of liability when underlying
insurers become insolvent."w Because the focus then shifts to potential-
ly related policy language, courts and litigants often find themselves
searching for ambiguities that might require an excess insurer to drop
down.' The majority rule is that absent obligatory policy language, an
excess insurer is not required to drop down and cover that portion of a
loss once within an insolvent insurer's coverage.
In Hoffman Construction Co. v. Fred S. James & Co., the insured
had three layers of coverage: a $50,000 Seaboard Surety primary policy, a
$450,000 intermediate layer of excess coverage provided by Holland-
America, and an umbrella liability policy with Century Insurance. Sea-
Reliance Ins. Co., 619 So. 2d 1220, 1223 (La. Ct. App. 1993); see, e.g., Atkinson
Dredging Co. v. St Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 836 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. Va. 1993).
150. Metropolitan Leasing, Inc. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 633 N.E.2d 434, 436
(Mass. App. C), review denied, 639 N.E.2d 1082 (Mass. 1994); see, e.g., Newton v.
United States Fire Ins. Co., 391 S.E.2d 837, 839-40 (N.C. CL App.) (discussing "amen-
datory endorsement"), review denied, 399 S.E.2d 329 (N.C. 1990). Insurers have recog-
nized the problem. Many policies now expressly include provisions precluding drop-
down coverage. Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 630 So. 2d
759, 768 n.18 (La. 1994).
151. See, e.g., Alabama Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Magic City Trucking Serv., Inc., 547 So.
2d 849, 853-56 (Ala. 1989).
152. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 12 F.3d 92,
95-96 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying Illinois law); Revco D.S., Inc. v. Government Employ-
ees Ins. Co., 791 F. Supp. 1254, 1264-69 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (applying Ohio law), affd,
984 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1992); Alaska Rural Elec. Co-op. Ass'n, Inc. v. INSCO Ltd., 785
P.2d 1193, 1194-96 (Alaska 1990); Maricopa County v. Federal Ins. Co., 757 P.2d 112,
115 (Ariz. CL App. 1988); Playtex FP, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 622 A.2d 1074, 1078
(DeL Super. Ct. 1992); Southeast AUt. Cargo Operators, Inc. v. First State Ins. Co., 398
S.E.2d 264, 265 (Ga. Ct App. 1990); Hendrix v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d
937, 938 (Ky. Ct App. 1991); Vickodil v. Lexington Ins. Co., 587 N.E.2d 777, 778-80
(Mass. 1992); American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Employers' of Wausau, 454 N.W.2d
462, 466-67 (Minn. Ct App. 1990); Fred Weber, Inc. v. Granite State Ins. Co., 829
S.W.2d 589, 591 (Mo. Ct App. 1992); Central Waste Sys., Inc. v. Granite State Ins.
Co., 437 N.W.2d 496, 498-500 (Neb. 1989); Werner Indus., Inc. v. First State Ins. Co.,
548 A.2d 188, 190-91 (N.J. 1988); Ambassador Assocs. v. Corcoran, 562 N.Y.S.2d 507
(App. Div. 1990), qffd, 589 N.E.2d 1258 (N.Y. 1992); North Carolina Ins. Guar. Ass'n
v. Century Indem. Co., 444 S.E.2d 464, 467-71 (N.C. Ct App.), review denied, 448
S.E.2d 532 (N.C. 1994); J. Kinderman & Sons, Inc. v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 593 A.2d
857, 859-60 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), aWfd, 619 A.2d 1058 (Pa. 1993); Rapid City Regional
Hosp., Inc. v. South Dakota Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 436 N.W.2d 565, 567 (S.D. 1989);
Emscor, Inc. v. Alliance Ins. Group, 804 S.W.2d 195, 198-99 (Tex. CL App. 1991). But
see Kelly v. Wel, 563 So. 2d 221, 226 (La. 1990).
153. 836 P.2d 703 (Or. 1992).
154. Id. at 704.
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board paid the first $50,000 of plaintiffs $375,000 covered loss."' When
Holland-America became unable to pay the next $325,000 due to insol-
vency, the plaintiffs demanded the money from Century.'
The Century excess policy provided that the company would only be
liable for the "ultimate net loss of... the amount recoverable under the
underlying insurances" specifically declared.' 7 The plaintiffs argued that
the phrase "amount recoverable under the underlying insurances" re-
quired the umbrella carrier to pay that portion of the loss that could not
be recovered from insolvent Holland-America." Century argued that
the phrase entitled the plaintiffs to recover only that portion of the net
loss exceeding the limits of the underlying policies."' The plaintiffs es-
sentially argued that "amount recoverable" meant the amount "able to be
recovered," while the insurer construed the phrase to mean the "amount
capable of recovery.""
The Hoffman court embraced the insurer's urged interpretation."'
The court drew support from the "Limit of Liability" section in the Centu-
ry umbrella policy, which specified the circumstances under which the
umbrella policy would drop down." The policy provided for drop down
coverage in "those situations in which there [was] reduced primary cov-
erage... on account of the payment of claims."" The court's holding
that Holland-America's insolvency failed to create drop down coverage
gave effect to both provisions and was consistent with the basic rules of
contract interpretation.'"
The court next rejected the plaintiffs' interpretation based on the "Loss
Payable" provision in the Century policy."' The Loss Payable provision
stated that "Liability under this policy with respect to any occurrence
shall not attach unless and until the Insured, or the Insured's underlying
insurer, shall have paid the amount of the underlying limits on account
of such occurrence."" The court explained that to accept the plaintiffs'
insolvency argument would render this provision "a meaningless
redundancy."'" The Hoffman court concluded that the parties could not
155. Id.
156. Id.
167. Id. (emphasis omitted).
158. Id. at 705.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 706.
161. Id. at 707.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 706-708.
165. Id. at 707.
166. Id. at 707-708.
167. Id. at 708.
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have intended such an unreasonable result.'"
Finally, the plaintiffs asserted that the language in the Century policy's
"other insurance" clause required drop down coverage." Like most
"other insurance" clauses, the Century policy provided that it would be
excess over other "valid and collectible insurance."'" That condition, the
plaintiffs argued, demonstrated the insurer's intent to cover any losses
unless it was determined that other insurance of the insured was both
valid and collectible."" The court rejected this argument as well."
The court found plaintiffs' argument flawed because the use of the
word "collectible" demonstrated the parties' awareness of the
collectibility of concurrent insurance and also that the parties chose not
to connect it separately with the phrase "amount recoverable under the
underlying insurances. " "7  The Hoffman court reasoned that the omis-
sion was patented.'7 4 The "amount recoverable" provision was designed
to acknowledge the underlying insurance specifically stated in the policy
declarations, while the "other insurance" clause was specifically intended
to limit the umbrella carrier's liability should other insurance be avail-
able."17 5
Playtex FP, Inc. v. Columbia Casualty Co. 76 presented a slightly dif-
ferent situation. In Playtex, Mission National Insurance, one of several
excess carriers, became insolvent.'" All of the excess insurers em-
ployed "following form" policies."
Like the Hoffman plaintiffs, the Playtex plaintiffs argued that the
phrase "amount recoverable" meant "real money."' Thus, the coverage
purportedly provided by the Mission policy was not an amount recover-
able due to Mission's insolvency." The excess carriers argued that
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 622 A.2d 1074 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992).
177. Id. at 1076.
178. Id. at 1078. "Following form" policies "are subject to all conditions, agreements,
exclusions and limitations in the underlying policies." Massachusetts Bay Transp.
Auth. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 597 N.E.2d 439, 443 (Mass. 1992).
179. Playtex, 622 A.2d at 1081.
180. Id.
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"amount recoverable" and "limits of liability" were synonymous. "' The
Playtex court, like the Hoffman court, concluded that "amount recov-
erable" referred to specifically scheduled underlying insurance." The
Mission policy failed to meet this definition.'
The plaintiffs next turned their attention to the "Maintenance of Under-
lying Insurances" requirement in the Mission policy.'TM This provision
required the insured to maintain the scheduled underlying policies in full
force and effect for the duration of the excess policies, except for any
reduction in applicable limits or the aggregate limit.tm If the insured
failed to maintain the underlying policies, Mission agreed to be bound
only to the extent of its previous obligation.'tm
The plaintiffs argued that Mission's financial situation caused a
'reduction' in the underlying limits beyond the insured's control or which
was not the insured's fault. "' Because the excess carriers' policy fol-
lowed Mission's form, the excess carriers were obligated to drop
down.tm The insurers contended that any reduction must be by pay-
ment of claims." Were that not so, the insurers argued, the condition's
purpose would be eliminated.'90 The Playtex court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument.' The condition in the Mission policy requiring the
insured to maintain its underlying insurance was simply that; it was
"clear that the provision [was] not intended to expand the insured's cov-
erage and force the excess insurers to drop down."'
The positions taken by the Hoffman and Playtex courts make practical
sense. Excess insurance and umbrella policies are relatively inexpensive
because excess insurers are only obligated to pay claims to the extent
they exceed primary coverage." Insureds' expectations that excess car-
riers drop down in the event of insolvency are objectively unreasonable.
An underlying insurer's insolvency is not an "occurrence."" Additional-
ly, because the insured presumably selected the primary carrier, it is not
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1083.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1085.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Alaska Rural Elec. Coop. Ass'n, Inc. v. INSCO Ltd., 785 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Alaska
1990).
194. See Zurich-Am. Ins. Co. v. Mead Reinsurance Corp., 555 N.Y.S.2d 333, 334 (App.
Div.), appeal denied, 564 N.E.2d 671 (N.Y. 1990).
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unfair to ask the insured to bear the risk of insolvency. Excess insurers
should not be asked to bear the risk of the insolvency of primary insur-
ers they do not select.' Finally, the term "collectible," when used in an
"other insurance" clause, should never be held to create an ambiguity as
to an excess insurer's coverage in the case of a primary insurer's insol-
vency. In the excess insurance context, an "other insurance" clause
serves to limit the company's liability in the event insurance other than
the scheduled underlying insurance is available. Where a primary insurer
is insolvent there is no "other insurance," and the clause never comes
into play.19
While Hoffman and Playtex reflect the majority position, Coca Cola
Bottling Co. of San Diego v. Columbia Casualty Co.'7 reflects the oth-
er side of the insolvency coin. Coca Cola Bottling also involved the Mis-
sion insolvency, and following form excess policies." As in Playtex, the
case hinged on the "Maintenance of Underlying Insurances" provision in
Section I of the Mission policy.1
Columbia argued that because it was excess of the Mission policy, and
therefore not scheduled as underlying insurance in the Mission policy,
Section III of the Mission policy could not define the coverage provided
by the Columbia policy.'m This argument was succinctly disposed of by
the court
The fundamental difficulty with Columbia's argument is that it requires that Mis-
sion bear risks without imposing similar risks on insurers whose coverage is in
excess of Mission's coverage. Such a disparate risk allocation between primary
and excess carriers is inconsistent with the "followed form" nature of the insur-
ance Columbia provided. "An excess policy generally follows the form of the un-
derlying primary coverage and is called 'following form' excess coverage, i.e., the
excess had the same scope of coverage as the primary policy."'
The court next looked to Columbia's policy definition of its lower lim-
its.' The policy provided coverage "'where applicable excess of prima-
ries.'"' Because the Columbia policy did not fully define the lower lim-
its of its coverage, the court returned to the underlying Mission poli-
195. Alaska RurWa, 785 P.2d at 1195.
196. Id. at 1196.
197. 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 643 (Ct. App. 1992).
198. See id,
199. See id.
200. Id. at 646.
201. Id. at 646-47 (citation omitted).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 647.
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cy.' Of course, the Mission policy provided that the lower limit of cov-
erage was the "amount recoverable,"' a phrase previously determined
by California courts to be ambiguous.' The Coca Cola Bottling court
thus concluded that Columbia was obligated to drop down.w
As noted previously, drop down coverage may be an issue for reasons
other than an underlying insurer's insolvency. National Union Fire In-
surance Co. v. Glenview Park District' is an exemplary case.
National Decorating Service (NDS) contracted with the Glenview Park
District to refurbish an ice rink.' The contract required NDS to main-
tain a public liability insurance policy with limits of not less than
$1,000,000, and to specifically name the District as an additional in-
sured." ' NDS purchased the required policy from National Union Fire,
and also purchased a $2,000,000 excess and umbrella policy from Nation-
al Surety."' The underlying National Union policy excluded coverage
for damages caused by the negligence of an additional insured, i.e., the
District.
212
During the refurbishing, NDS employee Frederick Claussen (Claussen)
fell from a scaffold and was seriously injured. Claussen's guardian
sued the District, and National Union then filed a declaratory judgment
action, alleging that the District's alleged acts of negligence were exclud-
ed by its policy. 1 The trial court sustained National Union's subsequent
dispositive motion, and further found that National Surety's excess and
umbrella policy dropped down to cover the District." National Surety
argued on appeal that its policy did not drop down; the District respond-
ed that the insurer's argument was of no moment, because its policy was
in fact primary.
21 6
National Surety's policy provided true excess coverage, denominated
Coverage A, and umbrella coverage, or Coverage B. The umbrella cover-
age obligated National Surety: "To pay on behalf of the Insured all sums
which the Insured shall be obligated to pay as damages by reason of
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 645.46.
207. Id.
208. 594 N.E.2d 1300 (IlM. App. Ct 1992), qffd in part, rev'd in part, 632 N.E.2d
1039 (mlL 1994).
209. Id. at 1301.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1301-02.
213. Id. at 1302.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1306.
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liability imposed on the Insured or Assumed under Contract because of
Personal Injury, Property Damage or Advertising Injury caused by an
Occurrence during the Policy Period.""7 The Coverage A portion of the
policy also included a typical excess "other insurance" clause, providing
that the National Surety coverage was to be excess over other valid and
collectible insurance."8
The Glenview court held that National Surety was obligated to drop
down and defend and indemnify the District in connection with the
Claussen suit."' The National Surety policy was excess with respect to
Coverage A, but Coverage B's umbrella provision afforded primary cover-
age.' Because the National Union policy excluded the Claussen loss,
the "other insurance" clause in National Surety's umbrella coverage did
not operate.2
2. Allocating Liability Between Concurrent Excess Insurers
Courts are seldom called upon to prorate liability between concurrent
insurers affording true excess coverage. As a general rule, courts should
attempt to reconcile the "other insurance" clauses at issue just as though
the policies were primary.' The fact that competing policies are excess
rather than primary does not change the fact that they operate on the
same plane or at the same level.
Among the few cases addressing this issue is Mission Insurance Co. v.
United States Fire Insurance Co.m In Mission, Mission Insurance is-
sued a $1,000,000 umbrella policy to the lessor of a vehicle.' A lessee's
employee wrecked the vehicle.' The lessee had a "Commercial Com-
prehensive Catastrophe Liability Policy" with U.S. Fire.' The U.S. Fire
policy had limits of $3,000,000. Both policies contained excess "other
217. Id. at 1307.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1308.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 260 Cal. Rptr.
190, 199 (Ct. App. 1989) (excess "other insurance" clauses in umbrella policies
deemed mutually repugnant and proration ordered).
223. 517 N.E.2d 463 (Mass. 1988).
224. Id. at 464.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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insurance" clauses providing coverage in excess of all other valid and
collectible insurance.' Neither company's policy was identified in the
other's schedule of underlying policies." There was no dispute that, in
the absence of "other insurance," each of the policies covered the subject
loss.' °
Mission and two primary insurers settled a tort claim arising out of the
accident."' Mission then sued U.S. Fire seeking a declaration that U.S.
Fire had to contribute to the settlement.' U.S. Fire successfully moved
for summary judgment, asserting that its coverage was excess to
Mission's policy and that it need contribute nothing until the Mission
policy was exhausted.33 The Massachusetts Supreme Court re-
versed.'
The Mission court first determined that both policies created "umbrel-
la-type excess insurance,' rather than the owner's policy being prima-
ry, as U.S. Fire contended.' The court then turned to the conflict be-
tween the two competing excess "other insurance" clauses, adopting the
majority approach that excess clauses are mutually repugnant.' The
court required both insurers to prorate the loss by equal shares.'
In reaching this conclusion, the Mission court rejected U.S. Fire's
argument that Mission's failure to state in its limit of liability clause that
its coverage was excess of all other collectible insurance, as it provided
in its "other insurance" clause, created a fatal ambiguity.' The court
reasoned that it would be clear to Mission's insured that the policy pro-
vided excess coverage.' The only colorable ambiguity resulted from a
comparison of the Mission limit of liability clause with the corresponding
clause in the U.S. Fire policy." Creating an "ambiguity" by comparing
Mission's policy with a separate unrelated document (the U.S. Fire poli-
cy) did not justify construing Mission's policy other than as written.'
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id
235. Id. at 467.
236. Id. at 464-66.
237. Id. at 467.
238. Id. at 468.
239. Id. at 467.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
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IV. STATE INSURANCE GUARANTY FUNDS AS "OTHER INSURANCE"
With the increasing number of liability insurer insolvencies in the late
1960s, Congress took notice.w Faced with the prospect of congressio-
nal intrusion into state insurance domain, the insurance industry per-
suaded the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) to
draft model insurance guaranty fund legislation.' States quickly adopt-
ed the NAIC model legislation. Today, almost all states have some form
of guaranty fund for property and casualty insurers.'
Once an insurer is declared insolvent, and assuming the insured's loss
is a statutory covered claim, the state guaranty fund or association steps
into the insolvent insurer's shoes and assumes all related rights and
obligations.' There are, however, limits on the various state funds. For
243. Grace M. Giesel, A Proposal for a Tort Remedy for Insureds of Insolvent In-
surers Against Brokers, Excess Insurers, Reinsurers, and the State, 52 OHIO ST. LJ.
1075, 1087 (1991).
244. Id. at 1088.
245. ALA. CODE §§ 27-42-1 to 42-20 (1986); ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.80.010-.190 (1993);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-661 to -695 (1990); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-90-101 to -123
(1992); CAL INS. CODE §§ 1063-1063.15 (West 1993); Cow. REV. STAT. §§ 104-501 to -
520 (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 38a-836 to -853 (1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§
4201-4223 (Cum. Supp. 1992); FLA STAT. ANN. §§ 631.50-.70 (West 1989); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 33-36-1 to -19 (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 431:16-101 to -219 (1990); IDAHO
CODE §§ 41-3601 to -3621 (1991); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 215 pan. 5/532 to /553 (Smith-
Hurd 1993) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, par. 1065.82-.103 (Smith-Hurd 1991));
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 27-6-8-1 to -19 (Burns 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 515B.I-.26 (West
1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-2901 to -2919 (1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.36-010
to -170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22:1375 -:1394 (West
1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A §§ 4431-4452 (West 1990); MD. ANN. CODE art.
48A, §§ 504-519 (1994); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 175D, §§ 1-16 (1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
500.815(a) (1994); MINN.STAT. §§ 60C.01-.22 (1994); MM CODE ANN. §§ 83-23-101 to -
137 (1991); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 375.771-.780 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-10-101 to -
117 (1992); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2401 to -2418 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 687A.010-
.160 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 404-B:1-:18 (1983); NJ. REV. STAT. §§ 17:30A-1 to
-20 (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59A-43-1 to -18 (Michie 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
26.142-01 to -15 (1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3955.01-.19 (Anderson 1989); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 36, §§ 2001-2020 (1990); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 734.510-.710 (1989); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 27-34-1 to -19 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-31-10 to -170 (Law. Co-op 1989);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 58-29A-1 to -53 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-12-101 to
-120 (1994); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.28-C §§ 1-22 (West 1989); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 31A-28-201 to -221 (Michie 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 3611-3626 (1984); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-1600 to -1623 (1994); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 48.32.010-.930 (1990); W.
VA. CODE §§ 33-26-1 to -19 (1992); Wis. STAT. §§ 646.01-.73 (1990); WYO. STAT. §§ 26-
31-101 to -117 (1991).
246. See Windle v. Alabama Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 591 So. 2d 78, 80-81 (Ala. 1991);
1411
example, most funds provide a maximum statutory limit for a single
claim, 7 some states impose a deductible,' and perhaps most impor-
tant for "other insurance" or multiple insurance purposes, most states
make the exhaustion of other insurance policies a prerequisite to guaran-
ty fund recovery."
Whether astate guaranty fund constitutes "other valid and collectible
insurance" was litigated in Luko v. Lloyd's London.'M In Luko, plaintiff
Michael Luko sued Independent Terminal Company (Independent) in
connection with his injury on Independent's pier." At the time of
Luko's accident, Independent had a $1,000,000 primary liability policy
issued by Midland Insurance Company, which included a $10,000 deduct-
ible.'M Independent also had a $10,000,000 umbrella policy issued by a
Lloyd's consortium.'m Independent was thus insured against losses up
to $11,000,000, with the first $1,000,000 covered by Midland and Lloyd's
then providing the excess coverage up to $10,000,000. "' The Lloyd's
umbrella policy also provided coverage in excess of $100,000 for any one
occurrence where no underlying insurance existed.'m
While Luko's suit was pending, Midland was declared insolvent.t m In-
dependent thus sought primary protection from the Pennsylvania Insur-
ance Guaranty Association (PIGA).=* Rather than reimburse Indepen-
dent for the amount of Midland's liability, Independent was directed to
Maytag Corp. v. Tennessee Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 608 N.E.2d 772, 775 (Ohio Ct App.),
jurisdictional motion overruled, 600 N.E.2d 679 (Ohio 1992); Washington Ins. Guar.
Ass'n v. Mullins, 816 P.2d 61, 63 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
247. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-42-8(a)(1) (1994) ($150,000); ALASKA STAT. §
21.80.060(a)(1) (1994) ($500,000); ARm REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-667(B) (1990) ($100,000);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.36-080(1)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1994) ($100,000).
248. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-42-05(1)(a) (1990); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 48.32.060(1)(a) (1990).
249. See, e.g., AR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-673(C) (1989); CAL. INS. CODE § 1063.2(e)
(West 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-36-14 (Miche 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 215 pars
5/546(b) (Snlth-Hurd 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2910 (1993) (must exhaust rights
under insolvent insurer's policy); MASS. GEN. L ch. 175D, § 9 (1987); see also Arizona
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Fund v. Herder, 751 P.2d 519, 523 (Ari. 1988); Witkowski v.
Brown, 576 A.2d 669, 671 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989); Hetzel v. Clarldn, 772 P.2d 800, 805-
806 (Kan. 1989); Ventulett v. Maine Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 583 A.2d 1022, 1023-24 (Me.
1990); Oglesby v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 832 P.2d 834, 843 (OkIa. 1992); Northland Ins.
Co. v. Virginia Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 392 S.E.2d 682, 684 (Va. 1990).
250. 573 A.2d 1139 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 584 A.2d 319 (Pa. 1990).
251. Id. at 1140.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1141.
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first seek coverage from the Lloyd's consortium. The "non-duplication"
provision of the Pennsylvania Act was the basis of PIGA's request.'
When the Lloyd's consortium did not respond to the request for informa-
tion regarding the extent of Independent's coverage, Independent filed a
declaratory judgment action.' The trial court required that Lloyd's cov-
er Luko's claim for all amounts exceeding $100,000, and that PIGA cover
the difference between Independent's deductible and $100,000 (the point
at which the excess coverage began).'
On appeal, the Lloyd's consortium first argued that its coverage did not
begin at $100,000 by virtue of Midland's insolvency." The court quickly
disposed of this argument, relying on the ambiguous language in the
Lloyd's policy.' The issue then became at what level Lloyd's drop
down coverage should begin. Was it the trial court mandate of $100,000,
or $300,000, the upper limit of PIGA's statutory obligation?'
The court concluded that PIGA's guaranty did not function as "other
valid and collectible insurance" within the meaning of the Lloyd's umbrel-
la policy.' The court reasoned that to adopt the insurer's argument
that PIGA should function as a primary carrier would "pervert legislative
intent."' PIGA was enacted to protect individuals whose insurers be-
come insolvent, and it was intended "'to place claimants in the same
position that they would have been in if the liability insurer had not be-
come insolvent. '"2m The Pennsylvania Act was intended "not to protect
other insurers by filling in for every aspect of the underlying insurance
but rather to fill in only as the insolvency adversely [affects] the in-
sured."2
7
Whether a state guaranty fund constitutes "other insurance" was most
recently contested in Scordill v. Smith.' In Scordill, Western Preferred
Casualty, the primary insurer, became insolvent.' Century Indemnity,
the excess insurer, argued that it should only have to drop down to the
258. Id. at 1140-41.
259. Id. at 1141.
260. Id. at 1141-42.
261. Id. at 1142.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1142-43.
264. Id. at 1143.
265. Id.
266. Id. (citations omitted).
267. Id.
268. 635 So. 2d 407 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
269. Id.
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statutory maximum protection afforded by the Louisiana Insurance
Guaranty Association (LIGA).tm LIGA, on the other hand, argued that
Century dropped down to provide "first dollar" coverage." The Scordill
court agreed with UGA.t
The court first observed that "LIGA's obligations are triggered only as
a last resort." LIGA's status as a fund of last resort was evidenced by
language specifically stating that if a claimant had other insurance avail-
able, it owed no duty to assume obligations of insolvent insurers.' In
fact, CIGA's purpose was to safeguard claimants in the event of insurer
insolvency, not be the financial support of solvent insurers! 5 Absent
LIGA's existence, "Century would drop down to dollar one.' ° The
Scordill court concluded that LIGA's existence should not alter the re-
sult.
m
Luko and Scordi/ are well-reasoned. State guaranty funds are intended
to provide a limited form of protection for the insured public, not to
protect insurance companies from the insolvencies of their fellow insur-
ers.' Exposing an insured to liability while softening the insurer's blow
via operation of an "other insurance" clause would controvert legislative
intent. Luko and Scordill should represent the majority view.
V. DEDUCTIBLES AND STACKING
The accurate evaluation of insurers' exposure when allocating or ap-
portioning liability necessarily includes consideration of deductibles and
the potential stacking of policy limits. The presence of deductibles and
insureds' ability to stack multiple policies may significantly affect
insurers' indemnity obligations.
A. Deductibles
Difficulty sometimes arises when one or more policies among which a
loss is being allocated contain(s) a deductible. The essential issue is
270. Id. at 407-08. In Louisiana, unlike most jurisdictions, an excess policy drops
down upon a primary insurer's insolvency if Its "Limit of Liability" language provides
for coverage in excess of "the amount recoverable under the underlying Insurances."
Id. at 408.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 409.
273. Id.
274. Id at 408-09.
275. Id. at 409.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See Maxwell Communications v. Webb Publishing Co., 518 N.W.2d 830, 833
(Minn. 1994) (citations omitted).
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whether insurers' allocation of liability among or between themselves
may result in insureds' personal exposure. Several courts have addressed
this issue, but there appears to be no clear rule.
The insured in Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Transport Indemnity
Co.2 settled a wrongful death claim for $25,000 after Transport Indem-
nity refused its tender.' The power company had concurrent liability
coverage with the Home Insurance Company." The Home policy had a
$25,000 deductible; the Transport Indemnity policy did not have a de-
ductible.' The power company sued Transport Indemnity to recover its
defense costs plus the amount paid in settlement.' Home was not
made a party to the declaratory judgment action' Applying Oregon
law, the Pacific Power court concluded that the policies' "other insur-
ance" clauses were mutually repugnant, and that the loss should be pro-
rated between the two carriers.' Transport Indemnity bore only its pro
rata share, notwithstanding Pacific Power's apparent inability to recover
from Home by virtue of its deductible.' Because the deductible in the
Home policy was relevant only to its relationship with its insured, and
because Home was not a party, the Pacific Power court never addressed
the insured's residual liability.'m
A more interesting deductible analysis appears in Cargi, Inc. v. Corn-
merca Union Insurance Co.' In Cargill, unlike Pacific Power, both
insurers were before the court.
In CargiU, a barge accident resulted in a $194,158.07 loss of Cargill
grain.' Cargill submitted the claim to Huffman, which towed the
barge.'m Huffman's marine insurer, Commercial Union, denied cover-
279. 460 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1972).
280. Id. at 960.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 961. Such a clause in a policy provides that the policy's coverage shall
be treated as excess where the insured has an additional policy which protects
against the same risk. Id,
286. Id. at 961-62.
287. See id. at 962.
288. 889 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying Minnesota and Missouri law).
289. Id. at 176.
290. Id
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age.!" Cargill then submitted the claim to St. Paul, its insurer.' St.
Paul paid Cargill $94,157.07, the difference between the amount of the
loss and the $100,000 deductible under the St. Paul policy.m Sometime
thereafter, Commercial Union changed course, concluding that its policy
in fact covered the loss.' Commercial Union then paid Cargill $90,000,
the difference between the unpaid balance of the claim and the policy's
$10,000 deductible.' Huffman then paid the remaining $10,000 of
Cargill's claim, i.e., the Commercial Union deductible.'
After first concluding that the "other insurance" clauses in the St. Paul
and Commercial Union policies were mutually repugnant, thus requiring
proration by policy limits,' the Cargill court next examined the effect
of the deductibles.' Commercial Union argued that the loss should be
prorated by limits without reference to the insurers' respective deduct-
ibles.' St. Paul argued that if the loss must be prorated, an amount
equal to St. Paul's larger $100,000 deductible should be shifted to Com-
mercial Union whose deductible was relatively small.'
The CargiU court accepted the basic argument that deductibles should
be considered in apportioning the insurers' respective indemnity obliga-
tions."' "Up to the $100,000 of St. Paul's deductible there was no 'other
insurance' triggering Commercial Union's 'other insurance' clause."'
The first $100,000 was therefore covered by Commercial Union, not by
St. Paul.' Moreover, considering the respective deductibles before ap-
portioning liability reflected the lesser economic risk assumed by St.
Paul, as evidenced by its larger deductible.'
The critical question for insurers beyond whether a deductible will be
accounted for in loss allocation is, when will it be taken into account?
Phrased differently, will the deductible be taken into account before pro-
ration, or after? Cargill provides a comparative analysis.
The Cargill court prorated the insured's loss by policy limits." Thus,
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 177.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 179.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 180.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. See id. (citing Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Continental Cas. Co., 431 F. Supp.
316, 319 (E.D. Pa. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 575 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1978)).
305. Id. at 180.
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Commercial Union bore 23.1% of the loss ($600,000 policy lim-
its/$2,600,000 available coverage), while St. Paul bore 76.9% of the
loss.' By shifting St. Paul's deductible to Commercial Union before
prorating the loss, the Cargill court calculated Commercial Union's pro
rata share to be $121,750.51.' Specifically-
$100,000.00 St. Paul's deductible
21,750.51 Loss of $94,158.07 after deductible x 23.1%
(Commercial Union's pro rata share)
$121,750.51 Total CU Liability
St. Paul was thus left with an indemnity obligation of $72,407.56."
The Cargill court could have prorated the loss before shifting the de-
ductible to Commercial Union-an approach enjoying existing judicial
support." Had the court pro rated the loss before shifting the deduct-
ible (as St. Paul urged), the parties' ultimate liability would have differed
by some $23,000. The difference is illustrated below.
$ 44,850.51 Loss of $194,158.07 x 23.1%
(Commercial Union's pro rata share)
100,000.00 St. Paul's deductible
$144,850.51 Total CU Liability
By shifting the deductible after prorating the loss, Commercial Union's
total liability would increase to $144,850.51. St. Paul, on the other hand,
would see its liability reduced to $49,307.56.
Deductibles may come into play where consecutive policies, rather
than concurrent policies, cover a loss. As a rule, insurers cannot by using
306. Id. at 180-81.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 181.
309. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Continental Cas. Co., 431 F. Supp. 316, 319
(E.D. Pa. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 575 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1978).
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their "other insurance" clauses allocate liability among themselves in a
way that will impose liability on the insured."' This rule holds true re-
gardless of whether liability flows to the insured by way of deductibles,
retrospective premiums or side indemnity agreements. "' Of course,
where the subject loss is continuing or progressive and the insured elects
coverage under a policy with a deductible, the insured should have to
pay the deductible.
B. Stacking
"Stacking" refers to the recovery of damages by an insured under mul-
tiple policies in succession until all damages have been satisfied, or until
the total limits of all policies are exhausted." An insured's ability to
stack policies is most often at issue in the uninsured motorist coverage
(UM) and underinsured motorist coverage (UIM) contexts. More specifi-
cally in UM and UIM cases, "intrapolicy stacking is the cumulation of the
liability limits for multiple vehicles under a single policy," while
"interpolicy stacking" refers to the cumulation of coverage afforded un-
der multiple policies."3 Uninsured and underinsured motorist claims are
fertile ground for stacking questions because any given person can usual-
ly qualify as an insured under more than one automobile liability policy,
and thus for uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage as well.3 '
Alternatively, several different vehicles may be listed on a single policy,
with the insurer collecting separate UM and UIM premiums for each.
It is nearly impossible to explain succinctly UM and UIM stacking rules
largely because of states' differing approaches."' Many states allow
310. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 707 F. Supp.
762, 771 (E.D. Pa. 1989), offd in part, rev'd in part, 25 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 1994);
Detrex Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 746 F. Supp. 1310, 1325-26
(N.D. Ohio 1990).
311. Air Products, 707 F. Supp. at 771; Detre, 746 F. Supp. at 1325-26.
312. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 437 S.E.2d 43, 44-45 n.1 (S.C.
1993) (citing Jackson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 342 S.E.2d 603 (S.C. 1986)).
313. Upshaw v. Trinity Cos., 842 S.W.2d 631, 632 n.1 (Tex 1992).
314. Baldwin & Midkiff, supra note 32, at 62.
315. Missouri law illustrates the legal morass that UM and UIM stacking can be-
come. As a general rule, Missouri law permits insureds to stack UM and UIM
coverages. See Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., 827 S.W.2d 208, 212 (Mo. 1992); Ro-
driguez v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 808 S.W.2d 379, 383-84 (Mo. 1991). It
does not matter whether separate premiums are charged for separate vehicles, since
Missouri courts presume that UM coverage for additional vehicles is built into basic
premium charges. Oliver v. Cameron Mut. Ins. Co., 866 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993). Assuming the policy definition of "insured" includes not only the named in-
sured but a "relative" or a "family member," courts will liberally construe these
terms. The same is true with respect to who is an "owner." See Lightner v. Farmers
Ins. Co., 789 S.W.2d 487, 489-90 (Mo. 1990). Injured occupants who are not named
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insureds to stack UM and UIM coverage under certain circumstances and
depending on any number of variables, including intrapolicy versus
interpolicy determinations, and the payment of separate premiums."' Of
those states that allow stacking, some nonetheless enforce clear and
prominently displayed "anti-stacking" provisions in UM and UIM poli-
cies."7 Other states, such as Kansas, do not allow insureds to stack UM
insureds or owners are not necessarily entitled to stack coverages. Krombach, 827
S.W.2d at 212; Hartford Ins. Co. v. Kean, 866 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Mo. CL App. 1993).
Occupancy insureds are not entitled to equal public policy protections. Hines v. Gov-
ernment Employees Ins. Co., 656 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Mo. 1983).
Missouri public policy prohibits insurers from including anti-stacldng provisions
in UM coverage. Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538, 544-45 (Mo.
1976). This public policy flows from Missouri statutes mandating UM coverage. See
Mo. REV. STAT. § 379.203 (Cum. Supp. 1994). Because Missouri does not mandate
UIM coverage, there is no public policy prohibiting anti-stacking clauses in the under-
insured motorist context. Noll v. Shelter Ins. Cos., 774 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Mo. 1989).
Clear and unambiguous anti-stacking clauses in UIM coverage are thus enforced as
written, so long as UM and UIM coverages are treated separately. Krensld v.
Aubuchon, 841 S.W.2d 721, 731 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). If insurers "lump together" UM
and UIM coverages, however, courts treat the combined coverages as UM coverage
and disregard or invalidate any anti-stacking clauses. See Keating v. Gavrilovici, 861
S.W.2d 205, 208 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Nolan v. American States Preferred Ins. Co., 851
S.W.2d 720, 723-24 (Mo. CL App. 1993).
FInally, set-off provisions in UM and UIM coverages--ncluding stacked
coverages-are enforceable. American Economy Ins. Co. v. Comejo, 866 S.W.2d 174,
178 (Mo. CL App. 1993); Keating, 861 S.W.2d at 208. Set-off provisions must be clear
and unambiguous if they are to be enforced. See Kilipack v. Farm Bureau Town &
Country Ins. Co., 861 S.W.2d 608, 610-12 (Mo. CL App. 1993).
316. See, e.g., Powell v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 601 So. 2d 60, 63 (Ala.
1992); Allstate Ins. Co. v. LInk, 645 A.2d 1052, 1055-56 (Conn. App. CL) (UIM cover-
age), cert. denied, 648 A.2d 161 (Conn. 1994); Bruder v. Country Mut. Ins Co., 620
N.E.2d 355, 358-59 (111. 1993) (UM coverage); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Davis,
613 So. 2d 1179, 1182 (Miss. 1992) (UM coverage); Jarailo v. Providence Washing-
ton Ins. Co., 871 P.2d 1343, 1345-49 (N.M. 1994) (UM coverage); Mitchell v. Na-
tionwide Mut. Ins. Co., 439 S.E.2d 110, 111 (N.C. 1994) (UIM coverage); Kinder v.
Oklahoma Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co., 813 P.2d 546, 548 (Okia. CL App. 1991) (UM
coverage); USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 445 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1994) (UM cov-
erage); Carrington v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 485 N.W.2d 267, 273 (Wis. 1992)
(UM coverage).
317. See, e.g., Glannini v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 837 P.2d 1203, 1206 (ArL
CL App. 1992); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Amos, 798 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Ark. CL
App. 1990); Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 852 P.2d 459, 467 (Colo. 1993); Dixie
Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 627 So. 2d 1306, 1306 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Armstrong v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 595 N.E.2d 172, 175 (111. App. CL 1992); Rodish v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 514, 514-15 (Iowa 1993); Yahr v. Garcia,
461 N.W.2d 363, 363 (Mich. 1990); Serrett v. Kimber, 874 P.2d 747, 749 (Nev. 1994);
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or UIM coverage."8 Fortunately, the UM and UIM stacking hodgepodge
does not taint stacking issues in the liability context, since UM and UIM
policies provide first-party coverage."
Insureds' ability to stack liability policies has emerged as an issue in
continuing injury or progressive loss cases, where consecutive policies
are implicated.'s Under the liability insurance concept of stacking, the
limits of all policies triggered by an occurrence are added to determine
the amount of coverage available to pay a single claim. Typical scenarios
in which insureds or plaintiffs might attempt to stack liability policies
include progressive disease claims, like asbestos exposure, and environ-
mental contamination, such as prolonged discharges from toxic waste
sites.
When liability insurance is at issue, "intrapolicy" stacking refers to
multiple occurrences involving the same person within the same policy
period. Returning to asbestos claims as an example, jurisdictions employ-
ing the exposure trigger could treat each inhalation of asbestos as a
single occurrence." Similarly, in the environmental claim arena, multi-
ple "sudden and accidental" discharges in a single policy period could be
deemed separate occurrences. An insurer's liability might be unlimited in
the absence of a stated aggregate coverage. "Interpolicy" stacking in the
liability insurance context becomes an issue when a single occurrence
transcends policy periods, thus triggering consecutive policies. An in-
sured would attempt interpolicy stacking in order to obtain the limits of
each policy's coverage.
Among the more interesting stacking cases is American Physicians
Insurance Exchange v. Garcia,' a recent Texas decision. Garca in-
volved medical malpractice allegations stemming from Dr. Ramon
Garcia's treatment of Gustavo Cardenas between October 1980 and April
1982.' The Cardenases alleged in a 1984 suit that Dr. Garcia's prescrip-
Concord Gen. Mut Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 637 A.2d 903, 904-905 (N.IL 1994); Rodriquez
v. Windsor Ins. Co., 879 P.2d 759, 765 (N.M. 1994); Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664,
666-69 (Utah 1992); McGreevy v. Oregon Mut. Ins. Co., 876 P.2d 463, 467 (Wash. CL
App. 1994).
318. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-284(d) (1993); Walker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
973 F.2d 634, 637-38 (8th Cir. 1992) (construing Kansas statute).
319. Ball v. Midwestern Ins. Co., 829 P.2d 897, 900 (Kan. 1992); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 826 (Wyo. 1994).
320. The allocation or apportionment of losses when consecutive policies are at
issue is discussed at infra notes 374-97 and accompanying text
321. Baldwin & Middiff, supra note 32, at 62.
322. 876 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1994).
323. Id. at 843.
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tion of two drugs for Mr. Cardenas caused Mr. Cardenas to develop a
debilitating brain disease.3'
At all relevant times Dr. Garcia was insured under three consecutive
Insurance Corporation of America (ICA) professional liability policies.'m
-In 1980, the doctor was covered under a $100,000 ICA claims made pol-
icy.' In 1981 and 1982, Dr. Garcia was covered under consecutive ICA
occurrence policies, each with $500,000 liability limits.' In 1983, the
doctor purchased a $500,000 occurrence policy from American Physi-
cians Insurance Exchange (APIE). m
In December, 1993, several months before filing their petition, the
Cardenases notified Dr. Garcia of their intentions by letter.' Dr. Garcia
reported the letter to APIE, which informed the doctor that its policy
would only cover claimed acts of negligence in 1983.'n After concluding
that Mr. Cardenas had seen Dr. Garcia but once in 1983 and, thus, that
ICA bore the greatest risk, APIE agreed with ICA to share in any settle-
ment or judgment on a pro rata basis." The Cardenases subsequently
filed an original and five amended petitions and did not allege malprac-
tice during the APIE policy period.' In July of 1985, APIE informed Dr.
Garcia that its policy was inapplicable, because all of the Cardenases' al-
legations occurred prior to its coverage."
The Cardenases' attorney made his first written settlement demand in
the amount of $600,000 before APIE sent its letter to Garcia denying
coverage.' The Cardenases' attorney subsequently made demands of
$1,100,000 and $1,600,000, the latter coming the day of trial.m The de-
mands went unmet.' On the day of trial, the Cardenases filed their
sixth amended petition, for the first time making allegations within
APIE's policy period.' This last petition was filed in conjunction with
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 843-44.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 844.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 844-45.
335. Id. at 845.
336. Id.
337. Id.
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the Cardenases' agreement not to execute against Dr. Garcia, but to look
only to his insurance to satisfy any judgment.m The Cardenases ob-
tained a $2,235,483.30 judgment.'
The issue ultimately became APIE's extracontractual liability for its al-
leged bad faith refusal to settle within policy limits.' However, the
Cardenases' lowest settlement demand of $600,000 triggered no duty on
APIE's part unless it was within applicable limits." The Cardenases' de-
mands could satisfy the "policy limits" requirement only if the limits of
all triggered policies could be stacked.'
The Garcia court refused to allow the plaintiffs to stack the ICA and
APIE policies to satisfy this requirement because it involved a single
claim with indivisible injury.' The policy's per-occurrence indemnity
cap is not raised simply because an occurrence has been extended over
several policy periods, according to the Garcia court.'
The [bad faith] claim by Garcia and the Cardenases rests on the assumption
that Garcia had three times more insurance than he purchased. At no time during
the four relevant coverage years did any two policies overlap. Thus, at no time
during the four years did Garcia carry liability insurance with a per-occurrence
limit greater than $500,000. Garcia did not purchase malpractice insurance for $1.5
million in coverage, as he might have done by purchasing excess or umbrella
coverage, and therefore he may not claim to benefit from $1.5 million in coverage
by stacking temporally distinct policies.
Although the triggering of multiple policies would provide multiple funding
sources and thereby have a considerable effect on any contribution claims be-
tween ICA and APIE, it cannot lead to the conclusion that Garcia's total coverage
for a "continuing" Claim Occurrence somehow exceeds the "Per Claim Occur-
rence" limit stated in every policy he purchased.
If a single occurrence triggers more than one policy, covering different policy
periods, then different limits may... appl[y] at different times. In such a case, the
insured's indemnity limits should be whatever limit applied at the single point in
time during the coverage periods of the triggered policies when the insured's limit
was highest. The insured is generally in the best position to identify the policy or
policies that would maximize coverage.'
Were concurrent primary and excess policies triggered, the Garcia court
concluded, those insurers should allocate the loss or potential loss
among themselves.'
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 848.
341. Id. at 849-50.
342. Id. at 849.
343. Id. at 853.
344. Id. at 853-54.
345. Id. at 854-55 (footnotes omitted).
346. Id. at 855.
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Absent the plaintiffs' ability to stack the various policies, APIE never
had a chance to settle the Cardenas suit within policy limits.' APIE
thus could not be liable for classic third-party bad faith.'
The Supreme Court of Louisiana examined interpolicy stacking, which
it termed "horizontal stacking," in Cole v. Celotex Corp.'m The Cole
plaintiffs were three former refinery workers who claimed damages at-
tributable to long-term asbestos exposure in their workplace.' The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were negligent in failing to provide
them with a safe workplace in every year from 1945 through 1976."
The jury agreed and awarded each plaintiff $300,000.m The defendants
were insured at all relevant times by the Insurance Company of North
America (INA).' INA's coverage during these years ranged from
$10,000 to $50,000 per accident and/or occurrence.'m
INA argued that only one policy limit should be available to satisfy the
plaintiffs' judgments."m Specifically, INA asserted, the plaintiffs should
be limited to the single highest applicable per accident or per occurrence
limits policy triggered.' The plaintiffs, conversely, argued that INA's
receipt of annual premiuns "refute[d] its attempt to telescope cover-
age." 7 The Cole court rejected INA's arguments and allowed the plain-
tiffs to horizontally stack the INA policies to permit full recovery.
The Cole court first reasoned that stacking was appropriate because of
its adoption of the "exposure" trigger theory.' In other words, INA's
coverage was triggered by the plaintiffs' mere exposure to asbestos dur-
ing each policy period.' The court observed that because the exposure
theory's effect is the distribution of losses over many years, it harmo-
nized nicely with the horizontal stacking of liability policies." Indeed,
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. 599 So. 2d 1058, 1060-61 (La 1992).
350. Id. at 1061.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. ItL
354. Id.
355. Id. at 1074.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 1078.
358. Id. at 1079-80.
359. Id. at 1079.
360. Id. at 1075 r51.
361. Id. at 1079.
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exposure theory represents a judicial attempt to parallel an insured's
potential tort liability with its insurers' coverage.' This benefits
insureds by keeping down liability insurance costs.M
Second, the Cole court found support for its decision to allow horizon-
tal stacking in "general principles of insurance law."m Without survey-
ing case law or comparing applications, the court casually accepted a
statement in a treatise proclaiming that claimants generally "may recover
under all available coverages provided there is no double recovery." "
Last, the court posited that the case before it might not even involve
stacking.' To support this hypothesis, the court analogized the instant
case to progressive loss cases involving multiple insurers.' The court
noted that where multiple insurers are involved, the cumulation of policy
limits is arguably necessary to ensure contribution among insurers.m
By spreading the plaintiffs' judgments over several INA policies, the
court was effectively "enforcing INA's contribution rights against it-
self."" However, the Cole court's final point makes little sense; after
all, INA's "rights against itself" exist only in the abstract
Although Cole is among the most recent interpolicy or horizontal
stacking decisions, it does not necessarily represent the majority view.
The leading exposure theory case is Insurance Co. of North America v.
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.,' in which the court refused to permit
interpolicy stacking through a single insurer issuing multiple policies."
In Forty-Eight, the Sixth Circuit recognized that the exposure theory
could lead to stacking problems and held that no insurer should be held
liable in any one case for amounts exceeding the highest single yearly
limit of each policy.'
Insureds should not be allowed to stack multiple -liability policies,
regardless of whether they are issued by a single insurer or by several
insurers. Insureds desiring greater coverage than might be available on a
primary basis are free to purchase excess or umbrella policies. To allow
insureds to stack policies is to treat insurers' obligations for catastrophic
or continuing injuries differently from their obligations for other losses.
362. Id.
363. See id.
364. Id. at 1080.
365. Id. (citations omitted).
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), clar(fled on rehg, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
371. Id. at 1226.
372. Id. at 1226 n.28.
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Courts should not rewrite policies to reflect this distinction. Moreover,
the fact that an occurrence spans several years does not change the fact
that it is but a single occurrence. For example, a doctor's continued
negligence over several years does not translate into more than one
claim of malpractice.m
VI. APPORTIONING DEFENSE COSTS BETWEEN OR AMONG CONCURRENT
PRIMARY INSURERS
A plaintiffs complaint or petition may trigger more than one concur-
rent insurer's duty to defend.' Given insurers' sensitivity to defense
costs, it is not surprising that concurrent insurers frequently seek con-
tribution toward defense costs just as they look to apportion their indem-
nity obligations.
373. See Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 641 N.E.2d 545, 548-49
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994); American Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842, 845,
853-55 (Tex 1994).
374. "Each case involving an insurer's promise to defend must be considered inde-
pendently. . . ." Simmons v. Farmers Ins. Group, 877 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah Ct. App.
1994). Generally, whether an insurer owes its insured a defense is determined by
comparing the allegations in the petition or complaint with the policy. See, e.g., Cin-
cinnati Ins. Co. v. Lee Anesthesia, 641 So. 2d 247, 249 (Ala 1994); Haines Contract-
ing, Inc. v. Georgia Ins. Co., 440 S.E.2d 738, 739 (Ga. CL App. 1994); Hawaiian Holi-
day Macadamia Nut Co. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 872 P.2d 230, 233 (Haw. 1994);
Dixon Distrib. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 641 N.E.2d 395, 398 (OI. 1994); Ottumwa
Housing Auth. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 495 N.W.2d 723, 726 (Iowa 1993);
Steptore v. Masco Constr. Co., 643 So. 2d 1213, 1218 (La. 1994); Baywood Corp. v.
Maine Bonding & Cas. Co., 628 A.2d 1029, 1030 (Me. 1993); Town of Ayer v. Imperial
Cas. & Indem. Co., 634 N.E.2d 571, 572 (Mass. 1994); Green Mountain Ins. Co. v.
Foreman, 641 A.2d 230, 232 (N.H. 1994); Lopez v. New Mexico Pub. Sch. Ins. Auth.,
870 P.2d 745, 747 (N.M. 1994); Ledford v. Gutosld, 877 P.2d 80, 82 (Or. 1994); Feder-
ated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Piedmont Pet Corp., 444 S.E.2d 532, 533 (S.C. CL App. 1994);
Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roffe, Inc., 872 P.2d 536, 538 (Wash. CL App. 1994); Reisig
v. Union Ins. Co., 870 P.2d 1066, 1068 (Wyo. 1994). If just one of several pleaded
theories is potentially covered the insurer must defend the entire suit, even if the
policy specifically excludes other alleged bases for recovery. See Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Freightliner Corp., 628 N.E.2d 325, 328 (11. App. Ct 1993); Treadway v. Vaughn, 633
So. 2d 626, 628 (La CL App. 1993), unit denied, 635 So. 2d 233 (La. 1994); Voorhees
v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1259 (NJ. 1992). Any doubts as to an
insurer's duty to defend must be resolved in the insured's favor. Horace Mann Ins
Co. v. Barbara B., 846 P.2d 792, 796 (Cal. 1993); Hart Constr. Co. v. American Family
Mut Ins Co., 514 N.W.2d 384, 389 (N.D. 1994); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Russo, 641 A.2d
1304, 1306 (R.L 1994); Clemons v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 879 S.W.2d 385, 392
(Tex CL App. 1994).
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An insurer that attempts to recover some portion of defense costs
from a concurrent carrier that did not assume its respective duty to de-
fend may have a difficult time. There is no contractual obligation be-
tween or among the insurers; all contractual duties or obligations flow
only to the insured. 8 Accordingly, a few courts do not allow concur-
rent primary insurers to recover their defense costs.'a As the Supreme
Court of South Carolina held in Sloan Construction Co. v. Central Na-
tional Insurance Co.:'
[Wlhere two companies insure the identical risk and both policies provide for fur-
nishing the insured with a defense, neither company, absent a contractual rela-
tionship, can require contribution from the other for expenses of the defense
where one denies liability and refuses to defend. The duty to defend is personal to
both insurers; neither is entitled to divide the duty."
If the minority approach explained in Sloan has some redeeming quality,
it is its encouragement of concurrent insurers to promptly resolve de-
fense issues by cooperative arrangement.'
A majority of jurisdictions hold that an insurer honoring its duty to
defend may obtain contribution from a concurrent insurer that breaches
its duty to defend their common insured.' The majority position
sounds in equity,"I and indeed is supported by fairness and logic. Be-
cause each primary insurer affording coverage has a duty to defend the
375. Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815, 850 (Ct. App.
1993) (citing American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 318 P.2d 84, 86 (Cal. CL
App. 1957)); Church Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 509 N.W.2d 274, 275 (S.D. 1993).
376. See Continental Cas. Co. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 637 So. 2d 270, 271-75 (Fla.
Dist. CL App.), review denied, 645 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1994).
377. 236 S.E.2d 818 (S.C. 1977).
378. Id. at 820.
379. See Jostens, Inc. v. Mission Ins. Co., 387 N.W.2d 161, 167 (Minn. 1986).
380. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 862 F.
Supp. 160, 163-65 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (applying Texas law); Uberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unit-
ed States Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 756 F. Supp. 953, 957 (S.D. Miss. 1990) (applying
Mississippi law); Continental Cas. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co., 883 P.2d 473, 475-76 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1994); Herrick Corp. v. Canadian Ins. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 844, 847-49 (Ct.
App. 1994); Sacharko v. Center Equities Ltd. Partnership, 479 A.2d 1219, 1224 (Conn.
App. C. 1984); Rentals Unlimited, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Ins. Co., 647 A.2d 1278,
1283-84 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1994), cert, denied, 651 A2d 854 (Md. 1995); Michigan
Educ. Employees Mut. Ins. Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co. of Am., 516 N.W.2d 93, 94-95
(Mich. CL App. 1994); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 592 A.2d
516, 517-18 (N.H. 1991); Avemco Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 513 A.2d 962,
966-67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Dlv. 1986); American Gen. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Progressive
Cas. Co., 799 P.2d 1113, 1118-19 (N.M. 1990); Continental Cas. Co. v. Rapid-American
Corp., 609 N.E.2d 506, 514 (N.Y. 1993); Unlsun Ins. Co. v. Hertz Rental Corp., 436
S.E.2d 182, 186 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993); Perez Trucking, Inc. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc.,
886 P.2d 196, 201 (Wash. CtL App. 1994).
381. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 520, 522
(CL App. 1994).
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insured, each should share in defense costs. Allowing a concurrent pri-
mary insurer to avoid contributing to its insured's defense only encourag-
es the breach of the insurer's duty to defend, as the carrier can thereby
reduce its expenses. Of course, and as is true with concurrent insurers'
indemnity obligations, an insurer's right to contribution is not automatic.
In other words, a concurrent insurer seeking contribution or reim-
bursement must make such a demand. Whatever obligation that might be
imposed on a non-participating insurer "[does] not accrue until that in-
surer [is] requested to participate on some basis.'
A defending insurer's equitable right to contribution does not attach if
a concurrent insurer also defends, but the complaining insurer defends
more vigorously or otherwise incurs greater costs. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Mutual Enumclaw Insurance Co.' illustrates this point.
Aetna involved a defamation claim against an attorney, Skip Smyser, and
a public opinion polling firm.' Smyser was insured under both his law
firm's business owner's policy with Aetna and his homeowner's policy
with Mutual of Enumclaw.' Both insurers honored their duty to defend
Smyser.' Aetna ultimately spent $30,522.04 for Smyser's defense, while
Mutual of Enumclaw spent only $5,220.00.' Aetna later sued Mutual of
Enumclaw in an effort to recover its defense costs.' The trial court re-
quired Mutual of Enumclaw to pay one-half of Smyser's total defense
costs, and the insurer appealed.'
The Aetna court recognized concurrent insurers' rights to contribution
or reimbursement of defense costs, but only where the target insurer
breaches its duty to defend.'m This distinction was critical, since Mutual
of Enumclaw "did not breach its duty to defend Smyser. ... "' The
court concluded that both insurers, "having fulfilled their duty to defend,
although adopting different strategy and tactics, shall pay for their own
defense costs." '
382. American Home Assur. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 558 A.2d 65, 69
(NJ. Super. Ct App. Div.), cert. denied, 569 A.2d 1334 (NJ. 1989).
383. 826 P.2d 1315 (Idaho 1992).
384. Id. at 1316.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 1317, 1319.
390. Id. at 1317-19.
391. Id. at 1319.
392. Id.
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With the great weight of authority supporting the apportionment of
defense costs among duty-bound primary insurers, the method or means
by which costs are shared becomes the critical issue. Unfortunately, a
majority rule cannot safely be stated. It is not unusual for courts in the
same jurisdiction, or for federal courts sitting in diversity cases, to apply
differing rules depending on the case. Some courts simply divide defense
costs equally between the insurers,' while others prorate defense costs
based on the total policy limits.' Defense costs may also be appor-
tioned in accordance with indemnity payments," an approach that en-
joys wide acceptance.
All three approaches to apportioning defense costs are somewhat arbi-
trary, but all are justifiable. The latter approach arguably best reflects
concurrent insurers' intent, since it tracks their respective indemnity
obligations. Courts should always attempt to give effect to the contract-
ing parties' intent Prorating defense costs by total policy limits recogniz-
es the basic principle that where an insurer's potential liability is greater
its interest in the litigation should be greater, and it should therefore
bear defense costs in proportion to its interest.' Finally, because
insurers' defense and indemnity obligations are separate and distinct, a
compelling argument can be made that defense costs should be borne
equally. After all, each insurer assumed an equal and unrelated duty to
defend.
The "other insurance" clauses in concurrent insurers' respective poli-
cies should have no bearing on the apportionment of defense costs.'
Of course, in certain circumstances an "other insurance" clause may
operate to remove an insurer from the coverage picture, thus severing its
duty to defend. The concurrent insurer with primary liability must then
393. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Executive Ins. Co., 893 F.2d 517, 520 (2d
Cir. 1990) (applying New York law); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 592 A.2d 515, 517-18 (N.H. 1991).
394. Continental Ins. Co. v. McKain, 821 F. Supp. 1084, 1090-93 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(applying Pennsylvania law), offd, 19 F.3d 642 (3d Cir. 1994); Avondale Indus., Inc. v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 774 F. Supp. 1416, 1436-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying New York
law); CNA Cas. of Cal. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 222 Cal. Rptr. 276, 289 (Ct. App. 1986);
Sacharko v. Center Equities Ltd. Partnership, 479 A.2d 1219, 1224 (Conn. App. Ct.
1984).
395. Columbia Cas. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 870 P.2d 1200, 1202
(Ariz. CL App. 1994).
396. See Federal Ins. Co. v. Cablevision Sys. Dev. Co., 662 F. Supp. 1537, 1540 n.5
(E.D.N.Y.), q0fd, 836 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1987).
397. Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 758 F. Supp. 1394, 1397
(D. Mont. 1991), qo'd, 981 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1992). But see State of N.Y. v. Blank,
27 F.3d 783, 798-99 (2d Cir. 1994); Employers Mut. Cos. v. Illinois Emcasco Ins. Co.,
570 N.E.2d 528, 530 (I1. App. Ct. 1991) (citing New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Certain
Underwriters at Uoyd's, London, 216 N.E.2d 665 (Il. 1966)).
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bear the entire burden of defense. Beyond such fundamentals, however,
"other insurance" clauses speak only to loss allocation. In the liability
insurance context, "losses" are either covered judgments or settlements
on the behalf of insureds. "Other insurance" clauses thus relate only to
insurers' indemnity obligations, and they do not even purport to address
the allocation or apportionment of defense costs.
VII. ALLOCATING LOSSES AND APPORTIONING DEFENSE CO AMONG OR
BETWEEN CONSECUTIVE INSURERS:
"MULTIPLE INSURANCE" PROBLEMS
As previously discussed, the problems posed when there is concurrent
coverage are often complex. Such difficulties pale in comparison to the
problems raised in cases involving progressive injuries or losses. Asbes-
tos-related disease claims, hazardous waste site litigation and a wide
range of other "toxic torts," as well as progressive property damage cas-
es, such as those involving earth movement and water leakage, have
spawned hopelessly confusing insurance coverage problems. "Other in-
surance" clauses do not operate where the subject policies are consecu-
tive rather than concurrent, depriving insurers and insureds alike of a
crucial tool for resolving coverage disputes. Courts are thus left to adopt
or embrace one of several equitable apportionment theories that have
emerged.
A. Coverage '"Tiggers"
Comprehensive general liability (CGL) policies cover bodily injury or
property damage caused by an "occurrence." Standard policies define an
"occurrence" as an "accident, including continuous or repeated exposure
to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.' In contin-
uing injury or progressive loss cases, there may be prolonged exposure
to the harmful condition, ultimately followed by manifestation of the
harm. The question then becomes, which consecutive policies were trig-
gered? The answer to this question is crucial, because each insurer
whose coverage is triggered is potentially liable for the loss up to its
398. See, e.g., Smartfoods, Inc. v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Co., 618 N.E.2d 1365,
1367 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993); Friendship Homes, Inc. 'v. American States Ins. Cos., 450
N.W.2d 778, 779 (N.D. 1990); Sanborn Plastics Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 616 N.E.2d 988, 993 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
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policy limits, as well as facing defense costs. Four predominant coverage
triggers have emerged: (1) the "exposure" theory;, (2) the "actual irjury"
or "injury in fact" theory; (3) the "manifestation" theory;, and (4) the
"continuous trigger" or "triple trigger" theory. Of course, liability policies
do not specify a "trigger." The term "trigger" merely describes the event
or events that determine whether an insurer must defend and/or indem-
nify its insured under a given policy.
1. The "Exposure" Trigger
The "exposure" theory of liability was crafted in asbestos litigation.
Asbestos-related diseases develop slowly over many years without detec-
tion; however, because scar tissue develops shortly after the inhalation
of asbestos fibers, courts employing exposure theory deem each expo-
sure (i.e., each deposit of asbestos fiber) to be a separate occurrence of
bodily injury in a continuing tort.' Exposure theory has moved beyond
asbestos litigation to general toxic torts and environmental litigation'
In short, the exposure theory results in CGL coverage being triggered
each time a person or property is exposed to the harmful condition dur-
ing a policy period. ' Regardless of when the injury actually occurs, it
is deemed to have occurred at the time of exposure." A worker's re-
peated inhalation of harmful vapors over a twenty year career thus may
trigger twenty CGL policies (assuming calendar year policy periods).
2. The "Actual Injury" or "Injury in Fact" Trigger
The "actual injury" or "injury in fact" trigger implicates those policies
in effect when the subject property damage or bodily injury actually
occurs,e even if it is not discovered during that policy period.' Ha-
399. Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 253 Cal. Rptr. 277, 281 (Ct. App. 1988);
Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co. of Haw., 875 P.2d 894, 914 (Haw. 1994); see, e.g.,
Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 595 A.2d 469, 478 (Md. 1991).
400. See, e.g., Village of Morrisville Water & Light Dept v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 775 F. Supp. 718, 730-31 (D. Vt 1991); Mapco Alaska Pet, Inc. v. Central
Nat'l Ins. Co., 795 F. Supp. 941, 948 (D. Alaska 1991); TBG, Inc. v. Commercial Union
Ins. Co., 806 F. Supp. 1444, 1452-53 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (wastewater discharge at hazard-
ous waste site).
401. Sentinel Insurance, 875 P.2d at 914; see also American Employers Ins. Co. v.
Pinkard Constr. Co., 806 P.2d 954, 956 (Colo. CL App. 1990), cert dismissed, 831
P.2d 887 (Colo. 1991) (applying exposure theory to progressive property damage un-
der CGL policy).
402. Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 858 F. Supp. 1407, 1419 (D.
MAnn. 1994).
403. Quaker State Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 868 F. Supp. 1278,
1300 (D. Utah 1994); SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut Ins. Co., 515 N.W.2d 588, 595 (Mlnn.
Ct App. 1994).
404. See Abex Corp. v. Maryland Can. Co., 790 F.2d 119, 121, 124-25 (D.C. Cir.
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wait adopted the injury in fact trigger for all standard CGL policies in
1994. The Supreme Court of Hawaii spoke for all jurisdictions that have
adopted this trigger when it held in Sentinel Insurance Co., Ltd. v. First
Insurance Co. of Hawaii, Ltd.:"s "[Tlhe injury-in-fact trigger is com-
pelled by the plain language of the policies, and it does not violate the
objectively reasonable expectations of the parties or relevant policy con-
siderations. " "
Where harm results from discrete, identifiable events, or where con-
tamination ceases prior to a particular policy's inception, the actual inju-
ry trigger limits coverage to the policy in effect when contaminants or
pollutants were first discharged. Harm persisting into subsequent policy
periods relates back to the initial policy period.' If harm results from
diverse causes over successive years, the date of actual injury may not
be limited to a single policy period."
3. The "Manifestation" Trigger
Those courts employing the "manifestation" trigger hold that bodily
injury or property damage occurs when a latent disease or defect mani-
fests itself. The policy in effect when the injury or damage is discovered,
or reasonably should be discovered, is thus triggered. The manifestation
trigger has been widely adopted." The manifestation trigger results in
1986); American Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 748 F.2d 760, 763 (2d
Cir. 1984); see, e.g., Cortland Pump & Equip., Inc. v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 604 N.Y.S.2d
633 (App. Dlv. 1993), appeal denied, 640 N.E.2d 147 (N.Y. 1994).
405. 875 P.2d 894 (Haw. 1994).
406. Id. at 915; see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. McCormick & Baxter
Creosoting Co., 870 P.2d 260, 264-65 (Or. CL App.), modified, 875 P.2d 437 (Or. 1994)
(discussing policy language).
407. See Boyce Thompson Inst. for Plant Research, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
751 F. Supp. 1137, 1142-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
40& Savoy Medical Supply Co. v. F & H Mfg. Corp., 776 F. Supp. 703, 709-10
(E.D.N.Y. 1991); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368, 1379-90 (E.D.N.Y.
1988) (Agent Orange claims); see also Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co. v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 609 A.2d 440, 455-56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (applying New York
law), cert. denied, 634 A.2d 528 (N.J. 1993).
409. See, e.g., Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 41 F.3d 429, 433-37 (9th Cir.
1994) (applying California law-property damage under liability policy); Mraz v. Cana-
dian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1328 (4th Cir. 1986) (Maryland law); Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 273 Cal. Rptr. 431, 432-34 (Ct. App. 1990);
Wrecking Corp. of Am., Va., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 574 A.2d 1348, 1350
(D.C. 1990); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 472 N.W.2d 5, 6-7 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1991) (formaldehyde gas exposure); Dorchester Dev. Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co.,
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the narrowest coverage because it assigns the risk to the policy period
when the harm was discovered or should have been discovered. Once
the subject injury or damage manifests itself, subsequent policies cannot
be triggered. The insurer on the risk at the time of manifestation bears
the entire loss. '°
4. The "Continuous Trigger' or "Triple Trigger' Theory
The broadest coverage is afforded by application of a "continuous
trigger" or "triple trigger." This theory was first expounded in Keene
Corp. v. Insurance of North America.' The continuous trigger theory
implicates all policies from the date of first exposure through manifesta-
tion. It is called the "triple trigger" or sometimes the "Keene triple trig-
ger" because it embraces the three other possible triggers: exposure,
actual injury, and manifestation. Like the manifestation trigger, the con-
tinuous trigger has been widely adopted. 2
The continuous trigger theory is often thought to best accommodate
the competing interests of insurers and insureds. As the court in Owens-
Illinois, Inc. v. United Insurance Co.41 observed in the progressive dis-
ease context: "[T]he continuous trigger theory best comports with what
medical science teaches and what common sense dictates, that a disease
begins with the onset of exposure and continues until the illness be-
comes manifest. It follows that insurance policies in place from exposure
to manifestation are implicated and afford coverage.""' The Owens-Ili-
nois court's reasoning translates easily to environmental claims, such as
those attributable to the discharge of pollutants over several years.
737 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tex Ct App. 1987).
410. Larkspur Isle Condominium Owners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 3, 5-6 (Ct. App. 1994); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. ILJ. Stickle Intl, 602
N.E.2d 353, 356 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991), cause dismissed, 584 N.E.2d 743 (Ohio 1992).
411. 667 F.2d 1034, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
412. See, e.g., New Castle County v. Continental Cas. Co. (CNA), 725 F. Supp. 800,
812-13 (D. DeL 1989) (Delaware law), afrd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. New Cas-
tie County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1991); Montrose
Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 5 CaL Rptr. 2d 358, 363-69 (Ct. App.), rtpew grant-
ed, 862 P.2d 661 (Cal. 1992); United States Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 643
N.E.2d 1226, 1256-57 (IlL App. Ct. 1994) (property damage under CGL policy); Owens-
Illinois Inc. v. United In Co., 650 A.2d 974, 995 (N.J. 1994); J.L France Refractories
Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 507 (Pa. 1993); see also Harford County v.
Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 610 A.2d 286, 294-95 (Md. 1992) (manifestation Is *not the sole
trigger of coverage n environmental pollution cases" when CGL policy at issue).
413. 625 A.2d 1 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1993), cert. denied, 639 A.2d 301 (NJ.
1994).
414. Id. at 26.
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B. Liability Insurance: Allocating Losses and Apportioning Defense
Costs
Different triggers may be applied to different types of injuries and
property damage.1 5 Additionally, losses spanning consecutive policy pe-
riods may not be confined to progressive disease cases (e.g., asbestos
litigation) and environmental hazards. For example, claims of child sexu-
al abuse and medical malpractice may implicate multiple policies. To the
limited extent possible, general guidelines for allocating losses and ap-
portioning defense costs must therefore be gleaned from a few illustra-
tive cases.
1. Exposure Trigger
In Gu(f Chemical & Metallurgical Corp. v. Associated Metals & Miner-
als Corp.,' the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined the appropri-
ate apportionment defense costs among a chemical manufacturer's five
insurers."" Some 5000 workers sued the manufacturer, alleging that ex-
posure to the latter's product, molyoxide, between 1946 and 1990 harmed
them."8 The Gulf Chemical court apportioned defense costs "according
to the time that each insurer accepted the risk of exposure to Gulfs
chemicals."4 19 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit explained that liability for
defense costs should be based on "(1) who sues Gulf (as opposed to who
recovers damages from Gulf); (2) the time period [of] alleged expo-
sure... ; and (3) the amount of effort required to defend Gulf .... "'
Because it could not determine the answers to these factors from the
existing record, the court ordered the insurers to bear the costs equal-
ly.421
Missouri adopted the exposure trigger in Continental Casualty Co. v.
Medical Protective Co.' In Continental Casualty, three malpractice
insurers sought declaratory judgment on the proper apportionment of a
415. Trustees of Tufts Univ. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 616 N.E.2d 68, 75 (Mass.
1993).
416. 1 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 1993).
417. Id. at 368. The chemical manufacturer appealed the district court's dismissal of
its claim against three insurers. Id.
418. Id. at 367.
419. Id. at 372.
420. Id. at 373.
421. Id.
422. 859 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
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settlement that the insurers paid on a dentist's behalf.' The plaintiff in
the underlying action alleged that the dentist "failed to exercise ordinary
skill and care throughout the course of her treatment," which spanned
some forty-eight office visits between 1965 and 1985.' Although none
of the insurers' policies ever overlapped, "[t]he trial court, focusing on
the 'other insurance' clauses contained in the policies..., ordered a pro
rata allocation of the loss based upon the total of policy limit exposure
of each company. " '
The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, first observing:
The provisions of liability insurance policies pertaining to the effect of other or
additional liability insurance coverage for the same loss relate to concurrent cov-
erage of a single occurrence. These policy provisions have no application to a loss
resulting from series of occurrences over a period of time involving consecutive
rather than concurrent insurance coverage.'
The court next observed that each of the insurers contracted to indem-
nify the dentist only for the period during which their respective policies
were in effect.' Accordingly, each insurer should not be held responsi-
ble for any actions of the insured prior or subsequent to the period of
their respective coverage.' Because the trial court's decision mandated
the opposite result, it was therefore erroneous. ' The unfairness of the
trial court's approach was most evident when the court considered that
"[tihe risk to which each insurer is exposed and the premium it re-
ceives... are related more to the time of exposure than to the amount
of coverage."'
The Continental Casualty court concluded that "[w]here a loss is
caused ... by a series of cumulative acts or omissions.... the fair meth-
od of apportioning the loss among consecutive insurers is by application
of the 'exposure theory.'"' The court then divided the settlement
among the insurers in amounts proportionate to the number of days that
each insurer was exposed to the risk.'
Finally, the court resolved the issue of defense cost apportionment. '
Because defense costs are an "inevitable concomitant of a claim for dam-
423. Id. at 790.
424. Id. at 790-91.
425. Id. at 791.
426. Id. (citations omitted).
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 792.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 793. The three insurers stipulated to the amount of $11,237.63 as a "rea-
sonable cost of defense." Id.
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ages," the court divided the amount in the same proportion that it divid-
ed the damage settlement'
2. Actual Injury Trigger
The Supreme Court of Minnesota recently allocated liability for proper-
ty damage under consecutive liability insurance policies in Northern
States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co." In. Northern States, the
groundwater was contaminated at two of the insured's coal-tar
gasification facilities." The insured argued that all of its consecutive
insurers were liable and that the "court should apportion liability" pro
rata according to the respective policy limits.' The court rejected this
argument, noting that the appropriate theory in Minnesota to determine
which consecutive policies have been triggered by an "occurrence" is the
"actual inury" or "injury-in-fact" theory.'
The essence of the actual injury trigger theory is that each insurer is held liable
for only those damages which occurred during its policy period; no insurer is held
liable for damages outside its policy period. Where the policy periods do not over-
lap, therefore, the insurers are consecutively, not concurrently, liable. A "pro rata
by limits" allocation method effectively makes those insurers with higher limits
liable for damages incurred outside their policy periods and is therefore inconsis-
tent with the actual injury trigger theory."
The court then addressed the actual allocation of damages based on this
theory.'
The Northern States court instructed the trial court to presume that
damages were continuous beginning from the first damage to the time
that damages were discovered or when cleanup occurred in those situa-
tions where damages span multiple policy periods."1 The court further
instructed that if an insurer claimed that no damage occurred during his
respective policy period, the court determined that the insurer main-
tained the burden of proof on that fact.'2
434. Id.
435. 523 N.W.2d 657, 658 (Minn. 1994).
436. Id. at 659.
437. Id. at 662.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id. at 664.
442. Id. The court noted that an insurer becomes liable only upon "at least one
[triggering] occurrence." Id.
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In the instant case, the court found that there was no feasible method
of determining when individual instances of pollution had occurred be-
cause the pollution was so continuous and repetitive.' This "one con-
tinuing occurrence" satisfied the requisite triggering occurrence for each
period of the applicable policy.' Therefore, the court concluded that
the proper method of allocating the total liability of the insurers was to
base it on the length of time that each insurer was on the risk.'" The
court explained its conclusion by example:
If... contamination occurred over a period of ten years, 1/10th of the damage
would be allocable to the period of time that a policy in force for one year was on
the risk and 3/10ths of the damage would be allocable to the period of time a
three-year policy was in force."
Because the insured had a self-insured retention under each of the
triggered policies, the court held that the insurer bore the loss up to its
retained limit under each triggered policy."7 The insurers then had to
pay for amounts that exceeded the insured's retained limit for each poli-
cy "up to the policy limit for one occurrence."'
Northern States is a curious decision because the court essentially
applied a continuous trigger even though it announced that it was apply-
ing an actual injury trigger. The court's de facto application of the contin-
uous trigger no doubt stemmed from its determination that there was but
a single continuing occurrence. Although the Northern States court's
approach is not erroneous, it is intellectually dishonest to label it as ac-
tual injury theory. The court should have just stated that the continuous
trigger applies to progressive losses, even though the actual injury trigger
is Minnesota's first choice or standard. In fact, this was the approach the
Hawaii Supreme Court took in Sentinel Insurance Co., Ltd. v. First In-
surance Co. of Hawaii.'
3. Continuous Trigger
Among the most recent asbestos cases is J.H. France Refractories Co.
v. Allstate Insurance Co.," in which the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
443. Id. (citing Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368, 1383-85 (E.D.N.Y.
1988)).
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. 875 P.2d 894, 917-19 (stating that "where inury-in-fact occurs continuously over
a period covered by different insurers or policies, and actual apportionment . . . is
difficult or impossible to determine, the continuous injury trigger may be employed"),
appeal granted, 879 P.2d 558 (Haw. 1994).
450. 626 A.2d 502 (Pa. 1993).
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vania approved the continuous trigger theory of liability."' Using this
theory, the court reversed the intermediate appellate court's decision to
prorate liability based on "the amount of time each policy was in ef-
fect."' The court gave four reasons for its decision. First, the language
of the policies required each insurer to "'pay... all sums which the In-
sured shall become legally obligated to pay'. . . not merely some pro rata
portion."' Second, medical evidence contradicts the notion that asbes-
tos-related disease progresses linearly.' Thus, it was logically inconsis-
tent to apportion liability on a linear basis.' Indeed, the court was un-
willing to apportion liability based on a fictitious policy with unascertain-
able terms and limits.' Finally, the insurers' policy defined "occur-
rence" to include "'continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which
result in bodily injury.'"' The court explained that this definition en-
tails liability for an entire loss because "additional exposure or injury...
at times other than when the insurer was on the risk" is irrelevant "once
the liability of a given insurer is triggered. "4a
Consistent with these reasons, the J.H. France Refractories court held
that each and every one of the insurers who maintained a policy during
the period of an asbestosis-related disease, or its evolution, is deemed a
primary insurer.' Additionally, the court allowed the insured to seek
indemnity from its choice or combination of policies and to turn to any
of the remaining insurers determined to be on the risk during the devel-
opment of the disease once the insured exhausted the limits of the other
policies.'
Finally, the court observed that its method for allocating loss affected
neither the insurers' rights to contribution nor the validity of "other in-
451. Id. at 507. The court called the continuous trigger theory the *multiple trigger"
theory. Id. at 506.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 508 (citing Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. 48 Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d
1212, 1214 (6th Cir. 1980) ("Asbestosis is a progressive disease .... And varies
greatly from person to person.")).
455. Id. Third, it is a "legal fiction" to find the insured was self-insured during peri-
ods that it was uninsured and that the court should therefore include it as one of
the insurers when the court apportions liability.
456. Id. (quoting Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1039, 1048-49
(D.C. Cir. 1981)).
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Id. at 508-09.
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surance" clauses."' Indeed, insurers remained free to seek reim-
bursement of "indemnification or defense costs ... under 'other
insurance' clauses or under the equitable doctrine of contribution.'
In Zurich Insurance Co. v. Transamerica Insurance Co.,' a Califor-
nia appellate court applied the continuous trigger to progressive property
damage claims made under third-party liability policies.' The Zurich
court rejected the manifestation trigger based on the definition of
"occurrence" in the third-party liability contexte' The court reasoned
that the manifestation trigger did not translate well to "a continuing se-
ries of loss causing events" that implicated liability coverages, even
though a court might appropriately apply it in the first-party property
insurance context.4
J.H. France Refractories and Zurich make clear that any insurer on a
risk in continuous trigger jurisdictions initially faces liability up to its
policy limits." Liability and defense costs must somehow be appor-
tioned later. Unfortunately, "other insurance" clauses do not assist in any
way because they apply only when there is concurrent coverage. If a
court is to allocate liability and defense costs, it will most likely prorate
based on purely equitable principles." The wild card, of course, is the
method of proration. A court might simply allocate a loss through contri-
bution by equal shares or straight contribution by limits, or a court might
create a hybrid mechanism, such as prorating based on policy limits
multiplied by years of coverage.
461. Id. at 509.
462. Id.
463. 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 913 (CL App. 1994).
464. Id. at 922.
465. Id. at 921.
466. Id. at 922.
467. See J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 508-09 (Pa.
1993).
468. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 913, 923 (Ct. App.
1994).
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C. A Single Occurrence v. Multiple Occurrences
When a loss spans several policy periods, insurers and insureds com-
monly question whether there is a single occurrence or multiple occur-
rences. Most courts have adopted the "causal approach" to determine
whether particular events constitute one occurrence or multiple occur-
rences for purposes of insurance liabUity.'s Under the causal approach,
so long as the injuries stem from one proximate cause there is a single
occurrence.'
°
The single occurrence versus multiple occurrences question may come
up in the context of environmental claims where pollutants are dis-
charged over a period of years. Alleged multiple occurrences also may be
an issue in medical malpractice cases where the plaintiff treats with the
allegedly negligent physician over several months or years."' The ques-
tion has recently and frequently been raised in disturbing cases of pedo-
philia 4 n
In Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. v. Archdiocese of Portland in Ore-
gon,' Interstate appealed the sunmary judgment granted to the Archdi-
ocese.474 Nine years earlier, Fred Grgich sued the Archdiocese. Grgich
asserted that he had been sexually molested from 1979 to 1983 by a
469. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 796 F. Supp. 929, 936-
37 (W.D. Va. 1992) (applying Virginia law); Arizona Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Fund v.
Helme, 735 P.2d 451, 456-57 (Ariz. 1987); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Olive's Sporting
Goods, Inc., 764 S.W.2d 596, 599 (Ark. 1989); Mason v. Home Ins. Co., 532 N.E.2d
526, 529 (IM. App. Ct. 1988), appeal denied, 537 N.E.2d 811 (IlL. 1989); Lander v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 614 So. 2d 1346, 1357 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Bish v. Guaranty
Nat'l Ins. Co., 848 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Nev. 1993); Doria v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 509
A.2d 220, 224 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986); Voigt v. Riesterer, 523 N.W.2d 133,
136-38 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
470. Bish, 848 P.2d at 1058.
471. See, e.g., Doe v. Illinois State Medical Inter-Ins. Exch., 599 N.E.2d 983, 989-91
(Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (I1. 1992); Insurance Corp. of Am. v.
Rubin, 818 P.2d 389 (Nev. 1991); National Chiropractic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 840
P.2d 732 (Or. CL App. 1992), review denied, 846 P.2d 1161 (Or. 1993).
472. See, e.g., Society of the Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Lafayette
and Lake Charles, Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 26 F.3d 1359, 1363-67 (5th Cir.),
reh'g denied, 29 F.3d 626 (1994); Lee v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 826 F. Supp.
1156, 1161-64 (E.D. Mo. 1993); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Elizabeth N., 12 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 327, 329-30 (Ct App. 1992); Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc.,
558 N.E.2d 958, 973-74 (Mass. 1990).
473. 35 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1994).
474. Id. at 1326.
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priest working for the Archdiocese.' Father Laughlin, the priest, sexu-
ally molested children for many years.'6 Laughlin's behavior was first
reported in 1979 and complaints continued to be reported every year
through 1983.' The Archdiocese and Laughlin settled the Grgich suit
for $500,000.Th
At all relevant times the Archdiocese maintained at least a $50,000 self-
insured retention (SIR).' A first layer of excess coverage was provided
by Underwriters at Lloyd's of London (Lloyd's), with a second layer ex-
cess policy provided by Interstate Fire & Casualty Company (Inter-
state).'8 Interstate incorporated Lloyd's terms by using "following form"
policies."' Interstate funded nearly $350,000 of the Grgich settle-
ment.' Interstate then sued the Archdiocese and Lloyd's for reimburse-
ment of all funds that it contributed to the settlement.' Interstate
maintained that each molestation of Grgich was a separate occur-
rence.' Alternatively, Interstate argued that each series of molestations
in a single policy period constituted a single occurrence.' Either way,
Grgich's claims triggered coverage in each policy year, therefore, the
Archdiocese's annual SIR's and the consecutive Lloyd's policies covered
the entire loss.'
The district court concluded that Laughlin's molestation of Grgich
during 1979-83 constituted a single occurrence.' In determining wheth-
er the single occurrence triggered one or more policies, the court applied
the "first encounter rule."I Because Grgich was first molested in 1979,
the court held that all claimed damages were covered under the policies
in effect in 1979.' Based on this theory the court did not allow Inter-
state reimbursement."' The Ninth Circuit reversed."
The Interstate Fire court reasoned that while the standard policy defi-
nition of "occurrence" provides that multiple exposures attributable to
475. Id
476. Id. at 1327.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 1327-28.
486. Id. at 1328.
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id. at 1331.
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the same general conditions constitute a single occurrence, the policy's
assuring clause made clear that this is true only of multiple exposures
during the policy period.' Accordingly, Grgich's exposure to Laughlin
in each of the four different policy periods constituted separate occur-
rences.4
The Archdiocese and Lloyd's argued that a finding of multiple occur-
rences would violate "the rule that an insurer cannot insure against a
loss that has already begun.' The court quickly disposed of this argu-
menti
By positing that the entire series of molestations constituted a single "loss," as
that term is used in the policies, this argument assumes what it seeks to prove.
Here, there is distinct loss in each policy period because... each policy covers
only damages arising from the molestations "happening during the period of Insur-
ance." As the Diocese of Lafayette court reasoned in directly analogous circum-
stances: "A subsequent molestation, occurring outside the policy period, is not a
consequential damage of the previous molestation; it is a new injury, with its own
resulting damages." Because the loss under any given policy includes only damag-
es stemming from molestations occurring within the policy period, and because
there were distinct acts and distinct damages requiring indemnification in each
policy period, this argument too must fail.*
In Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co.,' the parties
agreed that six reported incidents of pedophilia by one priest over a
period of eight years constituted "a single, continuing occurrence that
spanned eight one-year policy periods."' In Diocese of Winona, Aetna
insured the Diocese when the plaintiff was first molested." The other
two responsible insurers, Lloyd's and Interstate, argued that the damage
should be deemed to have occurred at the time of the plaintiffs first
encounter with the priest; thus, only Aetna's policy was triggered.'
Aetna argued that each consecutive policy covered only that portion of
the plaintiffs injury that occurred during the policy period, such that
"any damage award must be apportioned between the triggered poli-
cies."ms
492. Id. at 1329-30.
493. Id. at 1330.
494. Id.
495. Id. (citations omitted).
496. 858 F. Supp. 1407 (D. Minn. 1994).
497. Id. at 1414.
498. Id. at 1413.
499. Id. at 1414.
500. Id.
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The court rejected the argument that the majority of the plaintiffs
injuries stemmed from the first incidence of abuse."' Based on the facts
presented, the court found that the plaintiff continued to suffer addition-
al personal injury as long as he endured the priest's abuse." Because
the single occurrence spanned multiple policy periods, the court rea-
soned that the damage had to be allocated between the policy periods
according to when it happened.' The court allocated damages on a
monthly basis, since the priest abused the plaintiff during only parts of
the first and last policy periods.'0 Allocating damages on a monthly ba-
sis instead of an annual basis was said to be more than fair under the
circumstances.'
A different situation was presented in Washoe County v. Transconti-
nental Insurance Co.' The Washoe plaintiffs alleged that Washoe
County (the County) negligently licensed the Papoose Palace Day Care
Center (Papoose). A Papoose employee admittedly abused several
children between May 1980 and his arrest in April 1983.'
The County eventually paid out $406,000 to settle all the pending
lawsuits.' The County retained two insurers, Transcontinental Insur-
ance Company and Columbia Casualty Company, to cover claims exceed-
ing the County's $50,000 retained limit."0 When the carriers declined to
indemnify the County for its settlements with the Papoose claimants, the
County sued."'
The County argued that its liability stemmed from the single ongoing
act of improper conduct in the licensing process."2 The failure to ade-
quately investigate Papoose's qualifications led to dangerous conditions
for the children attending Papoose."' In short, the County argued that
all of the employee's acts of molestation constituted a single occur-
rence.'" The insurers contended that the injuries to each child consti-
tuted separate occurrences per policy period because additional liability
resulted each time a child was molested by a Papoose employee."'
501. Id. at 1421.
502. Id.
503. Id. at 1423.
504. Id.
505. Id. at 1424.
506. 878 P.2d 306 (Nev. 1994).
507. Id. at 307.
508. Id.
509. Id.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. Id.
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Thus, the carriers reasoned, the $50,000 injury limit had never been sur-
passed." The trial court sustained the insurers' summary judgment mo-
tion, concluding that the molestation of each child was a separate occur-
rence. 
7
The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the trial court."' The Washoe
court rejected the insurers' argument that the occurrence analysis neces-
sarily focused on the Papoose employee's conduct."" The court found
that an "occurrence" would be found under the "causal" approach only
when it could be linked to the liability of the defendant.' The court
held that negligence in the County's licensing of Papoose caused all the
acts of molestation." The court concluded that the County's negligence
in the licensing process, and its attendant investigation, constituted a
single occurrence.' As the case was remanded in favor of the County,
the carriers were obligated to indemnify the County for its settlements in
the Papoose litigation.=
D. The Special Problems of Property Insurance
First-party property insurance cases are materially different from third-
party liability cases. A property insurance policy is a contract under
which "the insurer agrees to indemnify the insured in the event the in-
sured property suffers a covered loss.'"' Coverage under the policy en-
compasses specific losses or "perils."' Property insurance policies con-
sider "perils" to be losses due to "fortuitous" forces, such as "lightning,
wind and explosion."' First party contract cases depend on whether
the policy explicitly or implicitly provides coverage for the claim.' In
contrast, coverage under a'liability policy is predicated on the tort law of
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. Id.
519. Id. at 308.
520. Id. at 310.
521. Id. at 308.
522. Id.
523. See id. at 311.
524. Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 710 (Cal. 1989) (quoting
Michael E. Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art of Policy Drafting: New Perils
for Property Insurers, 20 FORUM 385, 386-87 (1985)).
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. Id.
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negligence.' Thus, liability insurance policies cover more risks than
first-party policies.'m
The leading case on loss allocation in the first-party property context
is Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance v. Superior Court.' The
Prudential-LMI plaintiffs built an apartment complex in 1971 and in-
sured it successively with four different fire and property insurers over a
fifteen-year period."M Prudential insured the building from October 1977
to October 1980.1 The policy covered "all risks of direct physical loss,"
except for specific exclusions.'
Five years after the Prudential policy expired, the plaintiffs discovered
that a large fissure had damaged the foundation. They fileda claim one
month later.' The plaintiffs' insurance broker informed all four insur-
ance companies of the claim.' Prudential's investigation found that the
damage resulted from the stress of "expansive soil."' Nearly two years
after filing the claim, but before receiving a formal rejection, the plain-
tiffs sued the insurers on alternative theories of breach of contract, bad
faith, breach of fiduciary duties and negligence.'
Prudential moved for summary judgment, claiming plaintiff could not
prove that the loss occurred while Prudential insured the property.=
The trial court denied the insurer's motion.' Prudential then petitioned
the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the plaintiffs'
claim failed under the policy's provision that suits must be brought with-
in one year.' The Court of Appeal agreed that the plaintiffs' claims
were time-barred."' The property damage may have occurred over sev-
eral years, and that may have influenced the appellate court's deci-
sion.u2 The court reasoned that "because it is often difficult to detect
progressive property loss and such damage may occur over several poli-
cy periods without detection, equity demands an apportionment of dam-
ages between those insurers on the risk during the entire period of the
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. 798 P.2d 1230 (Cal. 1990).
531. Id. at 1233.
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. Id.
535. Id.
536. Id. at 1233-34.
537. Id. at 1234.
538. Id.
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Id. at 1235.
542. Id. at 1234-35.
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damage progressed."' The court's apportionment of liability was one of
the issues that the California Supreme Court was asked to review. "
The Court of Appeal had observed in dictum that the continuous trig-
ger approach to liability should be applied.' Because its policy period
ended five years before the plaintiffs discovered the damage, Prudential
contended that it should not be responsible for any portion of the
loss.' Prudential asserted that the "manifestation rule" of liability was
reasonable. ' Under this rule, the insurer at the time of the discovery of
a loss must pay the claim.'
The Prudential-LMI court agreed that the manifestation rule is appro-
priate in first-party claims because it provides a well-defined standard for
insurers and claimants.' Indeed, such a rule is in the public interest
because without it, insurers could contest every claim.0" As the court
explained:
[Pirlor to the manifestation of damage, the loss Is still a contingency under the
policy and the insured has not suffered a compensable loss. Once the loss is mani-
fested, however, the risk is no longer contingent; rather an event has occurred
that triggers indemnity unless such event is specifically excluded .... Corre-
spondingly, in conformity with the loss in progress rule, insurers whose policy
terms commence after initial manifestation of the loss are not responsible for any
potential claim relating to the previously discovered and manifested loss."
Using the time of manifestation of damage as a guide to liability satis-
fies an insured's reasonable expectations because his current insurance
company indemnifies his loss.' The manifestation rule also benefits
insurers because it clearly establishes the parameters of liability.' Ab-
sent manifestation, insurers cannot be liable after their policies ex-
pire.' Further, this predictability ultimately benefits insureds through
lower premiums. '
543. Id.
544. Id. at 1232.
545. Id. at 1242-43.
546. Id. at 1243.
547. Id.
548. Id,
549. Id. at 1246-47.
550, See id
551. Id. at 1246-47 (citations omitted).
552. Id. at 1247.
553. Id.
554. Id.
555. See id. at 1246.
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The Supreme Court of Nevada took up the issue of apportionment
among consecutive property insurers some two years later in Jackson v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.me In Jackson, ground movement grad-
ually damaged the plaintiff's house.T1 7 The court's first task was to de-
termine whether the damage occurred during State Farm's policy peri-
od.' The court observed that although State Farm continuously in-
sured the property, the coverage was renewed annually.' State Farm
argued that it was responsible for damage incurred only within the one-
year period of the policy.' ° The Jacksons contended that applying the
continuous exposure rule was fair, while State Farm argued for adoption
of the manifestation rule.'
The Jackson court adopted the manifestation rule, agreeing with the
Prudential-LMI court that this theory "promotes greater certainty in the
insurance industry" and benefits consumers because it contains insur-
ance costs and satisfies insureds' reasonable expectations.' In reject-
ing the continuous exposure approach, the court distinguished the exten-
sive harm of the asbestos cases from ordinary damage claims.' The
tremendous need and widespread damage of the asbestos cases requires
special consideration and does not affect the analysis of individual claims
of "progressive property loss."'
Phudential-LMI and Jackson should reflect the majority view. Under
the "known loss" or "loss in progress" rule,' an insurer may insure on-
ly against contingent or unknown risks.as An insurer cannot be liable
556. 835 P.2d 786 (Nev. 1992).
557. Id. at 787.
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. Id. at 788.
561. Id.
562. Id. at 789.
563. Id.
564. Id.
565. The "known loss" and "loss in progress" rules are not interchangeable. Howev-
er, "[t]he only apparent difference between the two is that the known loss rule oper-
ates where the loss has occurred before the policy period commences while the loss-
in-progress rule applies when the loss is imminent or still occurring when the policy
becomes effective." Sentinel Ins. Co. v. Fist Ins. Co. of Haw., Ltd., 875 P.2d 894, 919
(Haw. 1994), order on consideration, 879 P.2d 558 (Haw. 1994).
566. Inland Waters Pollution Control, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 997 F.2d
172, 177-78 (6th Cir. 1993); Continental Ins. Co. v. Beecham, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 1027,
1046 (D.NJ. 1993); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 913, 919
(CL App. 1994); Sentinel Ins. Co., 879 P.2d at 558 (Haw. 1994); Public Util. Dist. No.
1 of Klickltat County v. International Ins. Co., 881 P.2d 1020, 1030 (Wash. 1994); City
of Edgerton v. General Cas. Co., 493 N.W.2d 768, 786 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992), oqffd in
part, rev'd in part, 517 N.W.2d 463 (Wis. 1994). As the Supreme Court of Illinois ex-
plained in Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204
1446
[VoL 22: 1373, 1995] Issues in "Other Insurance"
PPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
where damages occur and are apparent before its policy takes effectS
The loss in progress rule corresponds naturally with the manifestation
theory in that both seek to fix a time of loss.' In contrast, the expo-
sure theory attempts to allocate a loss along a continuum.' The expo-
sure trigger is thus wholly inconsistent with the known loss rule, which
requires a specific reference point for any given loss. Indeed, the known
loss rule is a "fundamental principle" of insurance law that provides that
insurance is designed to only cover risks "'which are not definitely
known to the insured.'" ' The manifestation rule preserves this princi-
ple, but the exposure theory does not.
VIII. SEFF-INSURANCE
When prospective insureds are sufficiently large or sophisticated, and
particular levels or types of losses are predictable, potential losses be-
come a cost rather than a risk' Even if target losses are not totally
predictable, the prospective insured may be in a financial position to
bear some or all of the losses. Because risk transfer, such as purchasing
insurance, entails transactional costs, deliberate risk retention may offer
economic advantages.B' An individual's or entity's deliberate decision to
retain risk and forego insurance is known as "self-insurance. " ' For ex-
(IlL 1992):
By its very nature, insurance is fundamentally based on contingent risks
which may or may not occur .... If the insured knows or has reason to
know, when it purchases [an insurance] policy, that there is a substantial
probability that it will suffer or has already suffered a loss, the risk ceases
to be contingent and becomes a probable or known loss. Where the insured
has evidence of a probable loss when it purchases (an insurance] policy, the
loss is uninsurable under that policy (unless the parties otherwise contract)
because the "risk of liability is no longer unknown."
L at 1210 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
567. See, e.g., Outboard Marine Corp., 607 N.E.2d at 1210.
56& See Zurich, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 920.21 ("[T]he manifestation rule presupposes that
the first party insured will be on site to observe the damage; It is in the nature of
the discovery rule.").
569. See id. at 922. This theory is appropriate when there is "continuous and re-
peated exposure to a continuing series of loss-causing events" Id.
570. Sentinel, 875 P.2d at 919.
571. See Barker, supra note 3, at 352.
572. Id
573. Id. Packing Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir.
1987)). Insurance involves risk transfer and risk distribution. In Clougherty Packing
Co., the Ninth Circuit succinctly explained basic insurance theor.
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ample, when a corporation's "losses" are a "certainty,"' it may choose
to self-insure. In such a case, the corporation would pay damage claims
outright.
A. Self-Insurance Mechanisms or Schemes
"Self-insurance" can take many forms. Self-insurance mechanisms or
schemes include: true self-insurance, or pure risk retention; the purchase
of insurance with a self-insured retention; the purchase of fronting poli-
cies; and the purchase of policies with retrospective premiums.
1. True Self-Insurance
A corporation that truly self-insures retains all risks against which it
might otherwise insure. For example, a corporation that self-insures
instead of purchasing a CGL policy bears any judgments or settlements
connected to property damage or bodily injury claims, as well as all re-
lated loss adjustment expenses."m For these reasons, true self-insurance
is usually reserved for the largest and wealthiest corporations. Many
governmental entities, such as municipalities, counties and various se'r-
Shifting risk entails the transfer of the impact of a potential loss from the
insured to the insurer. If the insured has shifted its risk to the insurer, then
a loss by or a claim against the insured does not affect it because the loss
is offset by the proceeds of an insurance payment Distributing risk allows
the insurer to reduce the possibility that a single costly claim will exceed the
amount taken in as a premium and set aside for the payment of such a
claim. Insuring many independent risks in return for numerous premiums
serves to distribute risk. By assuming numerous relatively small, independent
risks that occur randomly over time, the insurer smoothes out losses to
match more closely its receipt of premiums. Risk distribution incorporates the
statistical phenomenon known as the law of large numbers. This law is re-
flected in the financial world by the diversification of investment portfolios
and in the day-to-day world by the adage "Don't put all your eggs in one
basket."
Clougherty Packing Co., 811 F. 2d at 1300 (citations omitted). Self-insurance includes
no like elements or theories. There are also purely practical differences between insur-
ance and self-insurance. For example, insurance premiums are deductible, while depos-
its into self-insurance reserves are not. Id.
674. Barker, supra note 3, at 352.
575. Loss adjustment expenses may be described as "allocated" or "unallocated."
Allocated loss adjustment expenses are those costs and expenses that can be allocat-
ed to a specific claim because they are incurred in its adjustment, appraisal, investi-
gation, settlement or defense. Examples include attorneys' fees and expenses,
investigators' or experts' fees and expenses, court costs, bonds, post-judgment inter-
est, etc. Unallocated loss expenses are attributable to the cost of operating and main-
taining a claims department. See Thomas R. Newman, Excess Liability Over Self-In-
sured Retentions, 44 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 127, 127 n.3 (1994).
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vice districts, also self-insure. Governmental entities often choose risk
retention because of the prohibitive cost of liability insurance for their
activities or operations, or because the purchase of liability insurance
operates as a waiver of sovereign or statutory immunity.
2. Self-Insured Retentions
A corporation may purchase liability insurance covering less than its
entire possible exposure and retain the remaining risk The dollar
amount of potential losses retained or borne by the corporation is re-
ferred to as its "self-insured retention," or "SIR." When an SIR is under
an excess or umbrella policy, it is commonly referred to as the "retained
liniit." 76
Although deductibles and SIR's may appear superficially analogous,
there are significant differences between the two. First, when an impli-
cated policy includes an SIR, the full policy limits are available once the
SIR has been satisfied. A deductible, on the other hand, is subtracted
from the policy limits, thereby reducing an insurer's indemnity obligation.
Second, should an insured with a deductible become insolvent, the insur-
er must satisfy the deductible as part of its obligation to pay losses up to
its limit of liability. With an SIR, the impact of the insured's insolvency
usually is felt by the claimant-not the insurer. The insured remains ob-
ligated to pay the amount of its SIR directly to the claimant, and the
insurer is liable only for that portion of the loss exceeding the SIR. Final-
ly, when a liability policy includes an SIR, the insured generally adjusts
claims, either directly or through a third-party administrator. With a de-
ductible, however, the insurer retains control of claims handling.
3. Fronting Policies
"Fronting" refers to the issuance of an insurance policy under which
the insured is left to administer all claims and agrees to reimburse the
insurer for all settlements or judgments paid. Fronting policies do not in-
demnify the insured, and they are usually issued to satisfy state financial
responsibility laws. Fronting policies satisfy state financial responsibility
laws by guaranteeing third parties that their claims against the insured
576. See, e.g., Coleman Co. v. California Union Ins. Co., 960 F.2d 1529, 1533 (10th
Cir. 1992); Kennerly v. State, 580 A.2d 561, 566 (DeL 1990); Columbia Caa Co. v. City
of Des Moines, 487 N.W.2d 663, 663 (Iowa 1992); Chase Resorts, Inc. v. Safety Mut.
Cas. Corp., 869 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
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will be paid. The insurer essentially functions as a surety relative to the
insured's ability to pay covered claims.6'
4. Retrospective Premiums
A risk may be insured under a policy with a retrospective premium
feature. In other words, premium cost is determined annually based on
the insured's losses in the previous year, or "claim experience."' Retro-
spectively-rated policies operate simply: the parties establish an annual
premium at the inception of coverage based on estimated losses for the
ensuing policy year. If the actual losses incurred during the policy period
are less than estimated, the insured receives a partial premium rebate. If
actual losses are greater than the insurer estimated, the insured is
charged an additional premium.7 The retrospective premium is a per-
centage of the losses, often coupled with some portion of defense costs
or a charge for claims administration. Retrospective premiums are com-
monly encountered in workers' compensation insurance policies.'s
B. Self-Insurance as 'Vifr Insurance"
1. Self-Insurers v. Insurers in the Liability Insurance Context
As self-insurance has increased in popularity, liability insurers have fre-
quently attempted to compel self-insureds to share indemnity obligations
pursuant to the "other insurance" clauses in the insurers' policies. The
question then becomes, do self-insurance mechanisms or schemes consti-
tute "other valid and collectible insurance"? Several jurisdictions hold
that where "self-insurance" is pure risk retention, an SIR, or participation
in some sort of governmental risk retention pool, self-insurance is not
"other insurance.""
577. See Columbia Cas. Co., 282 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
578. See National Sur. Corp. v. Fast Motor Serv., Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1083, 1085 (IL
App. Ct. 1991).
579. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Howard Elec. Co., 879 P.2d 431, 433 (Colo. Ct. App.
1994); Corrado Bros., Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 562 A.2d 1188, 1190 (Del. 1989);
Transit Cas. Co. v. Topeka Transp. Co., 663 P.2d 308, 309 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983); Port
E. Transfer, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 624 A.2d 520, 520-21 (Md. 1993).
580. See, e.g., Security Officers Serv., Inc. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 653 (Ct. App. 1993); Deerfield Plastics Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 536 N.E.2d
322 (Mass. 1989).
581. See St. John's Regional Health Ctr. v. American Cas. Co., 980 F.2d 1222, 1224-
26 (8th Cir. 1992) (Missouri law); Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. National Cas. Co.,
804 F. Supp. 768, 777 (E.D.N.C. 1992), ,ffd, 996 F.2d 1213 (4th Cir. 1993) (addressing
issue of first impression under North Carolina law); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.
v. Marriott Homes, Inc., 238 So. 2d 730, 732 (Ala. 1970); Hifllsborough County Hosp. &
Welfare Bd. v. Taylor, 546 So. 2d 1055, 1057-58 (FI. 1989); Ponder v. Fulton-DeKalb
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Wake County Hospital System, Inc. v. National Casualty Co.' is a
representative case. The plaintiffs in Wake County sued the hospital and
its employee, nurse Sharon Sarvey, for medical malpractice in connection
with Sarvey's neonatal care of an infant' The hospital had liability in-
surance with St. Paul Fire & Marine, with a $750,000 per person/per
event SIR and a $1,000,000 annual aggregate SIR.' Sarvey had a sepa-
rate policy with National Casualty that did not have a deductible.'
Sarvey's National Casualty policy included an excess "other insurance"
clause.' The suit was settled for less than the hospital's $750,000 per
event SIR, with National Casualty and the hospital funding the settle-
ment 7 The parties reserved their rights to litigate coverage issues.'
The hospital later sued National Casualty seeking a declaratory judgment
that Sarvey's policy with National Casualty was primary, and provided
exclusive coverage for the settlement
The hospital contended that its SIR did not constitute "other valid and
collectible insurance" as that phrase was used in Sarvey's policy with
National Casualty.m The hospital argued that National Casualty's "other
insurance" clause applied only to other insurance policies and not to its
SIR." The hospital further argued that its SIR was not insurance at all
because (1) the hospital received no preniums or payments; (2) a risk of
loss was never shifted; (3) the hospital was not in the business of insur-
Hosp. Auth., 353 S.E.2d 515, 517 (Ga.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 863 (1987); State v.
Continental Cas. Co., 879 P.2d 1111, 1114-18 (Idaho 1994); Aetna CEs. & Sur. Co. v.
James J. Benes & Assocs., Inc., 593 N.E.2d 1087, 1092-93 (I1. App. Ct.), appeal de-
nied, 602 N.E.2d 445 (111. 1992); Eakin v. Indiana Intergovernmental Risk MgL Auth.,
557 N.E.2d 1095, 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Morgan v. City of Ruleville, 627 So. 2d
275, 280-81 (Miss. 1993); American Nurses Ass'n v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 471 A.2d 66,
69-71 (NJ. Super. CL App. Dlv.), qLd in part, rev'd in part, 484 A.2d 670 (NJ.
1984); In re Mission Ins. Co., 816 P.2d 502, 505-06 (N.M. 1991); Cone Mills Corp. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 443 S.E.2d 357, 360-61 (N.C. CL App.) (adopting the Wake County
court's reasoning), review alowed, 448 S.E.2d 518 (N.C. 1994); Physicians Ins Co. v.
Grandview Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 542 N.E.2d 706, 707 (Ohio CL App. 1988); In re
Request for Opinion of Supreme Court, 379 N.W.2d 822, 827 (S.D. 1985); City of
Laramie v. Facer, 814 P.2d 268, 270-71 (Wyo. 1991).
582. Wake County, 804 F. Supp. 768.
583. Id. at 770-71.
584. Id. at 770.
585. Id.
586. Id.
587. Id.
588. Id.
589. Id.
590. Id.
ance; and (4) the hospital was not subject to the statutory requirements
imposed on ordinary insurers.'
National Casualty contended that the hospital had a contractual obliga-
tion to defend and indemnify Sarvey as a third-party beneficiary under its
St. Paul policy for claims up to $750,000. This contractual obligation
constituted "other insurance" for purposes of National Casualty's poli-
cy.' Essentially, National Casualty argued that because St. Paul had a
duty to defend and indemnify Sarvey for any claim in excess of $750,000,
the hospital had a similar obligation to Sarvey under the St. Paul policy
for any claim under $750,000 arising out of her employment. ' National
Casualty further argued that the hospital should not be allowed to shift a
risk that the hospital accepted and for which it received a benefit' In
other words, it would be inequitable to allow the hospital to saddle Na-
tional Casualty with a loss that the hospital promised to cover and for
which it received the economic benefit of reduced premiums.'
The Wake County court sustained the hospital's summary judgment
motion.' The court reasoned:
[T~he plain and ordinary meaning of the term "insurance" contemplates a written
contract-an insurance policy-issued by one individual or entity to compensate
another for loss in exchange for a premium .... [Ujnder a self-insurance scheme,
no written insurance policy is issued by another individual or entity nor is a pre-
mium paid because obviously a business which is self-insured does not need to
pay itself to protect against its own risk of loss.
National argues that [the hospital] was contractually obligated to defend and
indemnify Sarvey for claims up to $750,000, and that this contractual obligation
constitutes "other insurance.'... [WIhatever contractual obligation Wake had to
Sarvey, [it) does not fall within the plain and ordinary definition of insurance as
the term is used in National's policy. Wake did not issue an insurance policy to
Sarvey, nor did Sarvey pay a premium to Wake for any benefit or protection
against loss. Because Wake had a self-insured retention of $750,000, it was es-
sentially uninsured for that amount. As a result, Wake cannot be viewed as hav-
ing 'insurance," as that term is plainly and ordinarily used, since it had no
insurance for valid claims made which were under $750,000.
The general rule stated in Wake County may be inapplicable in the
automobile liability insurance context. State financial responsibility laws
making liability insurance compulsory, coupled with many corporations'
(especially car rental agencies) decisions to self-insure, have made delib-
591. Id. at 770-71.
592. Id. at 771.
593. Id
594. Id.
595. Id.
596. Id.
597. Id. at 775.
598. Id. (emphasis added).
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erate risk retention the "functional equivalent" of liability insurance.w
Pure self-insurance and SIR's are typically held to be "other valid and
collectible insurance" in the automobile liability contextas
In HiUegass v. Landwehr,"' plaintiff Donald Hillegass was injured
when his car collided with a car driven by defendant Gregory
Landwehr.' Landwehr was driving a Burlington Air Express (BAE)
company car.' At the time, BAE was self-insured up to $1,000,000 and
had a $2,000,000 umbrella policy with Protective Insurance Company.'
Landwehr had his own policy with Farmers Insurance Exchange.' The
trial court concluded that BAE's self-insurance was other valid and col-
lectible insurance within the meaning of Farmer's "other insurance"
clause and determined that BAE was primarily liable." BAE appealed
the trial court's entry of summary judgment.'
On appeal, BAE argued that because "insurance" involves the contrac-
tual shifting of risk in exchange for premiums, there necessarily must be
a third-party insurer to implicate an "other insurance" clause in a con-
current policy." The Hiegass court summarily rejected BAE's argu-
ment:
599. McClain v. Begley, 465 N.W.2d 680, 682 (Min. 1991); White v. Howard, 573
A.2d 513, 515 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert denied, 585 A.2d 354 (NJ. 1990).
600. See Clark v. DS Rentco, Inc., 854 P.2d 1219, 1220 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Grand
Rent A Car Corp. v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 31 Cal. Rplr. 2d 88, 91-95 (Ct. App. 1994);
Barnes v. Whitt, 852 P.2d 1322, 1325-26 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993); Stop & Shop Cos. v.
Gonzales, 619 K2d 896, 898-99 (Del. 1993); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Elassal, 512 N.W.2d
856, 858-59 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); McClain v. Begley, 465 N.W.2d 680, 682 (Minn.
1991); White v. Howard, 573 A.2d 513, 515-16 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert denied,
585 A.2d 354 (N.J. 1990); Gutman v. Worldwide Ins. Co., 630 A.2d 1263, 1265 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1993); Wright v. Smallwood, 419 S.E.2d 219, 220-21 (S.C. 1992); National
Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Bang, 516 N.W.2d 313, 319 (S.D. 1994); Hartford
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 796 S.W.2d 763, 769 (Tex. CL App.
1990); Hillegass v. Landwehr, 499 N.W.2d 652, 656-56 (Wis. 1993). Contr Budget
Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Taylor, 626 So. 2d 976, 978-79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993);
Hearty v. Harris, 574 So. 2d 1234, 1237-38 (La. 1991); Kyrkos v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 852 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Wash. 1993).
601. 499 N.W.2d 652 (Wis. 1993).
602. Id. at 653.
603. Id.
604. Id.
605. Id.
606. Id.
607. Id.
608. Id. at 654-55.
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We reject Burlington's attempt to impose an implicit contract requirement not
specified... and instead look to the nature of "self-insurance" in the instant
case .... Whereas contractual insurance policies involve a third-party insurer un-
derwriting the insured's risk in exchange for premium payments, self-insurers
retain their own risk in exchange for not paying premiums. The parties implicated
in the risk-shifting may change depending on the particular arrangement, but the
essence of the transaction remains the same: exchanging future liability for premi-
um payments. In the words of the [triall court- "self-insurance is just a form of
insurance... the modifying term 'self' just indicates where it emanates ....
In the instant case, Burlington Air Express chose to retain its own risk for the
first $1 million rather than pay premiums to a third-party insurer. In so deciding,
Burlington was able to exercise its business discretion in devising a scheme of
risk management that it considered most advantageous. A different company
might have reached a contrary conclusion and contracted for coverage with a
third-party insurer.'
The court also rejected BAE's argument on public policy grounds.1
The court chiefly embraced Farmers' argument that it would be "funda-
mentally unfair" and contrary to the legislative intent expressed in
Wisconsin's financial responsibility law "to permit companies such as
[BAE] to self-insure and thereby escape both the expense of premium
payments and the possibility of being held liable as [a] primary insur-
er."6-1
The HiUegass court concluded that "[t]he phrase 'other collectible
insurance' necessarily embraces all forms of insurance, including self-in-
surance." " The court did not address BAE's final argument that Farm-
ers might have drafted a more detailed "other insurance" clause, presum-
ably addressing self-insurance. 3
It is currently impossible to state a general rule governing the applica-
tion of "other insurance" clauses to self-insurance. While a number of
courts have held that pure risk retentions, SIR's and governmental risk
retention pools are not "insurance,""' the issue apparently remains un-
decided in many jurisdictions. In some instances controlling documents
for government risk retention pools and other self-insurance mechanisms
may so strongly resemble insurance policies that courts are compelled to
treat them accordingly."' Too few courts have spoken to declare safely
609. Id. at 655.
610. Id.
611. Id.
612. Id. at 656.
613. Id.
614. See, e.g., Waire v. Joseph, 825 S.W.2d 594, 596-97 (Ark. 1992); City of Gary v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 612 N.E.2d 115, 118-19 (Ind. 1993); Coltey v. New England TeL &
Tel. Co., 600 A.2d 940, 94142 (N.H. 1991); Blackwelder v. City of Winston-Salem, 420
S.E.2d 432, 435 (N.C. 1992); Ellis v. Rhode Island Pub. Transit Auth., 586 A.2d 1055,
1058 (R.I. 1991).
615. See, e.g., Strength v. Alabama Dept. of Fin., 622 So. 2d 1283, 1284-89 (Ala.
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a majority position. Coupled with that relative lack of precedent and the
need for fact-specific inquiry is the growing contrary position in the auto-
mobile liability context. While the automobile liability cases have been
decided in the shadow of financial responsibility laws, it would be impru-
dent to think that a doctrinal leap to CGL policies is out of the question.
For example, there is no reason to believe that Hillegass should be limit-
ed to automobile liability policies, or that it does not generally state Wis-
consin law. After all, the HiUegass court's broad statement that "[tlhe
phrase 'other collectible insurance' necessarily embraces all forms of
insurance, including self-insurance,"" is in no way restricted to auto-
mobile liability policies.
Retrospectively-rated policies present a simpler situation. The fact that
an insurer charges retrospective premiums does not alter the existence
of a concurrent policy. The same is true with fronting policies. While a
fronting policy may be more akin to a performance bond, and the front-
ing insurer more akin to a surety, such a policy is nonetheless "other
insurance."
What should the law be? The better reasoned position is to hold that
true self-insurance (i.e., pure risk retention) and SIR's are other valid and
collectible insurance within the meaning of an "other insurance" clause.
Self-insurance is the functional equivalent of a liability insurance policy.
Rather than paying premiums to an insurer to transfer risk, self-insureds
retain risk in exchange for lower premiums, or no premiums. In both
instances the transaction is the same: there is an exchange of potential
liability for premium payments. Self-insurance is but one side of the
same liability insurance coin. While there may be significant theoretical
differences between insurance and self-insurance, there are no practical
differences in the "other insurance" context.
Of course, from a competing insurer's perspective it is fundamentally
unfair to allow a self-insurer that should be primarily liable to escape
liability because it opts to retain its risk. To so hold is to accord self-
insurers the dual benefit of no or reduced premiums, and freedom from
liability. But the fairness argument does not work well when removed
from the automobile liability forum. The business world is not a level
playing field, and there is no factual or legal basis for an argument that
self-insurers should be required to sacrifice themselves for insurers' eco-
nomic benefit. Outside of financial responsibility laws, there is no public
1993).
616. Hilegass, 499 N.W.2d at 656.
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policy favoring self-insureds' primary liability. Moreover, insurers wishing
to reach self-insurers through their "other insurance" clauses need only
specifically address self-insurance and SIR's in those clauses."7 Insurers
that fail to limit their coverage when drafting policies run the risk that
courts will later construe provisions against them."1 8
2. Self-Insurance as "Other Insurance" for Purposes of Determining
Guaranty Fund Liability
Regardless of whether self-insurance constitutes "other insurance"
when attempting to allocate losses between self-insurers and liability
insurers, self-insurance may constitute "other valid and collectible" insur-
ance for purposes of state guaranty fund liability in the face of an
insurer's insolvency. R.J. Reynolds Co. v. California Insurance Guaran-
tee Ass'n"' is among the recent cases on the topic.
The R.J. Reynolds Company (Reynolds) hired Multi-Marketing, Inc.
(MMI) to manage a special marketing program, including a racing
tour.'m As part of the promotional contract, MMI agreed to provide lia-
bility insurance naming Reynolds as an additional insured for incidents
arising on the tour." MMI procured the required insurance from the
Mission Insurance Companies (Mission).' MMI was provided a 1993
Nissan pickup truck by Reynolds for MMI's use during the tour.'
Reynolds was insured under an Aetna commercial automobile liability
policy with retrospective premiums, while Nissan was insured under its
own policy with the Insurance Company of North America (INA).'
A passenger in the Nissan truck, Tami Hetke, was injured while the
truck was being driven by an MMI employee.' Hetke sued Reynolds,
MMI and Nissan." Reynolds tendered defense of the suit to Mission,
which accepted the tender." Thereafter, Mission was declared insol-
vent.' Mission's insolvency "triggered certain statutory obligations" of
617. See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. Transport Indem. Co., 192 Cal. Rptr. 207, 208-09 (Ct.
App. 1983); Edwards v. Saul, 637 So. 2d 1258, 1261 (La. Ct. App.), wr-it denied, 643
So. 2d 161 (La. 1994).
618. See Penalosa Co-op. Exch. v. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 1196, 1200
(Kan. Ct. App. 1990).
619. 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 405 (Ct. App. 1991).
620. Id. at 406.
621. Id.
622. Id.
623. Id.
624. Id.
626. Id.
626. Id.
627. Id.
628. Id.
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the California Insurance Guarantee Association (CIGA), including the
obligation to pay covered claims on policies with insolvent member in-
surers.' CIGA refused to take over Mission's obligation to defend
Reynolds and Nissan.' CIGA asserted that because both Reynolds and
Nissan had "other insurance" available to them, the Hetke suit was not a
covered claim.nl
With Mission insolvent, and CIGA refusing to defend, Aetna assumed
Reynolds' defense.' Aetna settled the case for $804,192.' Under the
terms of its retrospectively rated policy, Reynolds was obligated to pay
$200,000 of the loss in its next Aetna premium.' Faced with prospec-
tive liability of $200,000, Reynolds filed a declaratory relief action against
CIGA. Reynolds alleged that it was not insured for the first $200,000
*of the loss by virtue of its retrospectively rated policy and, thus, it was
entitled to reimbursement of this amount from CIGA.' The trial court
entered summary judgment in CIGA's favor, concluding that Reynolds'
retrospective Aetna policy was "other insurance" for CIGA's purposes.
The Reynolds court concluded that Reynolds' $200,000 obligation to
Aetna was not an SIR, but rather part of the premium payment Reynolds
had agreed to pay for its Aetna policy. Accordingly, Reynolds was fully
insured under its Aetna policy.' 7
Reynolds attempted to characterize its retrospective premium obliga-
tion as a plan whereby it paid a set premium and was then uninsured for
losses up to $200,000.m The Reynolds court rejected this argument as
"misleading.' Rather.
Ilt appears from the language of the policy that the $200,000, in the event of a
loss during the rating period exceeding that amount, is but one component of the
retrospective premium. Furthermore, REYNOLDS clearly elected to have the cost
of its insurance rated retrospectively, thereby obtaining a substantial discount on
the initial premium charged .... Had REYNOLDS contracted with AETNA to pay
a standard premium in exchange for more comprehensive coverage... during the
629. Id. at 406-407.
630. Id. at 407.
631. Id.
632. Id.
633. Id.
634. Id.
635. Id.
636. Id.
637. Id. at 409.
638. Id. at 410.
639. Id.
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policy period, CIGA would have no .duty to reimburse REYNOLDS for that premi-
um payment. We see no reason why a different result should obtain simply be-
cause REYNOLDS sought to minimize Its cost of insurance by choosing [a) retro-
spective rating plan."
A fronting arrangement was at issue in North Dakota Insurance Guar-
anty Ass'n v. Agway, Inc. ' Agway, an incorporated farm supply and
food marketing cooperative, formed a wholly-owned subsidiary insurer,
Agway Insurance Company (AIC). Agway was then insured by AIC under
a fronting policy. The Supreme Court of North Dakota rejected Agway's
argument that it was a self-insurer and indicated that what appeared to
be a premium paid to AIC was but a deposit in a self-insurance plan
coupled with AIC's fee for plan administration.' The court concluded
that the parties' conduct indicated a typical insurance transaction, and
that their conduct was wholly consistent with an insurance contract.'
The AIC fronting policy constituted "other insurance," thus absolving the
state guaranty fund of liability.-
There is appreciable authority for the contrary position; that is, self-
insurance is not "other insurance" for guaranty fund purposes. In Iowa
Contractors Workers' Compensation Group v. Iowa Insurance Guaranty
Ass'n, " the Supreme Court of Iowa concluded that a self-insured
workers' compensation group was not an insurer, and that its claims
were covered by Iowa's guaranty act.' The Supreme Court of Louisi-
ana held in Bowen v. General Motors Corp. ' that self-insurance "is not
the equivalent of an insurance policy."' Accordingly, the presence of a
self-insurer did not preclude the plaintiff's recovery from the Louisiana
Insurance Guaranty Association. The New Mexico supreme court reached
the same conclusion in In re Mission Insurance Co.' The self-insured
employer in In re Mission "did not assume the risk of another,'a and
its risk retention therefore did not constitute insurance within the mean-
ing of New Mexico's insurance guaranty act."' The absence of a third-
party arrangement transferring risk again proved determinative in Stamp
v. Department of Labor and Industries.' The Stamp court concluded
640. Id.
641. 462 N.W.2d 142 (N.D. 1990).
642. See id. at 144-46.
643. Id. at 145.
644. Id.
645. 437 N.W.2d 909 (Iowa 1989).
646. Id. at 915-18.
647. 608 So. 2d 999 (La. 1992).
648. Id. at 1003.
649. 816 P.2d 502 (N.M. 1991).
650. Id. at 505.
651. See id. at 505-06.
652. 859 P.2d 597 (Wash. 1993).
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that a self-insured workers' compensation plan did not constitute "other
insurance" for purposes of the Oregon guaranty act, or its nearly iden-
tical Washington counterpart.0
The results in Reynolds and Agway are not surprising. Regardless of
whether a policy features retrospective premiums or reflects a fronting
arrangement, it remains a policy of insurance. Courts' willingness to
shield conventional self-insurers is more curious, since state insurance
guaranty associations are insurers of last resort.' However, pure risk
retention and SIR's are not insurance, and they do not meet many guar-
anty acts' definitions of insurance.'
C. Existence, Scope and Extent of Coverage
Most coverage issues surrounding policies with SIR's are no different
from the coverage issues attending conventional CGL policies. Occasion-
ally, however, courts are called upon to resolve coverage issues unique
to policies with self-insurance mechanisms.
1. Fact v. Extent of Coverage
The umbrella policy at issue in Continental Casualty Co. v. Roper
Corp."8 contained two separate coverage provisions: Coverage
A-Excess Liability Indemnity and Coverage B-Excess Liability Indem-
nity Over Retained Limit. Coverage A indemnified the insured "for loss in
excess of the total applicable limits of liability of underlying insurance
stated in the schedule.""7 Coverage B indemnified the insured with re-
spect to any occurrence "not covered by underlying insurance, or with
respect to damages not covered by underlying insurance but which re-
sults from an occurrence covered by underlying insurance, for ultimate
653. Id. at 600-01.
654. I. Reynolds Co. v. California Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 405, 408 (Ct.
App. 1991); Scordill v. Smith, 635 So. 2d 407, 409 (La. CL App. 1994); Ventulett v.
Maine Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 583 A.2d 1022, 1024 (Me. 1990); Terminix Int'l Co. Ltd. Part-
nership v. Tennessee Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 845 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
655. But see South Carolina Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Carolinas Roofing &
Sheet Metal Contractors Self-Insurance Fund, 446 S.E.2d 422, 424-25 (S.C. 1994) (not-
ing self-insurance fund was "insurance," so it could not make claim against state
guaranty association).
656. 527 N.E.2d 998 (Il. App. CL 1988).
667. Id. at 999.
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net loss in excess of the insured's retained limit ... ."I The insured,
Roper Corporation (Roper), had a primary policy with Columbia Casual-
ty.' The Columbia primary policy had limits of $950,000 per occur-
rence with a $1,000,000 aggregate in excess of Roper's $50,000 per suit
SIR.0
Columbia's liability limits for the 1975-76 policy year were exhausted
while fifteen covered suits remained pending. Continental indemnified
Roper for settlements and verdicts in excess of its SIR in all but two of
the cases. One of those cases, Webster, became the subject of the deci-
sion.i
l
The Webster plaintiff made a $500,000 settlement demand. Continental
offered to contribute $50,000 toward settlement contingent upon Roper's
payment of its $50,000 SIR. Roper refused and the case went to trial. A
jury returned a $76,000 verdict against Roper, which Roper appealed on
the issue of liability only.' While the appeal was pending the Webster
plaintiff offered to settle for $70,000, with $50,000 coming in the form of
Roper's SIR and $20,000 being paid by Continental. Roper refused and
prevailed on appeal, winning a new trial on liability and damages.'
Continental again asked Roper to settle the case within its SIR, or to
send the $50,000 to Continental and it would settle the case. Roper re-
fused Continental's demand and the plaintiff increased his demand from
$70,000 to $183,000. Roper took the case to trial, and the jury returned a
$214,000 verdict for the plaintiff.'
Roper then offered its $50,000 SIR to Continental, while vowing to
appeal. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. Roper then demanded that
Continental satisfy the $214,000 judgment plus post-judgment interest.
Continental responded by sending Roper a $20,000 check. Continental
took the position that Roper had needlessly exposed it to greater risk by
trying the case when it could have been settled for $70,000. Accordingly,
Roper was only entitled to the difference between its SIR and the reason-
able settlement that Continental favored.w
Roper asserted that Continental "had the obligation and the opportuni-
ty to settle the case for $70,000.1 In a declaratory judgment action,
Roper contended that Continental's obligations were governed by Cover-
658. Id. at 999-1000.
659. Id. at 1000.
660. Id.
661. Id.
662. Id.
663. Id.
664. Id.
665. Id. at 1000-01.
666. Id. at 1001.
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age B. 7 Coverage B in the policy indemnified Roper in connection with
occurrences or damages "not covered" by underlying insurance.' Rop-
er reasoned that because its primary Columbia policy was spent, the
Webster claim was "not covered" and Coverage B applied." Continental
maintained that Coverage A and Coverage B sections of the policy were
mutually exclusive. 70 According to Continental, Coverage A only
"pick[ed] up indemnity obligations" when primary insurance is depleted,
i.e., it afforded Roper true excess coverage." By comparison, Coverage
B picked up "risks [and] damages not covered by underlying
insurance."' Continental offered hypothetically that if underlying insur-
ance did not cover punitive damages, its Coverage B umbrella would pay
those damages.'
"[Tihe trial court focused on the meaning of the phrase 'not covered
by underlying insurance'" in Coverage B.' The court "concluded that
the word 'coverage' means the sum of risks that an insurance policy cov-
ers."' Therefore, because the Webster suit fell within "the underlying
Columbia policy, Coverage A of the Policy applied when Columbia's
coverage was exhausted."'6 In other words, the trial court accepted
Continental's argument "that the words 'coverage' or 'covered' refer to
risks assumed, not ability to pay."6'
The appellate court reasoned that only very specific risks were as-
sumed by Continental under Coverage B: (1) "the risk that a certain oc-
currence will take place" for which there was no underlying coverage, or
(2) the risk of some type of damage award that the underlying insurer
did not cover.' Columbia assumed the risk embodied in the Webster
claim and the attendant damages and they were thus "covered," even
though Columbia did not pay them because its policy was exhausted.
In short:
667. 1l
668. Id.
669. Id.
670. Id.
671. Id.
672. Id.
673. Id.
674. Id. at 1001-02.
675. Id. at 1002.
676. Id. at 1001-02.
677. Id. at 1003.
678. Id.
679. Id.
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[T]he phrase "not covered" as it appears in the Coverage B provision of the policy
refers to the fact of coveage, not to the extent of coverage. Thus, in those circum-
stances, such as in Webster, where Columbia's underlying policy has assumed the
risk of the occurrence and the risk of the damages at issue, coverage exists. When
the extent of underlying coverage is exhausted, Coverage A, as an excess policy,
picks up the liability.'
Therefore, Continental fully performed its obligations under Coverage
A by tendering the $20,000 difference between the plaintiffs settlement
demand and Roper's SIR." The Roper court affirmed the trial court's
judgment for Continental.'
2. Scope of Coverage
In United States Elevator Corp. v. Associated International Insurance
Co.,' United States Elevator Corporation (USEC) had consecutive pri-
mary liability policies with Insurance Company of North America
(INA).' The INA policies had deductibles equalling their policy limits,
so they were straight fronting and claims administration arrange-
ments.' The policy limits were usually $500,000 per occurrence, but
the products and completed operations hazards had a $500,000 annual
aggregate limit. 0
USEC also had conventional excess insurance with Associated Interna-
tional Insurance Co. (Associated).' "The Associated policies extended
coverage to USEC for any losses or damages arising out of a single oc-
currence... which exceeded $500,000," i.e., the INA policy limits.'
The Associated policies also covered USEC for all losses "defined under
the aggregate limit of the INA policy in excess of $500,000.' Associat-
ed knew INA's deductible limits when it issued its policies.'u
USEC faced a number of suits alleging that its elevators were defective
(termed "products cases"), or claims and suits alleging negligent
maintenance and service of elevators (referred to as "service cases")."
Both parties agreed that the products cases were subject to the $500,000
680. Id. (emphasis added).
681. Id. at 1004-1005.
682. Id. at 1005.
683. 263 Cal. Rptr. 760 (Ct App. 1989).
684. Id. at 761.
685. Id. at 762.
686. Id. at 761.
687. Id. at 762.
688. Id.
689. Id.
690. Id.
691. Id at 763.
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aggregate limit of the INA policies.' Associated would thus become
responsible once total claims exceeded $500,000.' The dispute hinged
on the service cases.m Associated contended that service claims were
not subject to the $500,000 annual aggregate limit.' Thus, INA (and
USEC) were wholly liable unless a single service claim exceeded
$500,000, which none did
In defining the completed operations hazard, INA excluded certain
operations that its manual classified as having completed operations
coverage included in premises liability coverage.' The latter coverage
arguably included USEC's elevator and service operations." To the ex-
tent the somewhat obscure premises-completed operations provision ap-
plied, it operated to remove completed operations hazards from INA's ag-
gregate limit, dramatically increasing USEC's liability under its INA front-
ing policies."
USEC argued that the trial court should construe the ambiguous INA
policies in its favor.' USEC correctly reasoned that construing the am-
biguous policies against the insurer, thus placing the completed opera-
tions hazard and the related service cases under the INA aggregate,
would maximize its coverage by triggering Associated's excess cover-
age."' The trial court adopted USEC's position.'
The California Court of Appeal reversed.' The normal construction
of an ambiguous insurance policy against the drafter (INA) would work
to USEC's detriment given the nature of the policies.' Paradoxically,
USEC could recover against Associated only if the court reversed normal
rules of contract interpretation. USEC wanted the subject ambiguity
construed in the drqfter's favor.'" Unwilling to abandon traditional con-
692. Id.
693. Id. at 762.
694. Id. at 763.
695. Id.
696. Id.
697. Id. at 764.
698. Id. at 764-65.
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704. Id. at 765-66.
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tract principles, the court construed the INA policies against INA--and
thus against USEC.- Simply stated, the United States Elevator court
was unwilling to stand contracts law on its head.
The court's adherence to basic rules of construction "require[d] that
the services claims.., be indemnified under the occurrence coverage"
instead of the "aggregate coverage," the former coverage providing USEC
the "broader benefit."' USEC's "broader benefit" was only illusory, of
course, having been wiped out in reality by the purchase or fronting
policies.'
In Ford Motor Co. v. Northbrook Insurance Co., 71 the issue was
whether Ford's $2,000,000 per occurrence SIR constituted "underlying
insurances" within the meaning of Northbrook's first layer excess poli-
cy.711 If it did, the punitive damages exclusion operated to shield the
upper layer excess carriers whose policies followed form."' If not, the
excess carriers were faced with at least $12,000,000 in liability for puni-
tive damages awarded in two cases."3 The insurers contended that
"self-insurance" was not "insurance," a position with which both the dis-
trict and appellate courts disagreed."'
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the applicable policy exclusion could
be read as treating Ford's SIR as underlying insurance."5 Second, Ford's
SIR was set out in the schedule of underlying insurance in Northbrook's
first-layer excess policy."' Finally, the "manifest purpose" of the subject
exclusion was to prevent Northbrook from being required to drop down
into the position of a primary insurer.7 It therefore made no difference
"whether the initial exposure was covered by self-insurance or a conven-
tional policy of insurance, so long as the exposure was covered.""8
The practical construction adopted by the parties, who treated Ford's
SIR as underlying insurance for purposes of the policy's limits of liability
provisions, bolstered the Ford Motor court's reading of the exclusion. 9
707. Id.
708. Id.
709. Id. at 761-66.
710. 838 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying Michigan law).
711. Id at 831-32.
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There was also abundant extrinsic evidence that Ford's SIR was to be
treated as underlying insurance.'
IX. CONCLUSION
Courts and litigants have long been perplexed by "other insurance"
issues. The circular riddle posed by conflicting "other insurance" clauses
continues to be studied today. Even the straightforward, established
conflict rules are often muddled by confusing policy language and com-
plex facts. The attempted allocation of defense costs, the apportionment
of losses over consecutive policies, and the continued development of
self-insurance mechanisms or schemes only add to existing coverage
confusion. Unfortunately, there are seldom easy answers or simple solu-
tions to "other insurance," multiple insurance, and self-insurance prob-
lems. Courts in the same jurisdiction sometimes reach different conclu-
sions on the same or substantially similar issues. In this "dimly lit under-
world where many have lost their way,""' this Article hopes to shed
some light.
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